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Figure 1.

Sao Paulo, Brazil.
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Figure 2.

Urban Sao Pauio.
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generosity that we may here attempt to demystify the
concept of '’middle class" and see real people.
It would have been foolish to attempt to disguise
Santana under a pseudonym.

All names of individuals in

the thesis, however, are pseudonyms, and wherever
possible, the individuals described are composite distill
ates of many interviews with many people.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this work is to describe the
lives and careers of a number of middle class families
residing in the neighborhood of Santana, Sao Paulo city,
Brazil* The research was undertaken in order to evaluate
the assumption common to many writers that the middle class
plays a "vital'* or "decisive" role in the political and
economic evolution of developing countries.
A background assumption of the study is that
changes in a nation’s political and class structure reflect
the nation’s position in a changing world economy.^

This

means that an historical perspective is necessary to
account for the variety of economic and political forces
which may affect the formation of a middle class— that is,

*An example of this prirciple is to be found in
Wallerstein's (1972) description - ? developments in Poland
and England during the 15th and loth centuries.
Both had
"defeudalized" during the 14th century population decline,
and both had relatively similar class structures. England,
however, developed multiple economic activities and an indus
trial base directed by a capitalist class involved in sheep
raising, farming and industry. England developed a middle
level of "intermediaries" for these activities. Poland, on
the other hand, entered the world market as an exporter of
wheat and so "refeudalized" its economy and developed the
kind of capitalist class associated with latifundia econo
mies. Poland destroyed its intermediaries. It became a
neocolonial state, with its surplus drained abroad through
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a group which is discrete from both a lower working class
2
and an upper ruling class --and its eventual role in the
development process.

Therefore, the method employed here

is the display of family histories and careers against the
backdrop of Sao Paulo and Brazil’s political and economic
development over the past seventy years. I shall explore
periods during which people from middle income sectors
could have played the decisive roles attributed them by a
number of social scientists, and attempt to gauge their
actual influence during these periods.
The results of this study show first, that it is
not useful to consider the role of middle classes in deve
loping nations without precise reference to the urban, na
tional and international systems which determine the forma
tion, position and opportunities of specific middle classes.
The histories of the families studied suggest that until
recently there was no middle class in Sao Paulo: the va»
rious middle income groups which m a y now be said to compose
a middle class in that city were often "created," that is,
defined (or redefined) in their social positions by politi
cal forces over which they had no control.

the kind of international debt peonage familiar to students
of Latin American development (See also Frank, 1969; Cardo
so and Falleto, 1970; lanni, 1970; Wallerstein, 1974).
^See below, pp.25-28 , for the way in which the
terms "class," "middle class" and "middle sectors" are
being used in this thesis.
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Second, because Che formation of middle income
groups and a middle class reflect shifting political and
economic forces, the roles of middle income people in the
development process shift as well, and their political and
economic influence has had specific limitations over time.
Third, the middle class families studied have had less di
rect influence in the economic and political development of
Sao Paulo than many writers might suppose.

The research

shows that families like these were never close to top level
power, but that periodically different groups among them
have been included in different ways at intermediate levels
of power.

Over the past fifty years, in fact, these fami

lies have been progressively marginalized from spheres of
power as well as from strategic economic resources.
Before exploring these conclusions further, this
chapter will first discuss the literature on middle classes
in the development process of Latin America and describe
the assumptions about
used in this study.

class

and

middle class

which were

It will close with a brief discussion

of the neighborhood and population studied.
The importance of the role of the middle class has
been most strongly asserted by authors using modernization
models.

The concern with modernization grew together with

the development of the Gold War and the emergence of the
United States as a major economic and political power in
search of new markets for its output in the nonindustrial
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countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

In spite of

all-inclusive assertions that "modernization is . . . a
multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of
human thought and activity" (Huntington, cited in Tipps,
1973:200),** the causal agent for modernization was seen
as "economic take off" (Rostow, 1960). For many writers
it was the economy which was seen as the independent vari
able to which the political and all other systems had to
adapt (Apter,

1965:460; Lerner, 1958:401; Rostow,

1962:316;

La Palombara and Weiner, 1966:20; Anderson, 1967:iii, 369).
In order to understand the take off process, modernization
theorists turned to the European pattern of development
for insights into the conditions of change in the nonindus4
trial countries of the twentieth century.
Part of the pattern included the alleged economic
dynamism of European middle classes to which Weber had

Cf. Tipps (1973:200): "The concept tends to be a
summarizing one rather than a discriminating one, as every
effort is made to specify its meaning in terms which are
sufficiently general to avoid excluding any of the possible
ramifications of this "multifaceted process." Attempts at
definition are aimed more at telling us what modernization
is (or might be) rather than what it is not."
^Cf. Tipps (1973:201): "The influence of . . . r e 
ceived traditions is particularly evident in the case of
Modernization theory.
Though their terminology may be
somewhat novel, the manner in which modernization theorists
tend to approach the study of social change in Non Western
societies is deeply rooted in the perspective of develop
mental ism which was already firmly established in the con
ventional wisdom of Western social science well before the
end of the 19th century."
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alluded in The Protestant Ethic.and the Spirit: of Capita*
lism."*

Because it was assumed^ that the nonindustrial

countries would have development patterns similar to
European patterns, the “role of the middle class11 became,
as Stepan (1965:87) has noted, an "independent variable
associated with modernization."^

5Cf. Weber (1965:65): "We shall see that at the
beginning of modern times, it was by no means the capita^
listic entrepreneurs of the commercial aristocracy who
were either the sole or the predominant bearers of the
attitude we have called here the spirit of capitalism.
It
was much more the rising strata of the lower industrial
middle classes. Even in the 19th century its classical re
presentatives were not the elegant gentlemen from Liverpool
and Hamburg with their commercial fortunes handed down for
generations, but the self made parvenus of Manchester and
Westphalia who often rose from very modest circumstances.
As early as the 16th century the situation was similar.
The industries which arose at that time were mostly created
by parvenus."
6The assumption was by no means universal, even
among economists. See Gerschenkron, (1970) and Fishlow
(1970).
strong tendency to idealize the role of the
middle class in Western development was already present
in American sociology.
See for example Corbin (1922:88):
"Alone among the classes, the middle class has consistently
been praised: it has been conscious of its might and asser
tive of its right. Aristotle observed that the chief power
of the state may most wisely be entrusted to it. As leader
of a newly risen middle class Pericles crowned the great
age of Hellenic history, building the Parthenon, in Rome
the middle class gave the blood that conquered the ancient
world, the brain that laid the foundation of all law.
When the lamp of antiquity flickered out in the Dark Ages,
it was the middle class that led mankind forward to the
new day. It was the middle class protestant who brought the
conscience of the world to bear upon the life of the spirit.
When England set its constitution above the King, when the
American colonies established the people as the origin of
ail justice, when France built up the foremost European
republic, it was always the middle class in whom the move-
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The emergence of Latin American middle classes
was expected to increase economic dynamism and stimulate
political development, very much as the emergence of the
European middle classes was thought to have done.

Thus,

the American sociologist, John Johnson, held that one of
the most profound developments in Latin America
was the emergence of urban middle sectors as an
aggressive political force . . . urban middle groups
are vitally, if not decisively important in an
area where one still commonly hears and reads
that "there is no middle class to speak of" (1958:
2,vii; see also Ratinoff, 1967:61).
According to the American sociologist, Seymour Lipset,
the growing middle class in these countries /Latin
America./, like its 19th century counterpart supports
a democratic society by attempting to reduce the
influence of the anticapitalist traditionalists and
the arbitrary power of the military (1960:138).°
However, a few social scientists who undertook
research among middle income sectors in Latin America
were baffled at the social picture
countries.

presented in these

Thus, Lowry Nelson (1950:47), writing on Cuban

ment began and ended.
The institutions of civil liberty
are the creation not of the proletariat, nor yet of the
capitalists, but of those who are neither rich nor poor
. . . the middle class is distinguished above all others
for its political independence, its caution, its solid
practical intelligence, its steady industry, its high
moral average . . . " (See also Corey, 1935:13).
8See also Segovia (1950:35-40), Bouchereau (1950:6),
Palza (1950:15), Vega (1950:91). For country by country
analyses, see Johnson (1958).
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middle income sectors expressed the sense that society had
not yet "set or jelled" in the expected way. Other writers
with similar experiences in Latin America concluded that
in these countries the middle class had not yet taken up
their ^real role of mediator in the phenomenon of the class
struggle" (Carvajal, 1950:38. See also Dupouy, 1950). Latin
American countries were simply not developing economically
or politically according to the presumed model.
Explanations for this failure were sought first in
local culture and then in the area of psychological predis
position. Among those who concluded that Latin American
resistance to modernization was cultural in origin (Gillin,
1965; Rosen 1962, 1964; Greenfield,

1969; Greenfield and

Barros, 1965), Frank Bonilla found Latin American culture
"disappointing" --as measured by the number of Nobel Prize
winners and canonized saints (sic. Bonilla,1967:240,239).
Other writers did not go so far in their disapproval; Lipset
wrote
The relative failure of Latin American countries to
develop on a scale comparable to those of North
America has been seen in some part as a consequence
of variations in the value systems dominating these
two areas (1967:4).
Yet other writers pushed the chain of causality
further away from economics and introduced an element of
circularity in the argument by focusing on people's psyches.
Drawing on McClelland's research (1953; cf. also Hagen,
1962), some writers postulated that certain ideological or
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psychological prerequisites must exist among critical groups
before economic growth can take place (eg. Lipset, 1967:3-4).
These groups appear in the literature variously under the
names of “the middle class," a “new middle class" or “new
elites," who are expected to generate the economic growth

9
necessary for modernization.

Yet it is frequently left

vague or ambiguous whether such groups should be or are in
fact a nascent industrial bourgeoisie, or whether they re
present the “increasing numbers of middle level functio
naries" (Barber,1968:295; Hoselitz, 1965; Weinberg, 1969:
4) necessary for modern industrial society.
Consequently, there arose a concern with educatio
nal systems--or as Bonilla (1967:236) tellingly puts it,
with “non-coercive cultural control"— which would create
or instill the values consonant with modern economic
development (e.g. Coleman, 1965)?^ Such systems should pro-

See the exchange between Halperin (1969, 1970) and
Perlmutter (1967, 1970) for a similar discussion on the
role of the middle class in the Middle East.
*®Leeds (1971) and in a personal communication has
pointed out that the concern with culture traits as intrin
sic to the psyches of given populations, rather than as
variables depending on specific structural constraints, is
p e c u l i a r l y American. The concern for “education" and
“values," however, among modernization theorists appears to
have been an alibi for the real concern which was with
power. Modernization theory has recently received scathing
criticisms on the empirical, conceptual and ideological
levels, some of which are mentioned in the text (Bendix,
1967; Weinberg, 1969; Bodenheimer, 1970; Frank, 1972; Tipps,
1973; Walton, 1972). Empirically some descriptions of
the modernization process have been found to be overly
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vide the skills for advancement based on "achievement" ra
ther than the "traditional" advancement based on "ascrip
tion."

They would thus prepare the way for the formation of

pluralist groups, or a "civic culture," in the words

of

Almond and Verba (1963), and for the formation of "new
elites" (cf. Nadel,

1956), in contraposition to the "tradi

tional oligarchies" of Latin American countries to direct
the process of modernization (Apter, 1965:447).

Latin Ame

rican universities were scrutinized and reforms suggested
which would foster "modern" values (Lipset, 1967:42).

As

Solari wrote,
as academic education is universalized, it is somehow
linked with the democratization of society and even

simple or misleading (Tipps,1973). As a whole, these wri
tings are plagued by ethnocentricity, a unilineal scheme of
evolution and disregard for historical context.
It should
be pointed out, however, that modernization models are more
than mistaken theories developed to explain social change.
During the period of North American expansionism in the
1950's and 1960's, modernization writers often played the
role of "counselor to the king" (see Halberstam, 1969:192200).
In this context, the theory and its promulgation
abroad can be seen as a self serving ideology, justifying
North American expansionism and blinding foreign as well as
native social observers to the realities of power and capi
talist development.
See for example, Shils (1965:503), on
the importance of "modern humanistic scholarship:" " The existence of cultural movements inherited from the past,
either by physical survival or by traditional transmission.
requires interpretation.
To interpret them in a modern way,
highly qualified persons, well learned in the techniques of
modern humanistic scholarship, which are of universal validi
ty regardless of the parochiality of the subject matter,
must be available. The inherited culture is not rich enough
in itself either to serve as the cultural complement of a
modern society, or to engender the self respect demanded by
modernity."
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in Latin America it is accompanied by greater plura
lism and a wider division of power (1967:48 , emphasis
added).
But again, when the claims were checked through research
they were proven dubious at best.

The new elites did not

fulfill these expectations (Bonilla, 1967; Ribeiro,
Soares,

1967; Gouveia,

1967;

1967); they appeared too bound to

tradition to accept their "historical mission."
In the light of the search for a "new" middle class
or elite to direct the transition from tradition to moderni
ty, the modernization literature on immigrants is especial
ly interesting.

European,

largely Southern European, immi

gration to Argentina, Brazil and Chile in particular, was
especially heavy at the turn of the nineteenth century.
These immigrants are frequently described as "cultural de
viants" because of their lack of traditional Latin American
outlooks (Lipset,

1967:23-24; Willems,

1975:192) and as

unconscious and unwilling bearers of modernization (Germani,
1950:15-17; 1970:309; Bresser Pereira,

1962; Lipset, 1967).

While immigrants were relatively successful in Latin America,
Willems has recently attributed to them a "revolutionary"
role in the economic and social development of these coun
tries, which is similar to expectations for modernization
imputed to a middle class.
(1969)

study of the

Paulo,

Willems

Indeed, drawing on Dean's

industrialization

emphasizes

the

role

of

Sao

of upwardly
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mobile middle class immigrants in the industrial growth of
that city.11According to him, the overall role of immigrants
has not been restricted to the implantation and d e 
velopment of an industrial technology.
/The immigrant
trajectory/ implies a good deal of upward social
mobility.
Through the institutional channels of
business and industry, people of the most variegated
cultural origins moved to social classes higher than
they had occupied when they first settled in Latin
America. And by doing so they revolutionized the
very class structure of which they had become integral
parts. 'They not only changed the culture or life
style of the traditional classes, social mobility
itself became a highly pervasive structural element.
This of course happened only in the few countries
such as Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and to a lesser ex
tent, Chile and Venezuela, which attracted large
numbers of immigrants (1975:197, emphasis in the ori
ginal).
The relative success of some immigrants in Latin
America notwithstanding, we cannot accept a middle c l a s s immigrant or otherwise— as prime mover in Latin American
development because we are never told what a middle class
might be, might have been or might arise from.

While the

it should be pointed out, however, that while
Dean writes that the "immigrants who came to engage in
trade and industry were by origin petit bourgeois or middle
class," several paragraphs,later he writes that the majori
ty of the immigrants to Sao Paulo "had little chance to
rise out of the lower class: at best they might reach the
level of the retail trade or crafts shop. Those immigrants
who acquired fortunes and came to equal the coffee planters
in social position were of quite different origins...many
arrived with capital in some form...and as a rule the immi
grant bourgeois came to Sao Paulo with resources that placed
them far ahead of their fellows /and apparently not just in
the middle7 and practically determined a prefabricated
class structure" (Dean,1969:50-51).
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basic assumptions

of modernization theory have been

severely criticised by a number of writers (Bendix, 1967;
Weinberg, 1969;

g©deriheinter, 1971; Frank, 1972; Tipps,

1973; Walton, 1972), the concept of a politically effective
middle class continues as a kind of ideological amoeba
with claims and counterclaims

being made for ©r against

its role in particular historical events.
Thus, a number of critics of modernization theory
have attacked its unilineal evolutionary bias and its use
of the ,,traditional,,-,,modernH dichotomy, as though, in
Gouldner's words, the past were “a convenient contrast with
the present rather than...a preparation for it“ (1970:120).
For many critics of modernization theory, the kind of
economic development any Latin American country may under
go is a function of its past political and economic de 
pendence on the already developed capitalist countries:
that is, the so-called underdeveloped countries are
already modern. Their poverty has been generated by their
dependency relations with the wealthier countries.

For

dependency theorists, it is the power relations of capi
talism which are the independent variables; the indivi
dual economies and class structures of the nonindustrial
countries are seen as a reflection of them (Baran, I960;
Stavenhagen, 1968; Frank, 1969, 1972; Stein and Stein,
1970, Wallerstein, 1974; Leeds, 1973).

In a succinct re

ply to modernization theorists* position on the Latin
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American middle class, Stavenhagen pointed out that while
the term ostensibly refers to a statistical aggregate, it
is most often used as a euphemism for the ruling class or
bourgeoisie (1968:24-5).

When it does not refer to ruling

groups, it refers to groups which are dependent on the
ruling class (Stavenhagen, 1968:25; Adams, 1967; Horowitz,
1987; Pike, 1968; Petras, 1965; Stepan, 1965). While many
critics of the modernization position on the middle class
do not deny the existence of middle income groups which
belong neither to the ruling class nor to the property less
working class, they do not see

them acting even remotely

like their 19th century counterparts in Europe. Thus R. N.
Adams writes that
while it is possible to distinguish a growing middle
income sector, the older and basic dual structure
of prestige and value systems has not changed as much
as has been supposed. Rather, the apparently new
middle group is only a n extension of the traditional
upper class, both in terms of economic position and
basic values.
It is possible to understand many
aspects of contemporary Latin America if one sees
individuals operating in terms of one of these two
major sectors (the upper or the lower); while it is
quite impossible to do so by insisting on the emer
gence of a new middle class (1967:16. See also Leeds,
1964, 1965, 1973).
However, modernization critics have made counter
claims and often seem to share the assumption about the
existence and effectiveness of Latin American middle classes.
Thus Pike (1968) argues that in Chile a middle class
might have contributed not to economic growth as moderniza
tion writers expect, but to economic stagnation.

Moreover,
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the middle class Pike describes for Chile is left as
unspecific in its composition as is the modernization
version of a middle class.

One is unsure as to whether

it consists of an industrial bourgeoisie intermarried
with a landed aristocracy— distinctions within a ruling
class12-- or whether it consists of downwardly mobile
but socially aspiring poor relatives.
The theme of downward mobility (as opposed to the
upward mobility implied by modernization theorists) in the
creation of a middle class appears in the literature on
Brazil in the writings of Marques de Saes (1973) and
Jaguaribe (1973). Marques de Saes, for example, argues
that many of Brazil's middle income sectors represent
economic “fallouts" from bust periods of that country's
economic cycles.
The end of each economic cycle condemned the aristo
cratic stratum which had risen to economic ascendance
to decadence and impoverishment. However, the social
status and the political prestige which they had
con q uered during these periods did not permit ether
dominant sectors to regard the danger of their pro
letarianization with indifference. Thus arose a
welfaristic
state, ready to absorb all decadent
groups in
bureaucratic corps and armed forces
As a result of such bureaucratic employment in a

12

Angel Palerm's discussion of a Mexican middle
class in the 18th century also uses the term middle class
to refer to what appears to be a bourgeoisie (Palerm,1952).
13
All translations from Brazilian materials are
the writer's.
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sinecure or "Cartorial" state

14

, Jaguaribe (1966) argues

that the Brazilian middle class had significant influence
during critical periods of Brazil's development.

The re

lationship of the middle class with the military bureaucra
cy was raised recently by Jose' Nun, who concludes (1968)
that far from being an inherently democratic force, the
middle class in Brazil joined with the military in 1964
to prevent "premature democratization."

His argument is

based on the assumption that since military officers tend
to be of middle Olass origins, the military tend to repre
sent middle class interests.^

However, a recent analysis

of the Brazilian military (Stepan,1971:47) clearly suggests
that soldiers protect not their origins but their achieve
ments, and that far from acting as representatives of any
group, the military acts primarily to defend itself as an
institution.
However, despite all the claims with regard to the
role of the middle class in the development process of

14
"The term is derived from the old colonial notary
publics whose functions and status have remained almost un
changed to the present day, and who have a legal and socio
logical importance which goes far beyond that of their
Anglo Saxon counterparts" (Jaguaribe, 1966:168).
^ S e e also Wagley (1964:315): When "faced with a na
tional crisis or the threat of rapid change, the Latin Ame
rican middle class ultimately acquiesces; it remains passive
before a military regime that guarantees stability or it
actively supports a political party or a coalition of par
ties aimed at the status quo." See also Horowitz (1967:157158).
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various Latin American countries, we are told very little
about any actual middle class in any of them.

The confu-

sion as to what a middle class did or might do arises out
of the confusion as to whom a middle class might consist
of and how its "middleness" is defined against classes
above or below it.

The definitional difficulty thus crea

ted has been ignored by most writers through a global
extension of the term to include a variety of groups which
might compose a middle class (cfe Johnson,
noff, 1967:90; Stavenhagen,

1958:3; Rati-

1968:23-24; Stepan, 1965:87).16

As Leeds has pointed out, evasive terms ("middle sectors,
middle statuses, middle levels, middle elements, middle
groups, middle segments, middle components, middle masses")
which refer to no structurally or functionally delineated
unit have proliferated (1973:49).
One purpose of this study is to continue the cri
ticism of modernization theory's expectations for a middle
class role in Latin American development by bringing to
bear ethnographic data from middle income families in Sao
Paulo, Brazil.

Another is to suggest some ways in which the

^ S e e Johnson (1958:ix): "The terms "middle sec
tors," "middle groups," "middle components," "middle ele
ments," used interchangeably were settled upon to convey
the idea of middleness without paralleling any fixed cri
teria of middleness employed in areas outside Latin Ameri
ca . . . their membership ranges upward from the poorly
paid white collar employee in government with a limited
education and often a lack of helpful family connections,
to the wealthy proprietors of commercial and industrial
enterprises on the one hand and to the educated professio-
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concept of "middle class" can usefully contribute to our
understanding of the developmental process.
It seems to me that in order to speak of a middle
class in Brazil, Latin America, or elsewhere, one must
reconcile an historical and political view of class with a
functional view of classes and descriptive strata.
E. P. Thompson,

With

I see class as

an historical phenomenon, which in fact happens (and
can be shown to have happened) in human relationships.
The relationship must always be embodied in real people
and in a real context . . . class happens when some men,
as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared),
feel and articulate the identity of their interests as
between themselves and as against other men whose inte
rests are different (and usually opposed to) theirs.
The class experience is largely determined by the pro
ductive relations into which men are born— or enter
involuntarily (Thompson, 1964:9).
We call the experience of class "class consciousness*" but it
is always embedded in a particular cultural matrix:
If the experience appears as determined, class conscious
ness does not. Consciousness of class arises in the
same way in different times and places, but never in
just the same way (Thompson,1964:10,emphasis in the
original).
However, while the class experience is a relation
ship which waxes and wanes among men,

I agree with Leeds

(1973:53-5) that in the capitalist world functionally and
structurally defined classes have emerged over time, and
that these have developed differently in different places.
Thus, in the industrial community, one can discern the

nal men, teachers and high level government bureaucrats,
usually from old established families on the other."
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evolutionary emergence of bounded aggregates of
people divided off from and standing over against
each other by virtue of organization, position
occupancy and network interaction, as well as by
cultural mechanisms. The bounded aggregates appear
in their broadest and most simply understood forms
to be a "proletariat,"... a structurally defined
and segregated "middle class" and an "elite" (Leeds,
1973:53).
In the industrial nations, Leeds argues, the
functions of the middle class are what
one might call "lubricatory:" the making effective
of transactions involving the strategic resources of
society, the implementation of the exchanges of
resources, including money: collection of information,
transmission of knowledge, the processing of information
for ultimate users.... the function of these activities
is the linkage of the positions and organizations
structuring the proletarians and elites in such a
way that the necessarily interdependent societal
functions of these two aggregates can be made to oper
ate more or less predictably (1973:53).
In the industrial

North Atlantic community;

scales measu

ring the distribution of income, power and prestige
tend to concentrate medium levels of the measures
with the middle class, low ones with the proletarians,
and high ones with the elites (Leeds, 1973:53; see
also Leeds, 1967:347).
However, Leeds argues that such a three layered
structure of classes did not evolve in the countries
which developed in dependency relations to the industrial
nations.
Turning to Latin America in general, I see no
sets of functions separately attached to structurally
differentiated corporate social bodies of the kind
discussed above.
That is, as.it all state societies.
the functions exist, but they are not systematically
£ * Q & Q d , o u t sep^atel^feq$..gther functions.,,.,,,,—

catrtftfl,w

s„nteg.,.„ip-Bygop?afl f rej-ftfitaa and

they are not carried out by a systematically segre-

R eprod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co p yrigh t ow ner. F u rthe r rep rod u ction prohib ite d w ith o u t p erm ission.

27
gated body of specialists: a functionary or lubricatory, that is, a middle, class (Leeds, 1973:54,
emphasis added). *7
He argues that in Brazil and other dependent countries
only two classes developed, proletarians and elites, or
‘'masses1' and "classes" (1973:57; 1965:384). This is not
to say that there are no middle sectors on a descriptive
scale measuring the distribution of wealth, power and
prestige in Brazil.

These exist by definition, since

they are imposed methodologically, and indeed, Willems
has shown that in Sao Paulo state, at least, there
has always been since the 1820*s
a social stratum which cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be confused with the upper class of
wealthy landowners or with the lower class of slaves,
laborers, paupers, mendicants and vagrants (1970:46).
It would seem, however, that Willems is here
using the words 'fclass" and 'fctatus" co-terminous ly, in a
usage which we will avoid.

Leeds has shown that many of

these middle income strata or sectors are functionally
and structurally integrated into the elite, through a
series of networks, linkages and patron client relation
ships; and he has noted that the individuals,

It may be pointed out that Leeds (1964, 1965 and
1973) departs fairly radically from Leeds (1957).
In the
earlier work on cocoa plantations in Bahia, he describes
two classes defined by their differential relation to cru
cial resources, and a third "which is independent of these
resources" (1957:276).
The people in the third class
"occupy a position essentially independent of the produc
tive structure, and could logically, even if inconveniently
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qua individuals who compose the oligarchies are not
necessarily in the least at comparable income, pres
tige or power levels: these common stratification
criteria are social-structurally irrelevant here
(1965:384).
In Brazil, increasing status within the elite is associa
ted with larger networks and with a denser distribution
of functions rather than with the delegation of functions
as in the North Atlantic community (1973:56).

Personalist

networks extending through middle and upper income strata
are a fundamentally important resource for the upper
echelons of the elite, for information, political payoffs
and political control.
Thus, in the context of this discussion, I shall
only use the term "middle sectors" as a descriptive term,
referring to middle income strata with no assumptions as
to their class relations.

The object of the research

was to discover whether a class relation existed, or, in
Thompson's words, whether class was "happening" to middle
income sectors, many of which are assumed by Leeds to form
part of the "classes," or the elite.

For, with the par

tial exception of primate urban centers such as Sab Paulo,

be dispensed with" (1957:253).
The third, functionary,
or middle class "serves, so to speak, as the cog wheels
which mesh the owning and working classes into a single
productive machinery and lubricates this machine to
insure its effective operation" (1957:258).

R e prod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co p yrigh t owner. F u rth e r re p rod u ction pro hib ite d w ith o u t perm ission.

29

Leeds sees
no convincing evidence anywhere A n Latin America^ of
a bounded, segregated middle class exclusively exer
cising a set of societal functions, and ... no evidence
that such construction of boundaries is increasing or
even taking place (1973:57-58).
This thesis, however, does present such evidence.
The research embodied in it suggests that a middle class
is indeed being segregated from classes above and below it,
and that this is occurring in response to changes in Brazil's
position in the world economy.

That is, the bulk of the

thesis demonstrates that middle income sectors which in the
past were discrete, have come to resemble each other
structurally, as well as to share similar experiences and
ways of feeling about these experiences.

However, this

middle class is very different from that hoped for by moder
nization theorists.

The groups which compose it have had

very little initiative in Brazil's development.

Its values

are not like those attributed to European middle classes of
the 19th century.

The emerging consciousness of class which

the research suggests is radically different from an upper
ruling class consciousness or a proletarian one, because
while it arises out of the shared experience of exclusion
from oportunities for enrichment or political influence of
one, it does not have the material resources of the other to
defend.
Moreover, this middle class consciousness of class
is necessarily inchoate because the cultural idiom in which
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it is expressed is controlled by a very dominant and secure
ruling class, and because mechanisms and institutions which
were previously available for the political expression of
their individual interests, have now been removed.

1 shall

argue that this kind of consciousness of class contributes
indirectly to Brazil's present phase of economic development
and to many of the "fascist" overtones which characterise it.
These conclusions derive both from the kinds of
questions I began my field work with and from the quality
of the neighborhood in which I worked,

iln order to ascer

tain whether modernization theories about a middle class
were correct,

I wanted to know:

1. If there is a middle class in Sao Paulo, how did it
develop? How can it be differentiated from groups
"above" or"below" it? How could one account for the
variety of groups within it, to which all writers
paid lip service, while still referring to a single
"middle class" which could affect the development
process?
2. If immigrants were more modern (oriented towards indus
trial capitalism) than the native population, why was
this so? How much would this affect upward mobility?
In other words, how valid was a Horatio Alger vision
of the middle class?
3. If the downwardly mobile "poor relative" model of
middle class formation were correct, could it be shown
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that such people were more conservative and that they
therefore

preferred traditional bureaucratic employment

to the risks of business enterprise?

More broadly,

how much weight should be given to "origins” in
explaining subsequent behavior?
Sab Paulo city, Brazil, was chosen to research
modernization expectations on the middle class role
in developing nations because its size, industrialization
and political history would ensure the presence of every
variety of middle sector discussed in the literature: immi
grants, downwardly mobile poor relatives, businessmen and
bureaucrats.

Sao Paulo is the most rapidly growing indus

trial city in the world, the industrial center of Brazil
and the largest industrial center in Latin America.

Accor

ding to the 1970 census, the greater Sao Paulo area had a
population of over eight million, of whom between thirtyseven and sixty-four per cent are classified as "classe
media11 (middle class) by the weekly Vela magazine (V eJa.
1975(380):59).

Brazil and Sao Paulo have undergone an

extraordinarily high rate of growth since 1968, which
seems to have expanded the city's middle income sectors.
Again, according to Veia.
Of a total of almost 30 million Brazilian workers
counted in the 1970 census, about 8.2 million, that
is twenty eight per cent of the total, belonged to
the so-called "middle sectors." For the first time
in Brazilian history, this mass inhabiting the towns
and the countryside has surpassed the number of pro
letarians, which at the time was counted as 8 million

R eprod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co p yrigh t owner. F u rthe r re p rod u ction p rohibited w ith o u t p erm ission.

32
people (Veia.1975(380);59).
If Sao Paulo was ideal in terms of its sociological
parameters for the kinds of questions I was asking, it was,
however, problematic from the standpoint of anthropological
fieldwork.

Working in a city made it much more difficult

to fit into the lives of the people I wanted to study than
if 1 had worked in, say, a peasant community, jfhus many
more families came to be known through interviews than by
participant observation.

M a n y more of the anthropological

dimensions, specifically those concerned with revealing
the quality of life of informants* had to come from key
informants, especially women, than 1 had anticipated.
In addition, it was at first difficult to find
a population as opposed to isolated families, that was
willing to be studied.

In the field I used the term

“middle class'1 (classe media) as a status term which could
be claimed or ascribed to others, as a way to discover the
principles used in differentiating persons (cf. Silverman,
1966).

I hoped in this way that 1 would be able to dis

cover the various stylistic, social and political ways in
which informants themselves used the term “classe media11
and whether it referred to any structurally differentiated
category of people.

I also used the term descriptively,

that is, referring to people who were neither very rich
nor very poor.

This was done on the assumption that I

would be more likely to find a middle class situation
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among the middle income sectors of Sao Paulo, an assumption
which was somewhat qualified by the results of this research
since the income levels of the families interviewed were
in general above the middle income strata of Sao Paulo . ^
During the early period of research in Sao Paulo,
I discovered that the term "classe media" had become a
heavily publicised notion

19

related to levels of consump

tion allegedly made possible by Brazil's phenomenal economic
growth since 1968.

It is also a highly politicized concept:

by Government sponsorship it appears on television shows as
a category of people earning a given sum of money per month,
in the press as the people responsible for left or right
thinking governments; and most clearly in Government spon
sored civics courses at the University level, where
according to students that I spoke to, the

slasgftjpffdjyi

appears as those people who maintain a politically stable
and growing economy.

However, the "not too rich> not too poor" speci
fication was useful to sidestep gross misdirections in the
search for a middle class, such as suggestions that 1 in
terview domestic servants who had bought sewing machines
or refrigerators on the installment plan, or self styled
"middle class" resident North American businessmen with
significant real estate and industrial holdings and inter
national financial connections.
19
I was repeatedly referred to the novel, Sramos
Seis by M. L. Dupre' for a portrait of middle class life.
Published in 1942, the book describes the life of a nuclear
family between 1915 and 1942. At the opening of the story,
the husband is a salaried employee in commerce. He is pay
ing a mortgage on a house in a central city neighborhood.

R e prod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co pyrigh t owner. F u rthe r re p rod u ction pro hib ite d w ith o u t perm ission.

34
At that time, a number of people were willing to
discuss the ideological implications of the term "classe
media" and a few were eve n willing to claim that status
within the context of the discussion.

Understandably, very

few, however, were willing to submit to a North American
stranger's inquiries into their antecedents, household
economies and social networks.
the

classe media

I was told repeatedly that

was very closed (fechada) with social

contacts limited to their families, work places and clubs
(familia. trabalho e clubes). and that it would be most
unlikely that I would find the close contact situation I
was hoping for.
The people who were ultimately studied lived in
Santana, one of the forty eight

subdistricts in the dis

trict of Sao Paulo. Santana is located north of Se, the
center of Sao Paulo city, across the Tiete River on the
lowlands by the river and on the foothills rising to the
Serra da Cantareira mountains beyond.

In 1970 its popula

tion was 200,490 people, and it was the fourth most popu-

While
the wife earns extra money by making sweets
for festivities at the homes of wealthier relatives and the
children do not have university educations, but rather
"normal" or "commercial" courses beyond high school, this
is not a working class family, but rather a family belong
ing to middle income sectors.
Nonetheless, they refer to
themselves as "pobres" (poor). They are so in relation to
their wealthier relatives, and the links with these are
describedyas tenuous indeed. This suggests that the term
"classe media" as applied to middle income sectors has a
relatively short historical depth among Brazilians.
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lated subdistrict of Sao Paulo (IBGE, 1970:90; see Figure
3 and Appendix I).
Until the 1930*s Santana's character was that of
a predominantly rural appendage to the metropolis of Sao
Paulo across the river.
Santana has disappeared.

Today the rural character of
There are a few unpaved roads

left in the ere- ices between the hills which are settled
by pocket favelas

(shantytowns or squatments).

Much of

the area is cut into by major traffic arteries which lead
away from the city.

The previously rural countryside is

now occupied by two story residences and small commercial
and industrial establishments.

The swamps along the

river have been filled and periodic flooding by the river
is largely controlled.

The military airstrip along the

river borders on an air force residential compound as well
as on the Parque Anherabi, the largest convention and
industrial exposition center in Latin America.

In addition,

the center of Santana houses the northern terminus for the
new Sao Paulo subway system which was finished in 1974.
The center of the subdistrict, "Aouele miolo do
bairro11 (literally, the •'brain'* of the neighborhood), is
heavily commercial and extraordinarily busy with motor
and pedestrian traffic during the day.

It is located on

the blocks around the north-south axis of the area, Avenida Voluntaries da Patria, where it crosses the east-
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Figure 3.

Map of Greater Sao Paulo.
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SOURCE: Hochtief, Montreal & Deconsult (1970:20).
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west axes. Rua Dr, Gessr and Rua Alfredo Pujol (See Figure
4 ).

Commercial establishments along the main streets

include carpentry shops, bakeries, household appliance
stores, meat and fish stores, bars, clothing and shoe
stores, professional offices, two local newspaper offices,
several office supply stores, record shops, musical instru
ment shops, a guitar factory, beauty parlors, pharmacies,
branch banks and an umbanda shop.

20

On the side streets commerce is limited to a few
supermarkets, pharmacies, bars and occasional small textile
stores and “armarinhos11 (literally, “little closets,M small
stores sailing sewing supplies, paper goods and toys,).
Residential building plots are generally long and narrow;
the houses are most often two story stucco buildings with
small tiled or concrete front gardens sporting a few
formal flower beds.

Most have no garages and tin carports

are frequent additions to the front gardens.

Larger plots

may have a garage with servants' quarters above it and
a concrete backyard (quintal) between the main building
and the garage.

This often serves as the household's

laundry area.
The monotony of the rectangular two story buildings
is relieved by a few more elaborate houses, modeled after
"palacetes" (literally, “little palaces'1) built by

20Umbanda is a syncretic Afrc=Brazilian religious
cult (Brown,1974).
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Figure

Center of Santana,
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coffee barons in more central neighborhoods of the city
early in the century.

These may have porches, spiral co

lumns and even minarets, albeit generally on a smaller
scale than the mansions they were built to emulate.

The

largest of these on the top of the Santana hill is a red
brick construction in the style of a swiss chalet crossed
with a medieval castle, which now houses a private maternity hospital and a children*s library.

21

Most of these older

and more distinctive buildings, however, were shabby with
disrepair and blended with the simpler two story houses.
Occasionally private houses had small signs announcing
lessons in music, French and English.

Others also doubled

as small knitting factories and retail outlets.

Most, how

ever, were single family dwellings exclusively.
The interior of the houses and apartments I visited
are not characterised by any single style.

Except for the

older more elaborate houses, public and private rooms are
rarely larger than twelve by sixteen feet.

The living and

dining areas were frequently located in the same room.

Fur

nishings could vary between stark modern leatherette, modern

21
Large residential mansions dating from the 1920*s
often have been converted to business purposes.
In the for**
mer upper class^sections of town (Higienopolis, Avenida Paulista, Consolapao and Campos Eliseos, for example) such
mansions often house banking, real estate and publicity con
cerns.
In Santana, one housed a hospital, another a language
institute. Slowly and inexorably, however, such buildings
are being replaced by skyscrapers.
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synthetic plush, and, among a very few older informants,
dark and heavy Victorian.

Decorations in all public rooms

might include crochet doilies, plants and flowers, bric-abrac and paintings of landscapes, religious scenes or
animals.

According to informants, the presence of a few

silver items among older families indicates twenty-five
years of marriage.

Among younger families, new and shiny

silver ashtrays, canape picks, candy trays and animal
figurines create a decorative effect which is taken to
indicate upward mobility.
There is a great deal of morning activity on the
residential streets.

By six thirty in the morning long

lines form to wait for the busses which take people to
work in the city.

Later on, women chat with each other at

their garden gates while waiting for the fruit and vegetable
vendor, on their ways to and from shopping on the commer
cial streets.

Children play under the ubiquitous tin car

ports, or, in the quieter areas, right on the streets.
Twice a week women may be on the streets as early as six
thirty in the morning with their shopping carts to go
to the open air markets (feira). These activities peak at
mid morning, when the women disappear to prepare lunch—
often with the assistance of their maids--for which husbands
with cars return home.

Then children follow to have lunch

and to get ready for afternoon sessions of school.
afternoons are quieter.

The

Men return to work, women rest
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or go to the city for shopping, or to charity or religious
organizations.

By nightfall the houses are shuttered, the

Volkswagens are in the carports and the silence is only
broken by the drama of television soap operas.
While this impressionistic description might
^

characterise a number of Sao Paulo's subdistricts,

22

San

tana was a logical and interesting area in which to work.
Most of the families studied had lived in Santana for be
tween twenty and seventy years: thus, many of the indivi
dual careers reflect and are related to the development of
the subdistrict as well as of the city.

The distinct

groupings and interrelations over time among the consti
tuent families which the research revealed might not have
been as visible in older or redeveloped areas.

23

These

are dominated by high rise rental buildings characterised
by the rapid turnover of anonymous nuclear families who
have no longstanding ties to each other.
Although Santana's image on the southern side of
the Tiete River is that of a distant, inaccessible place
with a poor population,

24

and it is surrounded by neighbor-

2^For example, Vila Mariana, Pinheiros, sections
of Lapa.
^ V e l h o (1973) describes the isolation and anomie
of apartment dwellers on Rio de Janeiro's Copacabana beach.
24
This was the case not only for the inhabitants
of the wealthier sections of the city, such as Jardim
America, Jardim Paulista and Cerqueira
Cesar
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hoods poorer than itself (See Figure 5 and Appendix I),
Santana informants themselves consider the neighborhood
typically middle class ( tfpicamente classe media ).

In

deed, a survey of the city using 1968 census material
revealed that Santana was far from a poor neighborhood
(Hochtief, Montreal, Deconsult, 1970). It ranked just below
the midpoint of the forty-eight subdistricts of the city
when ranked by income and number of automobiles (twentyseventh and twenty-sixth respectively. See Appendix I).
Except for the large number of students and bureaucrats in
the area, Santana was in 1968, more or less "middle" among
all the subdistricts of the city (See Appendix I and Figure
5).
While Santana is thus statistically in the ••middle"
of a range of subdistricts, its development was relatively
late.

Santana's history is similar to that of many of the

older subdistricts of the city.

The original settlement of

Sao Paulo by the Jesuits in the sixteenth century included
not only the "paramilitary village" of Se (Wilhelm, 1965:11),
but numerous other sparse hamlets around Jesuit missions or

(See
Figure 5 ), but also for some of the government
personnel dealing with the construction of the subway termi
nal in Santana and the modernization of the area surrounding
the terminal.
Santana probably has this image because it
is surrounded by poorer neighborhoods, because few of Sao
Paulo’s rich ever go there and because to get there from the
center of town one must undergo traffic jams of legendary
proportions caused by road and subway construction.
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Figure 5.

Income distribution in Sao Paulo
sub-districts.

Is

Subdi

SOURCE: Adapted from Hochtief, Montreal &
Deconsult (1970:20,47,213-25).
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ehacaras (small farms) which were all linked to the central
25
parish of Se" (See Figure 6 ).
The hamlets were linked by
trade routes used by the Bandeirantes^ in the seventeenth
century, who in search for anything at all to sell, roamed
west for Indian slaves and north for gold.

Sao Paulo*s

economy provided barely enough for its own subsistence.

27

It was no major export center"itself, but engaged in com
merce with the country*s principal centers of production,
export and import: east to the port of Rio de Janeiro,
south to the port of Santos, north to the mining region,
south and west to the leather, mule and cattle complex,
and later with western sugar producing regions of Sao
Paulo province.
Until the nineteenth century then, Sao Paulo was
a minor trading center composed of dispersed settlements
over a large territorial expanse (See Figure 6 ). Its
urbanization consisted not of centrifugal expansion from
the administrative center of Se, but rather of territorial

^■*"The phenomenon of the town's multinucleated
population had its origins in a few indian villages, foun
ded initially by the Jesuits and grouped around chapels
built by /Portuguese/ landowners.
Embryonic agglomerations
and new neighborhoods or parishes, even new towns ... for
med around many of these missions or chapels" (Marcilio,
1968:62, 68-69).
^ S e e Morse (1965) on these quasi bandit explorers.
^Neighboring towns reserved part of their produc
tion for consumption in the capital.
These included Atibaia, Bragan^a, Nazare', Jundiai and Parnaiba (Marcilio,
1968:46).
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SOURCE: Marcilio (1968:36)
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shrinkage towards the center, through a process of filling
in the empty spaces between existing nuclei.

At the peri

phery many nuclei became independent towns (Marcilio, 196S:
16).

Within the area which now comprises Sao Paulo city,

many subdistricts were relatively independent rural communi
ties, which were linked by the city's growth during the
late nineteenth century and the twentieth century.
ly, this occurred when local landowners

28

Typical-

developed parts

of their lands creating new nuclei, such as Arouche, Campos
Eliseos, Consola^ao, Sta. Efigenia, Braz and Bom Retiro,
which are all subdistricts of Sao Paulo today (Wilhelm,
1965:13; Marcilio, 1968:16; Mendes Torres, 1969; 1970;
Dertonio, 1971; Masarolo, 1971; Jorge, 1970).
Thus, Santana's growth resulted from both Jesuit
settlement in the seventeenth century and local landowner
real estate development during this century.

The Fazenda

Sant'Anna was originally a Jesuit estate established by a
land grant from the Portuguese government in 1673 as well
as by various subsequent private donations.

After the ex

pulsion of the Jesuits in the eighteenth century the land
reverted back to the crown.

The site of the Fazenda Sant'

Anna became a seminary and a trade school for impoverished

^ O u t s i d e developers also played a role. For exam
ple, the British based City Company bought huge tracts of
land on the southern side of the city in the early part of
the century for future development. These are now the
wealthy subdistricts of Jardim America and Jardim Paulista.
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youths and in 1893 a barracks for the army.

The population

of the area appears to have been small and relatively cons
tant (See Figure 7 ), consisting of landowners, slaves,
tradesmen, wa v e r s , vagrants and beggars (Mendes Torres,
1970:24-33).

The local economy was based on agriculture

and pasturage.
Figure 7. Population of Santana from 1765 to 1825.

Dates

Hearths

1765
1778
1780
1786
1795
1818
1823
1825

83
122
111
131
126
125
136
154

P 2 2 ulatioja
356
1139
886
1059
1029
889
970

SOURCE: Mendes Torres (1970:22-33).
At the turn of the present century, Santana's
population was included in the census of the parish of
Sta. Efigenia in the center of the city, and Santana did not
even appear on the city maps (Mendes Torres, 1970:70, 81),
although one of the principal exits from the city to the
trade routes to the north passed through the area.

San

tana 's relatively slow growth at the end of the nineteenth
century may be inferred from the figures for the neighbo
ring district of Nossa Senhora do 0 (See Figure 8).

During

the twentieth century Santana's development was marked by
tremendous population growth, real estate development and
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Figure 8. Population growth in center city neigh
borhoods of Sab Paulo and Nossa Senhora do 0 in the Northern
Zone.
Subdistricts

1872

1886

1890

Se
Sta. Efigenia
Consolac&o
Braz
Penha

9213
4459
3357
2308
1883

12821
11909
8269
5998
2283

16395
14025
13337
16807
2209

N. Sra. do 0
Sad Paulo

1893
29518.
42715
21311
32387
1128

2023

2750

2161

2350

23243

44030

64934

192409

SOURCE: Mendes Torres
Morse (1970:238).

(1969: 112, 1970::66, 76);

*includes Santana.
shrinkage of the district’s territory.

29

The rapidity and shallow historical depth of San
tana’s development made it possible to discover among the
families studied three different trajectories towards the
formation of a contemporary middle class in Sao Paulo.
Two of these trajectories have been discussed above and in
the literature on middle classes in Brazil: the "upwardly
mobile immigrant" trajectory and the "cartorial" trajecto
ry, or the absorption of downwardly mobile rural elites
into expanding bureaucracies.

A third trajectory, which

Santana’s dimensions had extended^from the Tiete
River north to the Municipality of Mairipora, west to the
subdistrict of Nossa Senhora do Cf and east to the Municipa
lity of Guarulhos at the turn of the century (Mendes^orres,
1970:96). During the course of this century Tucuruvi
(1925), Pari (1934), Vila Maria (1938), Casa Verde (1938),
Limao (1965), Vila Guilherme (1965) and Vila Nova
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to my knowledge has not been previously described, consists
of the history of a'local elite" in Santana--one of Sao Pau
lo's nucleated hamlets--during this century's urbanization
process.
Families representative of all three trajectories
were present in Santana by 1930 and the relationships bet
ween all three over time are clarified when placed against
the historical backdrop of the four political epochs of Sao
Paulo and Brazil's history during this century. These are the
First Republic (1889-1930), the Vargas years (1930-1945), the
Second Republic (1946-1964) and the post 1964 military dic
tatorship. Each epoch created opportunities for different
groups among the families studied. Besides revealing the
careers of Santana's local elite, this method also demonstra
ted interrelationships between bureaucrats and immigrants
which have not been previously discernible because the two
categories are usually treated separately. The use of an
historical perspective suggests the dialectic by which, over
time, middle income sectors were included or excluded from
Sao Paulo's "classes" and the latter's mechanisms of domina
tion.

Finally, it shows the way in

which

groups of

entirely disparate origins have come to form at present

Cachoeirinha (1965) were split off to form new subdistricts.
Santana's area is presently of 2,106.7 km^ (Mendes Torres,
1970:95-100).
3^See Chapter Three for a description of this group
and my usage of the term "elite."
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a single, more or less homogeneous group.
The Santana families interviewed were friends and
friends of friends: except at the outer reaches of the
networks many know each other, or know of each other.
While differences of origins and wealth existed between
these families, the sample may be biased, then, towards
shared attitudes

and values.

These families are clearly

not a representative sample of all possible middle class
families in Sao Paulo.

1 am assuming at the outset, how

ever, that the family careers described here are paradig
matic of the formation of a middle class in Sao Paulo:
that is, the social forces which shaped the lives of my
informants affected the lives of other middle income
families in similar ways.
A total of ninety householders w a s
interviewed.

formally

Interviews with the first twenty of them

consisted of three parts and in many cases were spread out
over several weeks, even months.

First, a genealogy was

collected for both sides of the family where possible,
going back as far as informants were able to remember.
This memory span rarely exceeded more than three genera
tions. These genealogies yielded data on ethnic origins,
regional and international migrations and employment for
between forty and three hundred individuals per family,
with a greater emphasis, of course, on the career of the
particular informant.
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Second, information was collected on household
composition, income, property and source thereof, educatio
nal level and consumption patterns.

Third,

informants were

asked a number of open ended questions on Brazilian economic
and political development, on their visions of Sao Paulo's
social structure

and on their own positions and those of

their friends and relatives in that structure.

Towards the

end of the research period I carried out seventy additional
short form interviews in order to get strictly comparable
data and expand the corpus.

In addition, close personal

contact was maintained with several families who included
me in family and neighborhood activities, involving rela
tives and friends, many of whom had been or were later
also interviewed.
While the average per capita income in Santana
was NCr. 514.24 per month (at 1973 exchange rates of NCr.
6.22 to $1,00, this was equivalent to $82.35 per month,
or an annual income of $988.20), the ninety families
interviewed were considerably better off than the average
for the neighborhood, or indeed, most of the city, in terms
of their consumption patterns and incomes.

According to

the Plaflp y^banistigo .frasiso (PUB, 1968:144, 148), house
holds like these were part of the 1.7 per cent of the popu
lation of Santana with family incomes of ever NCr. 1,500.00
per month ($241.15 per month, or $2,893.89 per annum.
Figure 9).

See

They were well within the top 10.6 per cent of
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Figure 9. Monthly family income distribution in
Santana, 1968 prices.
Income Strata in NCr.
A and B
C
01
02

over 1,500.00
501.00 - 1,500.00
201.00 - 500.00
0
200.00

Percentage of Population
1.7
37.7
45.5
15.1

SOURCE: PUB (1968:148).
listed family incomes above NCr. 1,500.00 in Sab Paulo
city (See Figure 10), and most family incomes were well
above NCr. 4,000.00 a month ($643.08 per month or $7,716.96
per annum).

Besides these relatively high incomes, most

^
Figure 10. Monthly family income distribution in
Sao Paulo, 1968 prices
Income Strata in NCr.
A and B
C
D1
D2

over 1,500.00
501.00 - 1,500.00
201.00 - 500.00
0
200.00

Percentage of Population
10.6
36.2
41.3
11,9

SOURCES: PUB (1968:144), Pessoa de Barros (1974:19).
(87.8 percent) of the families interviewed owned their own
automobiles (.97 per cent automobiles per family), all owned
at least one television set (1.73 per cent televisions per
family), radios, stoves, refrigerators, washing machines,
vacuum cleaners and various other durable consumer goods.
As a group, the families interviewed provided employment for
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forty-four live-in servants and sixty-three day workers,
as cooks, chauffeurs and laundresses.

More than half

(53.9 per cent) have their salaries or pensions supplemented
by rents from properties they own and just under half (46
per cent) of the families have additional properties besides
those rented out, ranging from weekend or vacation houses
to plots of land on which they wish to build or which they
wish to sell at a profit at a later time (See Figures

11,

12, 13 and Appendix 111).
Figure 11. The percentages of income strata in
selected capitals of Brazil (1975).30

Recife
A1
A2
B1
B2
Cl
C2
D1
02

2
9
6
23
14
25
10
13

Salvador
2
11
10
26
14
20
7
10

Rio de
Janeiro

Sao
Paulo

4
7
11
28
23
21
3
3

7
12
g
29
15
18
8
3

Curitiba
3
8
11
29
14
22
7
6

Porto
Alegre
2
8
10
31
16
22
6
5

SOURCE: Associacao Brasileira de Annunciantes,
cited in Veia (1975(380):59).

■^iNote the discrepancy between the proportion of
the D stratum in Figure 11 in Sao Paulo (11 per cent) and
in Figure 10 (53.2 per cent). The 1975 figures suggest a
vast improvement in the earning power of 1968*s D stratum.
In view of studies which have shown increasingly inequitable
income distribution (Fishlow, 1972; Langoni, 1973), this
improvement is surely illusory, resulting from changing
the cut off points of the strata.
There is considerable
overlap between the strata Cl and C2 in the 1975 chart
and the D stratum in the 1968 chart. For example,
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Figure 12. Family income, education and consumption
strata in Brazil, 1975.

Strata

%

Monthly In
come in NCr.

Educational
Level

Purchasing Power
Indices

A1

3

12,000

95% U.A.
85% U.G.

90%: TV, ref, tfax, aut,
mix, dam, wash, vac
50%: TVc

A2

9

5,600

80% U.A.
50%:U.G.

90%: ..TV, rrdf, max, aut
75%: mix, dam
50%: wash, vac
25%: TVc

B1

9

3,600

50% U.A.
20% U.G.

90%: TV, ref, wax
50%: mix, dom, wash
75%: aut
15%: TVc

B2

28

2,200

30% U.A.
majority H.S.

90%: TV, ref
50%: aut

75%: wax
5%: TVc

Cl

16

1,400

majority H.S.

90%: TV, ref
1%: TVc

50%: wax

C2

21

1,000

40% inc. H.S.
majority inc.
Primary

90%: TV

75%: ref

D1

7

700

60% inc. H.S.
40% inc. Primary

02

7

400

100% inc. Primary
or illiterate

50%: TV

SOURCE: Shotgun Nestle: Associapao Brasileira de
Annuneiantes, cited in ye la (1975(380):59).
NOTES : U.A.
U.G.
TV
wax
mix
dom
wash

-

University Attendance
University Graduates
television
electric waxer
electric mixer
domestic servant
washing machine

H.S.
inc.
ref
aut
We
vac

-

High School
incomplete
refrigerator
automobile
doior^W
vacuum cleaner
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Figure 13,
1972-1973,

Monthly family incomes and consumption indices of Santana families interviewed

Income brackets in
thousands of NCr.

1.5-2

2-4

4-6

6-8

8-10

10-12

12-14

14-16

16-18

18+

Totals

No. of families with
incomes between

6

20

15

17

8

10

2

2

3

7

90

No. families owning
own house or apt. *

5

16

15

13

7

9

1

2

3

7

78

No. of automobiles

1

10

8

18

12

10

4

3

7

14

97

No. of TVs*

9

28

21

28

18

18

5

5

10

12

154

No. of live-inmaids *

-

3

4

7

4

10

3

1

2

8

42

No. of day maids*

-

13

12

11

7

8

1

1

3

7

63

No. families wi£h
rented property

2

8

5

9

5

7

2

2

7

49

No. families with,
unrented property

1

7

8

7

5

1

-

6

42

*Within each income bracket column.

5

2
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For most of the families interviewed this relative
wealth was derived from salaried positions in commerce,
the liberal professions or the various city or state
bureaucracies.

A few individuals had independent busi

nesses, some times in addition to their regular jobs.
Most married women did not work outside their homes.^1
Of all the women over thirty in all of the households
studied, thirty-eight or 34.86 percent, had or had had
careers.

Most of the single women in the sample had work

ed as teachers, social workers or secretaries, but many
were now retired on pensions. Almost needless to say,
all members of the families interviewed were literate
all children attended school, generally private school,
and all parents expected their children to continue on

C2 in the 1975 chart earns approximately $154.00 a month
(1,000 t 6.885 = 145.24), whereas the D stratum in the
1968 chart earns about $130.00 a month (500 ? 3.83=130.54).
This equivalence is further reinforced when real wages are
computed, since not only has the cruzeiro devalued, but
so has the dollar (by approximately twenty per cent from
1972 on). Using the 1968 dollar as base we could argue
that the $145.00 a month earned by C2 in 1975 is equiva
lent to 112.00 in 1968 dollars.
•^Miller (1976), who has studied middle class fa
mily organization in Belo Horizonte, writes that "many
middle class women have careers which take them outside
the home, and often their income is what really allows
the household to maintain a middle class life style" (1976
:64).
In her sample, twenty per cent of married women
worked outside their homes (1976;70).
32

Except for one eighty-four year old individual.
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to university.

The incidence of university attendance

among interviewees declined as their ages increased.
Figure 13 shows that there are significant
differences of family income among the families inter
viewed, and that as a whole the families range upwards
through the B2 to A1 strata in Figure 12.

However, the

range of the Santana families' relative wealth and the
foregoing figures should only he taken as a rough indi
cation of their economic rank on a graded scale for Sao
Paulo and the nation.

This information says nothing about

the emergence of a middle class separate from classes above
or below it.

In order to demonstrate this emergence, the

dissertation relies primarily on the in-depth interviews
which reveal the quality of the families' historical tra
jectories and the quality of the emerging consciousness of
- -middle--class.
In order to discuss the questions raised in this
chapter, the rest of the dissertation is organized as
follows:

Chapter II discusses the distinct political and

economic phases which have characterised Brazilian history
during this century and attempts to assess middle class
influence on Brazilian development.

It argues that a

middle class could not have played the role attributed to
it by modernization theorists for a number of reasons.

It

also suggests the ways in which middle income sectors
were generated by various political and economic forces,
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and that the transition from a two to a three class system
is a progressive but recent phenomenon.

The next two

chapters discuss the three trajectories identified in
Santana, towards the formation of a single middle class.
Chapter V describes those feelings and attitudes among
informants which I am here calling “consciousness of class."
Drawing on recent analyses of the television industry in
Brazil,

it shows how such a consciousness is manipulated

by the government so as to propagate an entirely false
vision of society.

The final chapter elaborates on the

conclusions presented earlier and suggests areas for
future research.
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CHAPTER II
POLITICAL PHASES OF BRAZIL'S DEVELOPMENT
AND MIDDLE CLASS FORMATION
It is customary to discuss the history of Brazil in
terms of the distinct political phases which have charac
terized it.

Modernization writers tend to emphasize the

role of a middle class in effecting the transitions from
phase to phase during this century, as well as in the
industrialization which has marked recent Brazilian history.
This chapter will present an overview of the political
phases of Brazil's growth during this century and then
discuss the effects of each on the formation of middle
income groups.

In each phase (First Republic, 1889-1930;

the Vargas years,

1930-1945; Second Republic,1 1945-1964;

and military dictatorship,

1964 to the present), Brazil's

position in the world economy changed; the political phases
reflected these changes, as did adjustments in the class
structure.

The world system perspective adopted and recent

historical research demonstrate that middle sectors were not

^I am following the more general usage in ascribing
the term “Second Republic" to the years between 1945 and
1964. Technically, the Vargas years between 1934 and 1937
are the Second Republic (Carone, 1973).
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as important for the transitions between epochs, nor for
the industrialization process,as writers favoring moderni
zation theory suppose.
In addition, the chapter argues that in spite of
oscillations, the overall trend in Brazilian history during
this century has been towards progressive centralization of
the Brazilian government and polity.

This political trend,

as well as various economic forces, significantly expanded
urban middle income sectors, as each phase brought an ex
pansion of administrative functions and a growth of middle
level positions of influence, thus preparing the ground
for a transition from a two to a three class system.
However, in spite of the growth of such middle income
sectors, the material suggests the hypothesis that the tran
sition from a two to a three class system, with an increa
singly large middle class being shunted away from power
and manipulated to serve the ends of centralization, is a
recent, if progressive phenomenon, and culminates in the
definition of a middle class as a politically powerless but
consuming group.
Although Brazil’s recent history is one of the most
successful industrial import substitution efforts in the
third world (Bergesman, 1972:71), during most of this cen
tury, its history has been linked to that of coffee on the
world commodity market.

Thus, the First Republic (1889-

1930) spanned the years when Brazil's economy was neocolo
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nial, dominated by the export of coffee.

Industry, which by

1920 was strongest in Sao Paulo, was closely linked to the
prevailing coffee interests.

Electoral politics were con

trolled by agricultural economic interests and national
power was dispersed among the key states of the federation.
In spite of chronic overprdduction, falling prices, increa
sing urban unrest and political factionalism, the coffee
interests, largely drawn from Sao Paulo state, were pre
eminent in government until the 1929 crash, which precipi
tated the 1930 military coup that brought Getulio Vargas
to power.
The Vargas years are commonly pointed to as the
critical period in which the government undertook an
explicit

policy of industrialization.

However, the early

years of the Vargas regime were marked by an effort at po
litical centralization which aimed to maintain Brazil's
position as an exporter of primary products and as an
importer of manufactured goods.

After a series of finan

cial crises a dictatorship was declared and the growing
state apparatus was mobilized to foment internal industrial
development in a highly favorable international context.
During the fifteen Vargas years there were no direct presi
dential elections.

The dictatorship, declared in 1937,

further concentrated political power in the presidency.

The

urban political movements which had developed during the
previous years were encouraged and manipulated, only to be
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finally outlawed under the dictatorship.
In 1945, Vargas was deposed by the military which
had brought him to power.

While coffee remained the most

important source of foreign exchange,

Brazil's economy was

increasingly penetrated by North American industrial inte
rests, which contributed to the import substitution process.
Politically, Brazil returned to a direct electoral system,
this time with an expanded electorate which was manipulated
and controlled by clientelism and demagogery.

In spite of

the increase in state and municipal autonomy and the elec
toral opening, further centralization of power occurred
through increased government intervention in development
planning.
Political centralization reached dramatic new
levels after 1964, when a military coup overturned the
previous populist regime.

Through the process of what

Cardoso (1973) has called "associated dependent development,"
much of the economy has become dominated by multinational
corporations.

Politically, the regime maintains a facade

of electoral democracy at the legislative levels, but the
realities are those of an authoritarian regime (Linz, 1962,
1973), if not an outright dictatorship.

The effects of

these centralizing processes on the development of a
middle class will be examined in more detail in the rest
of this chapter.
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Th e ,F igst,Rgp,qbliS,( 18.89^930)
Of all the political phases in Brazil during this
century, the First Republic is the one most linked to the
fortunes of coffee, which was grown primarily in the
states of Sao Paulo and Hinas Gerais.

Although from the

turn of the century on the coffee economy was in a chronic
crisis of overproduction,

2

Sao Paulo and to a lesser extent,

Minas, dominated national politics and the government
artificially supported the price of coffee.

The 1929 crash

and the drastic decline in coffee prices provided the con
text for a military coup which was organized by other
previously excluded regional interests in the country,
and which removed Sab Paulo from its position of dominance.
Because of blight in Asian coffee fields, in the
1890's Brazil became the world's leading coffee producer
for an expanding market in North America and Europe,(Dean,
1969:4; Carone, 1972:29).

In the early nineteenth century

coffee began its spread in the Vale dOiParaiba in the
state of Rio de Janeiro and moved west and north to Sao

In 1906, when the government began .to buy coffee
surpluses, Brazil produced 20,000,000 bags of coffee.
World consumption in that year was only 12,000,000 bags
(Margolis, 1970:25).
Because of artificial incentives,
coffee production continued to increase during the first
three decades of the century, although exports remained
stable.
In 1929, the year of the crisis, 28,941,000 bags
were produced and only 14,281,000 were exported, at a
price which was almost forty percent below that of the
previous year (Furtado, 1965:197-8).
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Paulo and Minas Gerais, where planting conditions were
best (Stein, 1957: Dean, 1969:3-4; Nicholls and Paiva,
1970:21ff; Margolis, 1970:25 ff).

Sab Paulo city funneled

coffee production from the interior of the state to the
port of Santos, and as a result of the financial and indus
trial infrastructure which developed with the coffee
economy, the city grew dramatically (Morse, 1972:227, 159,
164-5)3
During the First Republic, Sao Paulo*s population
increased as a result of a massive displacement of labor
from Europe to Brazil.**

In the decade which saw the

abolition of slavery, 1880-1890. more than 1,500,000 immi
grants arrived in Brazil to work on Sao Paulo's coffee
plantations.

Most of the immigrants were desperately poor,

but the conditions they found on the plantations were
grim enough to force many to re turn--or escape—

to the

3
~
Prior to the coffee boom, Sao Paulo had undergone
a minor sugar cane boom (1765-1851). However, the sugar was
of poor quality and commanded a low price on the world mar
ket. While the expansion of sugar areas north^and west of
the capital (Itu, Campinas, Sorrocaba, Piracicaba, MogiGuacu, and Jundiax) prepared the "economic infrastructure
that later permitted the rapid expansion of coffee fields
i . . many observers attributed the substitution of cane
with coffee by the growers to the unsatisfactory conditions
of the roads, which offered little security for the trans
portation of a highly perishable product under adverse
conditions" (Petrone, 1968:224-5).
^Cf. Hall (1971:3): "The disastrous competition of
cheap American grain in Italian markets, when added to the
long standing malaise of Italian agriculture and other fac
tors, created a ready supply of desperate potential emi
grants ."
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city for employment.-*

The effect in the city and country

side alike had been anticipated by the coffee planters: a
general lowering of wages because of the oversupply of
labor provided by the immigrants.^

Although by 1942 only

twelve percent of the city's working class was foreign
born, in 1900, ninety-two percent of the industrial workers
in^Sad Paulo were foreign born, and eighty-one percent
were Italians.

By 1920, well after the end of the heavy

immigration period, fifty-two percent

of the city's work

ing class was foreign (see Hall, nd:2; Rodrigues,
Simao,

1968;

1966).
Industry, as Dean (1969:13) has shown, grew in

direct relation to the coffee economy. The coffee economy
created a money market and foreign immigration had provided
both laborers and consumers for industrial production.

-*They were chosen, because they were poor; by Brazi
lian immigration services.
One way passages to Brazil were
paid for whole families of agricultural workers.
"The sub
sidy was limited to families in order to reduce the inci?*
dence of reemigration, . , . Immigrants willing to come
to Brazil tended to be those without any resources at all,
and it was thus very difficult for them to raise the rela
tively high price of a return passage for a whole^ family
if they became dissatisfied with conditions in Sao Paulo"
(Hall, 1971:2).
6Cf. Hall (1971:3): "They were brought to Brazil
for one purpose alone: to provide the coffee planters with
cheap labor. As one Sao Paulo deputy phrased it shortly
after abolition, 'We need laborers . . . in order to in
crease the competition among them and in that way salaries
will be lowered by means of the law of supply and demand.'"
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From rather simple beginnings in the import sec ten:, by
1920, Sao Paulo had become Brazil*s most important indus
trial center as well as agricultural export center.
The dominance of Sao Paulo and coffee interests
was reflected in the political contours of the First R e 
public.

The Politica dos Governadores (governors* or

states' politics), as the politics of the First Republic
became known, involved the domination of national politics
by state governors.

According to Assis Barbosa (1968), the

Politica dos Governadores arose from Brazil's precarious
international financial situation and internal political
situation: the early years of the Republic were marked by
regional civil wars and partisan violence.

While Brazil

dominated the coffee market, the expansion of coffee plan
tations required capital investments which the government
found abroad.

These loans were repaid by the Federal gov

ernment and not by the states—
whom they were made.

namely Sao Paulo--for

Thus, when the price of coffee fell

between 1894 and 1900, the states retained their revenues,
but the government's foreign debt mounted.

The debt be

came increasingly unwieldy because the internal price of
coffee

had been protected from external price fluctuations

by the devaluation of the cruzeiro.

That is, as the cru

zeiro became worth less, coffee exporters got more of them
per

unit of foreign exchange

earned by

their
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exports.7

Conversely, however, the government required

more cruzeiros per unit of foreign exchange necessary to
pay the national debt.

The devaluation of the cruzeiro

reached extreme limits by 1898, and this policy could no
longer be used to protect the profits of coffee exporters
(Furtado, 1965:195). Subsequently these profits were
protected by a valorization program, initiated by the Acordo
de Taubate in 1906, by which the government bought coffee
from the planters and only sold it when the international
price was more favorable (Fausto, 1971:228-9; Carone, 1972:
33-35, 38; Furtado, 1965:195).

In 1898, however, the then

President Campos Salles (1898-1902) was unable to get con
gressional support for various stabilizing financial
measures (including the Funding Loan of 1898) without
granting the states complete autonomy in dealing with
their internal political affairs (See also Carone, 1971:
174-7; 1972: 114-6, 302-4).
Not only did the states keep their revenues, they
were also allowed to form state militias, comparable in
every respect to national armies.**

Consonant with the

7Furtado (1958:195) writes that the planters were
“socializing their losses** with this exchange policy, because
as the cruzeiro became worth less, prices for all consumer
goods became higher.
^Fernandas (1973) documents the growing militarism
of all Brazilian states following the declaration of the
Republic.
Violence organized by regional oligarchies was
not new in Brazil, What was new was its professional orga-
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federalism of the time, the administration of government
was highly decentralized and dominated by the states'
oligarchies. Graham writes that
As a consequence of the weakness of the central
government a highly diffuse network of state adminis
trative systems emerged and took priority over an
only partially effective federal administration.
These regional administrative systems were entirely
at the service of the rural patriarchs who controlled
the patronage power (1968:21-22).
In addition, the Federalist Constitution of 1891
introduced direct presidential elections and replaced a
property requirement for suffrage with a literacy require
ment.

Direct presidential elections guaranteed a shift of

political power from the numerous and poor northern states
--which would have profited from a system of state elec
tors— to the richer, more developed and more populous
states of the south, which were fewer in number (Torres,
1965:80-84; Carone, 1972:285-7).

Increasingly, the presi

dency came to alternate between the two richest states,
Sao Paulo and Minas, to the relative exclusion
9
states.

of other

nization and the elaborate European training which these
militias received.

9
For a more complex picture of the balance of power
between the state# during the First Republic, see Love (1971),
Della Cava (1970), Carone (1971, 1972), Fausto (1972). The
alternation between Sao Paulo and Minas' control of the
presidency was known as the Caf£ com Leite policy, coffee and
milk, after the dairy interests of Minas ana the coffee
interests of both.
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At the local level, within each state, the system
was implemented by coronelismo10

or local bossism, as

well as by patronage and clientelism.

In return for local

favors, rural bosses or coroneis guaranteed the election
of the state governors and legislators.

These would not

seat opposition candidates in the legislature11 and the
governors of the states decided among themselves on the
next president, whose election in turn was guaranteed by
the state political machines.

Needless to say, the system

involved a good deal of electoral fraud and local level
violence (Nunes Leal,

1948; Santos, 1961; Cruz, 1959;

Nogueira, 1961; Torres, 1965; Queiroz,

1967; Pang, 1969,

1973; Della Cava, 1970; Nason, 1973).

Torres (1965:103-5)

tells of a town in Minas Gerais which only discovered

that

elections had been held in it by reading about the candi
d a t e ^ landslide victory in that town in a Rio newspaper

The military titles of coronei^ (literally,
colonels), derived from participation in pre-republican
state militias and less often, in the Paraguayan War.
11Cf. Carone (1972:302-7) and Marques de Saes (1973:
39).
Because of regional conflicts and fraud in elections,
each successful candidate had to be approved by a commission
of Verificacao de Poderes (a confirmation committee). This
was a committee which reviewed the voting records of each
election, verified whether or not they had been fraudulent
and proclaimed the winning candidates. As part of the developn&ent of the Politica dos Governadores. the control of
this committee was given to the states, who systematically
deluded all opposition candidates.
The '’presumption was,
except when proved to the contrary, in favor of the candi
date who claimed to have been elected by the dominant
party in each respective state" (Carone, 1972:306).
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some months later.

However, regardless of fraud and

violence, the system guaranteed that the new suffrage
requirements of the constitution would have no unsettling
"democratic" consequences; it perpetuated regional oligar
chies, and perpetuated itself by systematically excluding
all opposition.
This was,of course, obvious in the case of the
working class.

While the foreign colony in Sap Paulo was

extremely difficult to organize politically (Hall, nd: 3),
12
strikes did occur both in the city and countryside.
Political opposition from this sector was countered by the
availability of scab labor and the effectiveness of the re 
pression by Sao Paulo's state militia, the Forga Publica de
~
13
Sao Paulo.

Working class or peasant rebellions in other

states were also physically repressed (Della Cava, 1970,
1968; Faco^ 1963). As President Washington Luis was to say

^According to Hall (nd:3), strikes in the country
side were more like peasant iaqueries than organized poli
tical movements.
^ S a o Paulo's Forca Publica had already played a
decisive role in ascertaining Sao Paulo's prominence in the
first years of the Republic (ef. Hahner, 1967, 1969). It
was reorganized in 1901, and trained by a French military
mission in 1906 in preparation to oppose a federal inter
vention, which never occurred because the Federal government
finally accepted a plan to subsidize the pricejsf coffee.
The principal duties of the Forca Publica de Sao Paulo were
to guarantee the autonomy of thfe state against other states
and the Federal government, to maintain order in the cities
during electionssand to control strikes and keep rural
labor from migrating to the cities during slack periods
(Fernandes, 1973:194; Hall, nd:10).
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towards the close of the First Republic, “The Social
Question" (i.e., the growing number of strikes and incidents
of urban disorder), "is a matter for the police."
Repression of dissent was also clear in the case of
the most vocal opposition to the Politica dos Governadores.
Sao Paulo's Partido Democratico (PD).

The PD was founded

in 1926-27, after a dispute over appointments to the Coffee
Institute (Carone,

1971:235).

It was apparently a splinter

group separated from the dominant Partido Republieano Pau14
~
li s ta (PRP) oligarchy.
It did not question Sao Paulo's
dominance within the system, or the country's linkages
with foreign and dominant economies, because its constitu
ents formed part of an elite which depended on them.

It

was distinguished primarily by its anti-industrialism1^ and

1^1 am not aware of a history of Sao Paulo's PD and
its consistently liberal, that is, dependent, tendencies
over time.
In the 1930's it became the UDB (Uniao Demoerat^ca Brasileira) and during the populist years it became
the UDN (Uniao Democratica Nacional).
^ T h e PD espoused Manchesterian liberalism, which
it hoped would protect the Brazilian consumer from the high
prices associated with tariff protection.
"We must be
aware that Brazil still upholds a basic law, derived from
liberal inspiration, which does not permit privileges of
any sort, especially those which mortally assault the prin
ciple of free competition.
Neither we, nor anyone of good
sense^ would wish industry to disappear entirely from Brazil.
We thin£, however, that the /proposed tariff./ exploits the
consumer and will probably assist those industrialists who
have not prepared themselves for the struggle, those whom
the English would call 'unfit.' In this way . . . the pro
ject would impede natural selection which would be disas
trous for the cause of progress" (cited in Fausto, 1972:35).
Fausto suggests a more immediate reason for the PD's anta
gonism towards the industrialists: many industrial entre
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its demands for reform of the existing system which so
effectively excluded its constituents.

Because electoral

machines and results were so firmly controlled by the PRP
in Sao Paulo and by the regional oligarchies in other states^
electoral politics perpetuated those in power and excluded
all other contenders. ^
The relative stability of the Politica dos Governadores

and its systematic exclusion of opposition calls into

question the modernization position on what ultimately
brought down the First Republic.

According to a number of

writers, middle class dissatisfaction1^ during the First

preneurs and coffee exporters were of foreign origins and
the "opposition characterised itself by an attitude of xeno
phobia . . . to contrast with the cosmopolitan openings of
the 'old oligarchy'" which dominated the Republican party
(Fausto, 1972:36). Fausto provides an example of their
rhetoric: "Foreign cads, putrid drippings of overseas townlets, assassins, bought by the money of those who have be
trayed their nationality, foreign mud and pus,
come to
sully the lands of our fathers" (Fausto, 1972:36). This is
a kind of nationalism, but subject to the dependency rela
tions of Manchesterian liberalism.
^According to Parahyba's (1970) measurements of
the growth of literacy, urbanization and the electoral rolls
during the First Republic, more people could and did vote
than before.
But, until 1930, access to the ballot was li
mited to a minuscule proportion of the population.
No more
than 5.7 percent of the population ever voted in a national
election (Love, 1970:9).
In addition, while there was an
absolute increase in the numbers of the electorate, its
size relative to the regional populations decreased every
where, except in Sao Paulo, Espirito Santo and Rio Grande
do Sul (Parahyba, 1970:96).
^Responsibility for the political instability of
the First Republic was attributed to middle classes as
early as 1933 when Sta. Rosa (1963:32-54) identified their
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Republic was a “basic underlying cause" of the military
coup which brought Getulio Vargas to power (Poppino, 1968;
256; cf. Jaguaribe, 1966:59; Alexander,

1956:234; Johnson,

1958:162; Wirth, 1964:165; Carone, 1965:11-12, 46; Furtado,
1967:585).

These writers tend to identify as “middle class"

visible, more or less organized groups with some claim to
political resources.

Fausto (1972) examines the alleged

role of the middle class in the 1930 coup, and reduces it
to two sides of the same coin: a “middle class" is either
identified with the vanguard of the bourgeoisie, in ineluctible opposition to agrarian (“traditional") interests, or
a "middle class" acted through the Tenentes (rebellious
army officers) in its own nationalist and reformist interest
but failed to create more than a "limited" revolution.

He

concludes that both views are wrong.
Drawing on Warren Dean*s study of the industrializa
tion of Sao Paulo, Fausto (1972:46) points out that there
was no opposition between planters and industrial entrepre
neurs because industry grew out of the coffee trade.

Sao

Paulo*s industrialists formed part of the PRP which repre

interests with those of the Tenentes. The role of the
middle class in the declaration of the Republic is discussed
by Villela Luz (1964) and Marques de Saes (1973). Villela
Luz* study of two middle class politicians during the early
years of the Republic suggests that the role of such a class
was minimal during these years. Marques de Saes argues that
far from representing middle interests, the army acted ah a
protector of its own and oligarchic interests throughout
the First Republic (cf. Stepan, 1970).
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sented both agrarian and industrial interests.

After the

1930 coup they remained cool to the new government and in
1932 industrialists actively participated in Sao Paulo's
revolt against it.
The Tenentes. on the other hand, were a group of
young army officers responsible for revolts in 1922 in Rio,
in 1924 in Sao Paulo and Amazonas, and in 1928 in Sab Paulo.
Although they did participate in the coalition which over
threw the president in 1930, they cannot be identified with
the interests of middle income sectors.
Tenentes.

In discussing the

Fausto points out their absolute isolation from

and suspicion of the civilian population (1972:58-9)--of
any class--and the lack of organizational ties between them
and the opposition parties such as the Sao Paulo PD (1972:
61-65; cf. also Carone,

1975).

Urban middle income sectors

in Brazil cannot, then, be identified with specific groups
like the oligarchical industrialists or the rebel Tenentes.
What was actually in the middle, between the working
class and the ruling class was a far more amorphous and
undef ined population, which was itself a precipitate of
the boon and bust way in which coffee was planted.

The

development of such middle income sectors has frequently
been described, most recently by Marques de Saes (1973).
The complexity of the processes involved in the creation of
such sectors is suggested in Lucilla Hermann's

study

of

Paraiba,

Guaratingueta',

a

city

in

the

Vale

do
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itself the cradle of the coffee b o o m . H e r m a n n shows
clearly how the decline of one group and the splitting
of estates through inheritance made possible the appearance
of smaller parcels of land on the market.

While estates

could be reconsolidated by marriage or purchase in more
prosperous areas, in Guaratingueta, which was in economic
decline, the appearance of smaller parcels of land on the
market led to the economic ascension of other groups to
middle levels of economic stratification (Hermann, 1953:8489; 1943:37-40; 1950. See also Nicholls and Paiva, 1970).
Thus, through complex mechanisms a local boom and bust
cycle created several avenues to middle levels of economic
stratification.
The coffee economy brought several waves of down
wardly mobile migrants to Sao Paulo.

Under prevailing

methods of cultivation, the fertility of coffee trees de
clined radically after thirty years, by which time the soil
was exhausted and the land subject to extensive erosion, and
fit only for grazing cattle (Stein, 1957).
cf. also Margolis,

As Dean (1969:42;

1970:330) has pointed out, coffee planters

^ D u r i n g its three hundred year history the area
underwent economic cycles based on subsistence agriculture,
sugar cane and coffee production for export. Finally it
entered a period of decline in which for decades the only
jobs available were in bureaucratic and administrative
positions (Hermann, 1943; Nicholls and Paiva, 1970).
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were obliged to reinvest in new lands and move on to new
plantations.

Some did so and were able to remain on the

crest of the coffee economy; others emigrated to the city
with their families, while their economic and social for
tunes were still high enough to assure them of university
education for their children and careers in the liberal
professions and politics.

Although such families were no

longer oligarchs themselves, they participated in the oligar
chy and its institutions.

Although they were economically

downwardly mobile, they formed, in Leeds' terminology, a
part of the "classes1* (1965).
Others, however, stayed on longer and saw their
estates dwindle in productivity and undergo division by
inheritance.

Eventually they, too, came to the city, be

cause cattle grazing required a far smaller labor force: the
end of coffee plantation depopulated the land, leaving
behind grass, cattle and the ghost towns described by
Monteiro Lobato (1959) for the Vale do Faraiba (See also
Nicholls and Paiva, 1970; Margolis, 1970).

For migrants

who had undergone serious economic decline before coming to
the city, there was no hope at all of acquiring university
educations, since at the time there were no free state
universities.

Nonetheless, these migrants were not at all

like the impoverished rural migrants who were to swarm to
the cities after World War II.

Although they were poor,

they still owned land, and although they had no higher
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education, they were literate *

In 1920, when no more than

one quarter of the Brazilian population was literate (Havighurst and Moreira,

1965:86; Smith, 1963:662), this distin

guished them from the bulk of the population, but it implied
only the degree of wealth and power which was lost through
the decline of their plantations.

In spite of their litera

cy, then, many of the migrants who came to the city after
their agricultural fortunes were depleted are perhaps best
considered as forming a part of the "masses'1 (cf. Leeds,
1965) for the First Republic provided no means of political
expression for people like these.
Urban unrest existed throughout the First Republic
and increased in the 1920's. These were years of brutal
rises in the cost of living (Carone,
1972:94)

19

1972:185-6; Fausto,

and employment must have been difficult to find

in Sab Paulo*s glutted labor market.

However, although

the Tenente movement provided a focus for the expression
of dissatisfaction, one cannot, in Fausto*s words,
infer from popular sympathy for the Tenentes. the
existence of close ties between the movement and
the so-called middle sectors. The diffuse support

19In Sao Paulo, "in 1924 there were . . . popular
manifestations against the high cost of living: the movement
began when the bakeries closed their doors, demanding an in
crease in the price of bread. Popular pressure . . . led the
government to require stocks of flour in the bakeries and to
Install new butcher shops and fish markets, to reduce the
taxes on wheat, milk, potatoes, flour, beans, etc.: and to
cheapen transportation costs on certain foodstuffs"(Carone,
1972:190).
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accorded to the Tenentes derived above all from
its apparent identification with civilian dissidence . . . it was perceived as the armed sector
of civil dissidence (1972:62-3, emphasis added).
Thus, while the Tenente rebels were received by
popular acclaim during the 1924 revolt in Sao Paulo, four
days later not even the legislature or the newspapers knew
what the revolt was about (Fausto, 1972:58-59). Further,
when the rebels appealed to the city's population for
volunteers to help repel a bombing attack by Federal forces,
the effort failed, in spite of the acclaim accorded them
earlier by street crowds.

It is fairly clear then, that

middle income sectors had little recourse during the First
Republic: the electoral politics of the Politica dos_.Gover
ned ores effectively disenfranchised them, and there was
no means or mechanism through which they could express
their dissatisfaction effectively, much less topple the
regime.
The forces which destroyed the First Republic were
rooted in the 1929 financial crash and in its own economic
and political structure.

1929 was the year of greatest

overproduction of coffee and following the crash, the value
of exports decreased by almost forty percent below its
1929 price (Furtado,

1965:197; Dean,

12, Fausto, 1971:242).

1969:181; Levine,

1971:

As we have seen, the Politica dos

Governadores had established the center of power in the
major coffee states of Sao Paulo and Minas, excluding other
states.

In 1930, the unwritten rule of presidential
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alternation between these two states was broken with the
election of yet another Paulista president to succeed the
Paulista Washington Luis.

This, and the inability of the

president to extend credits to the coffee planters after
the 1929 crash, provided the cirevenstances which led to the
coalition which toppled the regime.

The political leaders

of Hinas Gerais united with other excluded regional oligar
chies, disgruntled coffee planters and all other groups
opposed to the regime, including Sao Paulo's Partido Demo
crat ico.

These groups formed the Liberal Alliance, which

put an end to the First Republic (Fausto, 1972:102; Queiros,
1967:52-53; Dean,

1969:182).

Their success depended on the

support of the military: the Tenente rebels, many of whom
were in exile and could only return to political careers
with a successful revolution, and the Army officer corps,
which only intervened when the revolution promised

to be

successful, although it had participated in the conspiracy.
(Fausto, 1972:103; Marques de Saes, 1973:92).

9Q

It is interesting that the electoral fraud which
presumably led to Vargas' electoral loss in 1929 did not
activate the coup: rather it was activated by the assassina
tion of his running mate after the election returns were
accepted (Tiller, 1965). Against the backdrop of a world
depression, this act is best understood as an expression of
coronelismo. which had been typified by such acts of vio
lence. Fausto (1972:97) writes that the internal contra
dictions of the polity of the First Republic would have
brought it to an end without the 1929 crisis: he sees a
readjustment of elites occuring during the Vargas years.
While that is certainly the case, it remains a moot point
whether it could have occurc&d without the 1929 crash, which
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The 1930 revolution was not, then, the result of
dissatisfaction among urban middle income sectors, but
rather the result of the internal oppositions of the
Politica dos Governadores at a particular national and
international economic conjuncture.

The 1929 crash made

it impossible to support the price of coffee: the Paulistas
themselves had no stake in a regime which failed them to
this degree.

It was this context which united regional

oligarchies and previously excluded groups such as the
PD and the Tenentes into an alliance against the regime,
and which brought Getulio Vargas to power.
The Vargas years (1930-1945)
The dominance of Sao Paulo in the politics of the
First Republic had reflected Brazil's dependence on coffee
exports.

The 1930 coup represented a realignment between

the states' oligarchies and the government in the face of
the financial crisis incurred by the 1929 crash.

Not only

did the price of coffee fall, but the foreign capital which
had been essential to protect the internal price during
previous fluctuations disappeared (Fausto, 1971:242).

In

deed, Britain, to which Brazil was deeply in debt, regarded
Brazil as a "conquered country" because of its fiscal
dependence on coffee sales (Hilton, 1975:50).

provided the opportunity for all the regional elites to
unite against Sao Paulo's dominance.
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Basically two strategies were available: to diversi
fy agricultural exports or to increase Brazil*s industrial
capacity.

One scholar of the Vargas years, Hilton (1975),

argues that industrialization was an immediate goal.
Dean (1969) has shown, however, that an explicit

policy

of industrialization did not develop until all the possi
bilities of the agricultural export economy were played out,
Moreover, Hilton's own data suggest that regardless of
Vargas' personal intentions, Brazil could not have industri
alized in the absence of a highly favorable world context.
This context began to emerge in the late 1930's and especial
ly during the Second World War.

It is useful, therefore,

to conceptualize the Vargas years in terms of two phases,
separated by the declaration of a dictatorship in 1937.
In order to deal with the financial crisis and to
maintain itself in power, the Provisional government's
first actions in 1930 were directed towards an immediate
centralization of economic and political power.

Many of

these actions anticipated the imposition of the Estado Novo
dictatorship seven years later.

The expansion of government

power redefined relations between the state and society, as
well as between classes, by the creation of a political
structure based on a strong presidency, state corporations
and corporativist syndicates and welfare institutions.

By

the close of the Vargas years in 1945,
virtually the entire urban sector (with the conspi-
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cuous exception of domestic servants) /had/ been
incorporated into a welfare system more comprehen
sive than that of many developed economies (Skid
more, 1973;34-35).
The process of centralization began eleven days
after the new government took office, with the fusion of
legislative and executive functions of government and the
institution of a new hierarchy of authority between the
central government and the states.

21

Lowenstein comments

that the result was as “spick and span a specimen of a
streamlined dictatorship as any produced before1' (1942:19),
and it swiftly redefined the position of states' oligarchies
towards the central government.

Electoral machines and

Governors' politics were obsolete.

State politics were

now controlled by a presidentially appointed interventor,
responsible only to the president.

The central government

could no longer be captured to express a particular interest
above all others, as it had been by the coffee oligarchy
during the First Republic.

^"The Chief of government was to decide exclusive
ly on the appointment and dismissal of public officials.
All representative and deliberative assemblies (federal,
state and municipalities) were dissolved.
Constitutions,
federal as well as state, remained in force, subject to m o 
difications to be decreed by the government. Otherwise
the administration of justice was to function as before.
The chief of government may appoint for each state a fede
ral delegate (interventor). The interventor acts for his
state as does the president for the whole union.
He excercises jointly all legislative and executive powers. He is
the executive authority of the union within the state; he
may be recalled by the federal government. On the lower
level of the municipalities, the mayors are appointed and
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Between 1930 and 1935 man/ of the states lost con
trol of their agricultural production and natural resources
to national institutes.

In spite of government interven-

tions in favor of agriculture,

22

crises persisted in the

coffee, sugar and cocoa economies.

A National Institute of

Cocoa was created in 1931 and the Institute of Sugar and
Alcohol in 1933.

While credits were restored to the coffee

planters, planters in both Minas and Sao Paulo were con*
stantly forced to appeal to the central government for assis
tance, and finally between 1934 and 1935, both relinquished
their production to the control of the National Department
of Coffee (Carone, 1973:125-155).

In 1934, the Mining and

Water Codes were promulgated, placing these resources as
well under the control of the government.

In the same year

the Federal Council of Foreign Trade was formed.
It is generally accepted that the size of middle
income sectors increased as a result of the growth of
Vargas' centralizing institutes and bureaucracies (Jaguaribe, 1965:169).

Chaffee (1970) shows that the growth of

middle sectors in Brazil is associated with the increase in

dismissed by the interventor” (Lowenstein, 1942:18).
22E.g., The Decree against usury (7/4/1933)
and the Decree reducing agricultural debts (1/2/1933)
(Carone, 1973:119-123).
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the budget for administration during the Vargas years

23

and Vieira da Cunha (1963:116) has documented the increase
in public employment between 1920 and 1940 (See Figure 14).
Figure 14. Number of public servants per 1000
in the population in selected states between 1920 and
1940.
1920
Sao Paulo
Rio de Janeiro
Federal District
Minas Gerais
Rio Grande do Sul

1940
13
15
59
8
17

5
6
4
2
8

SOURCE: Vieira da Cunha (1963:116).
As Federal bureaucracies and Federal control replaced the
loose network of state bureaucracies which had charac
terised the First Republic (Lowenstein,
Dalland,

1968:334; Graham,

1942:100-10 3;

1968:25; Dean, 1969:230;

Siegle, 1966:46-7), the new bureaucrats became dependents
of the central government and instruments of the govern
ment's domination.

Much government employment was limited

to the Brazilian born (Johnson, 1958:166), and it is

23»it should not be forgotten that there would be
a historic tendency for the administrative budget and the
size of the middle class to correlate, independent of any
direct relationship . . . /'but] the fact remains that
the extreme correlation is beyond any simple explanation
of the historic growth of two relatively independent fac
tors. A correlation of .99 indicates that in reality
the same phenomenon is being measured by two indices.
There may be no cause and effect relationship, but if not
it would be expected that a third factor is strongly
related to both factors" (Chaffee, 1970:122-3).
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highly probable that it extended to the literate "masses"
which we have seen were created by the downswings of coffee
plantation during the First Republic, and who had been
virtually disenfranchised by the Politica dos Governadores.
These previously excluded groups now participated in the
mechanisms of domination which increasingly reduced the
states to the "status of territorial subdivisions under
full central control" (Lowenstein,

1942:51; Hilton, 1975:23).

Of all the regions of Brazil, Sao Paulo was most
affected by the centralizing measures of the Vargas years.
For example, in addition to losing control over their
agricultural production, the elite of Sao Paulo city also
lost control over industrial labor.

Whereas prior to 1930,

industrial labor u n r e s t ^ had been a matter for the atten
tion of the police or individual industrialists (Fausto,
1972:108; Dean,
the government.

1969:151-167),

labor was now controlled by

The new labor regulations aimed not only

at disorganizing and controlling the working class (Fausto,
1972:107), but also challenged the "excessive individualism"
«v
25
of Sao Paulo's industrialists.
So as to make labor depen-

^^Rural labor unrest had often expressed itself
through banditry and messianic movements and had frequently
been of political utility to state political machines, es
pecially in the Northeast of Brazil.
In 1938 such movements
were destroyed swiftly and expeditiously by Federal troops
(Della Cava, 1970; Faco, 1963).
^V a r g a s wrote that "the excessive individualism of
the past century needed to be limited and corrected, predo
minantly in the interests of the whole society.
In this
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dent on the state, in 1930 a Ministry of Labor,

Industry

and Commerce was formed, separate from the Ministry of
Agriculture, which had previously handled urban working
class affairs.

A number of unions were outlawed: those

surviving were brought under government control.

The right

to strike was abolished and a loyalty oath was impo s e d . ^
Finally, the working class was split by nationalistic
appeals to its ethnic origins— ostensibly to protect the
native Brazilian worker's standard of living against immi
grant labor— but in fact to discriminate against Italian
workers who were felt to be responsible for anarchist
ideas and labor unrest (Fausto,
188; Levine, 1971:25, 33).

27

1972:108-109; Dean, 1969:

The process of the incorpora-

attitude there is no hostility to capital.
Quite to the
contrary, capital must be attracted, supported and guaran
teed by the public powers.
But the best way to support
and guarantee it, is precisely to transform the proleta
riat into an organic force of cooperation with the state,
and not to leave it abandoned by the law and the state, and
at the mercy of the destructive actions of perturbing
elements which are destitute of feelings for the fatherland
and the family”(cited in Fausto, 1971:253).
^ E l e c t e d union officials had to be recognized by
the Ministry of Labor before they could take office, and
a syndical tax of one day's salary was imposed on Jill wor
kers, whether they were union members or not (Simao, 1966:
Rodrigues, 1968:348; Dean, 1969:187-91; Erikson, 1970:5255; 1972:142-44).
^ T h e s e measures included imposing a limit on the
number of foreign third class passengers who could enter
the country and the passage of the “Two Thirds” Labor Law
in 1930, which required industries to show that at least
two thirds of their employees were Brazilian born.
In
fact, the Italian colony in Sao Paulo was not particularly
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tion of labor was continuous from 1930 to 1937.

A struc

tural change occurred in the position of labor: it became
a petitioner to the central government, whereas previously
it had been at the mercy of Sao Paulo's industrial oligar
chy.
Furthermore, although Vargas had restored credits
to the coffee planters, Paulistas were enraged at increased
taxes and the imposition of exchange controls.

These

measures were necessary to pay off foreign debts that
"were largely incurred by Paulista presidents" under the
Politica dos Governadores (Dean, 1969:192).

After two

years, Sao Paulo reacted to Vargas' political and finan
cial measures with the Constitutionalist Revolt.

The Pau

listas had expected Vargas to convene a Constitutional
Assembly and had assumed that a new constitution and a
return to electoral politics would restore them to their
previous political as well as economic autonomy.

The focus

of their outrage was the Tenente military interventor which

revolutionary and was extremely difficult to organize
(see Hall, nd., and Carone, 1972 for organized working
class movements).
Nonetheless, the divisive political
rhetoric flowed.
The new Minister of Labor said that one
"of the most deplorable aspects of the injustices committed
against the Brazilian laborer, and of his exploitation,
is that of the foreign workers who come to our country,
pushed out by the poverty of their own countries, and take
jobs away from Brazilians, because so many employers con
sider nationals to be inferior workers.
Not content with
this, the foreigner delivers himself to subversive pro
paganda, which is frankly despicable in the light of na
tional dignity" (cited in Fausto, 1972:109).
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Vargas had imposed on them.

The opposition Partido

Democratico. which had supported the coup against Washing
ton Luis and the First Republic, formed a united front
coalition with the ^ ^ ■ ^ P , & ^ p b J . ^ a ^ P a y l i ^ t a , and
between them they incited a general political euphoria
in favor of Sao Paulo's rights and the Constitutionalist
cause.

£xcept for the working classes (Carone,

1965:120-

21), the city's population was mobilized in support of
what was essentially a hopeless cause, which would benefit
only the oligarchy.
In Hay of 1932 street riots led to several deaths.
In June the Constitutionalist Revolt broke out in Sao
Paulo against the Federal government.

It was led by a

dissident army general and the SeTo Paulo oligarchy, and
fought by the Sao Paulo Forga Publica. aided by countless
volunteers.

Although the population was enthusiastic, and

Sao Paulo geared itself to produce for civil war (Morse,
1972:326-8), there was simply not enough war materiel and
the aid expected from sympathetic states never materia
lized.

Sao Paulo lost the initial advantage of the sur

prise attack, found itself unprepared to continue the
fight against the Federal government on various fronts,
and surrendered in three months (Silva, 1932).
The defeat represented the end of all hopes of
a return to the status quo ante for Sao Paulo: but it
also began the period of accomodation between the state's
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oligarchies and the central government.

The expansion of

the central government into areas which had previously been
under the control of individual states, or under private
2a
control, ultimately benefited the oligarchies
economi
cally, in that their markets were assured and protected
where possible.

While Sao Paulo continued being the

major industrial and coffee producing region in the nation,
its revolt guaranteed that its own interests would not be
ignored (Fausto, 1971:249).

It is significant that in

1935, when other states were embroiled in turbulent elec
toral battles over centralization versus federalism, Sao
Paulo was "conspicuously removed" from the struggle
(Levine, 1971:54).

For the time being, Sao Paulo had

tacitly accepted the situation whereby it was asked
to supply significantly less than its proportional
share of national political leadership in terms of
its economic power (Levine, 1971:55).
The political and economic centralization of the
Vargas years was more or less continuous from 1930 to 1937.
During the Constituent

Assembly of 1933 the Paulista dele

gates attempted to preserve at least the appearance of
states' rights, but before the final vote on the new
constitution was taken, all the centralizing measures of
the Provisional Government (1930-1934) were approved and

28See Carone (1965:98-102, 132; 1975) and Fausto
(1971:250-252; 1972:107) for the loss of influence of the
Tenentes in the coalition which had made the 1930 coup.
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removed from judicial review (Palmer, 1950:86; Lowenstein,
1942:22; Levine, 1970:10).

In the Estado Novo constitution

of 1937, Federal hold on the states was tightened even
further.

According to Lowenstein,

although the appearances are carefully preserved, the
states are reduced to the status of territorial
subdivisions under full central control; particularly
in fiscal matters, their rights are severely curtailed
(1942:51).
This kind of centralization appeared necessary if
Brazil were to cope with its internal regional tensions and
the economic warfare of the 1930*s.

29

In 1934 two main

contestants for Brazil's raw materials and Brazil's market
had defined themselves: Germany and the United States.
Germany needed raw materials, but it could only pay for
them with ''compensation marks," that is, money which
could only be used to buy an equal value of manufactured
goods from Germany (Hilton, 1975:40; Carone, 1970:116).
The United States wanted to export its industrial produc
tion to Brazilian markets.

Germany offered Brazil decreased

dependence on a single crop, coffee, through its own grow
ing need for Brazil's sugar, rubber, cotton and other
primary products.

The United States, primarily interested

in lowered tariffs for its exports and in Brazil's coffee,
offered foreign exchange.

Hilton's (1975) study of Bra-

29Vargas noted in 1930 that "diplomacy is increa
singly orienting itself in the direction of economic prob
lems." In 1935 a Minister of the Foreign Trade Council
observed that "Brazil found itself in a period of economic
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zilian maneuvers between the opposing interests of the two
powers, describes its efforts to avoid having to make a
commitment to either country which would exclude the other
(see also Wirth, 1970:17-51),

Until the war, Germany

bested the United States in its competition for the Brazi
lian market (Hilton, 1975:227), but until 1937, Brazil
remained peculiarly dependent upon the United States and
coffee because these were its principal suppliers of
foreign exchange.
Clearly, the centralization which occurred prior
to the dictatorship represented in part an effort to "play
out the alternatives of the export economy" (Dean, 1969:
205).

Brazil was attempting

to regain a trade position

based on diversified agricultural exports and not to
redirect the economy towards industrialization.

war in a time of peace" (Hilton,

30

That

1975:8-10),

^ S e e Dean (1969:180-206) for the measures affec
ting industry taken by the Vargas g o v e r n m e n t between
1930 and 1937. While in the long run Paulista industry did
not suffer, the increased financial and social interven
tions of the government were "not designed to accelerate
the process of industrialization" (Dean, 1969:205), but
rather to maintain social order. For examples of the "lipservice" given to the need for industrialization and the
ignored opportunities, see Dean (1969:183-4, 203). Dean's
book is an effort to qualify and refine the dependency or
"external shock" theory of Brazilian development (see Furtado, 1963; Baer, 1965, Frank, 1967, 1969) and show the
relations between external factors and the men who must
adapt to them (Dean, 1969:15, 86-87).
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effort only occurred after the 1937 declaration of the
Estado Novo.

The effort to play out the alternatives of

the export economy failed because of the basic dependence
on coffee and the United States for foreign exchange, and
the failure is expressed in the financial and political
crisis which precipitated the Estado Novo.
In 1937 Brazil could not pay its debts.

The

economic liberalism of the predictatorial years and the
need for free foreign exchange (i.e., not "compensation
marks") in exchange for coffee had resulted in concessions
to United States manufacturing interests and an "orgy of
imports" in 1936 (Dean,

1969:208).

The price of coffee

fell, and because of deflationary policies introduced in
the United States the same year, the flow of foreign ex
change ceased (Dean, 1969:209).

At the same time, and

reflecting the liberal economic policy,

Sao Paulo appeared

to be attempting to regain a position of prominence in the
nation through electoral means, by forming coalitions with
key states in preparation for the 1938 presidential
elections.

According to Dean, the government could not

have survived the crisis within the democratic framework,
and only by "dramatizing the political crisis could the
government be made to appear less culpable, and the ne
cessary emergency powers be arrogated without a loss of
confidence" (1969:208-9).
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Although the issue of federalism versus centra
lism continued to be central to Brazilian politics, the
crisis which the government dramatized was only tangentially related to regional aspirations.

Between 1933 and

1937 a good deal of visible political turmoil had been
generated by two urban movements, the National Liberation
Alliance (ALN) and the Integralists.

Both the left wing

ALN and the Fascist Integralist movement arose in the
early 1930‘s among middle income sectors of Brazil's urban
centers (Levine, 1970:63, 69, 73, 74, 90). Leadership for
both movements was recruited from among university educa
ted groups (Levine,

1970:64, 67, 87-89).

Between them,

they may have included from 170,000 to 300,000 active par
ticipants in the whole country, concentrated in the capital
cities (Levine,

1970:79, 95).

The university education of

their leaders indicates links to high levels of social
stratification--to the "classes" rather than the "masses"
(cf. Leeds, 1965).

Furthermore, although neither movement

had high operating expenses, both were financed by regio
nal opposition politicians and industrialists (Levine, 1970:
75, 95-96).

Nonetheless, and in spite of the high poli

tical visibility and frequent clashes between the ALN and
the Integralists, neither group was able to mobilize the
kind of support which the Sao Paulo oligarchy had genera
ted during the 1932 Constitutional Revolt.

The three

separate ALN revolts in Natal, Recife and Rio de Janeiro

R eprod u ced w ith p erm ission o f the co pyrigh t owner. F u rthe r re p rod u ction p rohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

94

in 1935 failed absolutely to mobilize popular support and
were speedily suppressed (Levine,

1970:104).

If both movements were financed by regional oppo
sition to the central government, both were also vulnerable
to manipulation by the central government.

In the context

of the 1938 elections, both were used to create a climate
which would require and justify a coup.

The Integralists,

in particular, were encouraged in an ongoing anti-communist
crusade which began after the 1935 abortive ALN rebellions.
These had resulted in the imposition ofa state of siege and
massive imprisonments of communists and suspected left
wing sympathizers.

When Vargas requested a continuation

of the state of siege, which had ended in 1937, the Senate
refused him.

Its spokesman, who significantly was from

Sao Paulo, affirmed that the country was peaceful and that
a state of siege during an election year might imply coer
cion (Carone, 1975:130).

Vargas reacted by freeing the

left wing ALN prisoners of 1935.

In order to further in

crease the climate of tension, the government created an
incident based on a false document which purported to be
a “plan'1 for a communist coup (Carone, 1975:130).

In this

context, the Integralists were encouraged in their anti
communism and were sought out by Vargas* representatives
to support a future coup.

The Integralists fully expected

to be officially recognized and to participate in the
new dictatorial government (Carone, 1975:134-5).

Instead,
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after the coup, the party was ignored, humiliated and
finally abolished together with all other political parties.
(Levine, 1970:160-1).

In this way the two political groups

which emerged from middle income sectors with regional
political backing were manipulated to forestall a threat
against centralization.
In this way also, by dramatizing a political crisis,
Brazil cut itself off from fiscal dependence on the United
States and coffee.

Payment on the national debt was suspen

ded ten days after the declaration of the Estado Novo.

The

new dictatorship also recognized that the country would
have to begin to substitute domestic industrial production
for imported industrial production (Dean, 1969:209).

The

value of imports decreased and new exchange controls favored
the import of raw materials for domestic production at the
expense of manufactured imports.

The government developed

new sources of public financing, and encouraged the deve
lopment of enterprises which would increase Brazil's self
sufficiency (Dean, 1969:209-215; Wirth, 1970:101-110).
However, the opportunity for the heavy, state
sponsored industrialization effort represented by the Volta
Redonda steel mill only became available with the British
wartime blockade on German trade.

Only then could Brazil

successfully gamble on North American fears of German
influence in the hemisphere and obtain the necessary funds
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to build the steel mill.

31

Thus, although the war caused

shortages and dislocations, it also provided the context
for the ''heroic” stage of Brazil's import substitution
(Cohn, 1971:303), because the shortages protected Brazil's
industries from foreign competition and stimulated exports
to consumer markets in Latin America which were cut off
from their regular suppliers (Dean,

1969:223).

The war also altered Brazil's relations with the
United States.

Although Brazil still owed unpaid debts to

the United States, Washington launched a massive public
relations effort in Brazil and Latin America as part of its
effort to maintain hemispheric unity against the Axis.

By

the end of the war, the Rockefeller Office, as the office
of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs became known,
estimated that it controlled seventy-five percent of the
news of the world reaching Latin America.

Latin American

and especially Brazilian public opinion leaders and busi
ness executives were included in this network of influence,

31
A Rio newspaper observed that what the United
States had failed to do with its commercial and good neigh
bor policy over years, the British blockade did in a matter
of months (Hilton, 1975:212).
In spite of political dis
agreements, trade with Germany increased after the declara
tion of the Estado Novo (Hilton, 1975:174?8).
The United
States did not retaliate first, because it hoped to regain
its export trade to Brazil, and later because it wished
to maintain the facade of hemispheric unity against German
political expansionism (Hilton, 1975:226-7).
It was only
willing to underwrite the development of the steel mill
after the declaration of the war (Hilton, 1975:219; Dean,
1969:219).
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which constituted a “propaganda effort virtually unprece
dented in the annals of American history” (Epstein, 1975:
50-52).32
Most important, however, to Brazil*s industrializa
tion at the time, was the support now given by the United
States as part of its own war effort.

In addition to the

finance for the Volta Redonda steel mill, this support
included the building of bases and infrastructure in the
Northeast, the exporting of machinery, and, with the Cook

32
"To gain control over the media of Latin America,
Rockefeller engineered a ruling from the U.S. Treasury
Department which exempted from taxation the cost of adver
tisements placed by American corporations that were co
operating with the Rockefeller office.
This tax exempt
advertising eventually constituted more than forty percent
of all newspaper and radio revenues in Latin America.
By
selectively directing this advertising towards newspapers
and radio stations that accepted guidance from his office
--and simultaneously denying it to media which he deemed
uncooperative or pro-Nazi--he skillfully managed to gain
economic leverage over the major sources of news in Latin
America. Moreover, as the newsprint shortage became cri
tical in South America, his office made sure that the
indispensable newsprint licenses were allocated only to
'friendly* newspapers . • . George Gallup, who later became
famous as a political pollster, and a group of prominent
social scientists quietly conducted systematic surveys of
public opinion in Brazil.
In a clear adumbration of the
post war CIA, the Rockefeller Office arranged for a *re»
search division* to employ clandestine observers from the
Export Bureau of the American Association of Advertising
Agencies in Latin America. . . . /These/ 'observers' sup
plied the Rockefeller Office with data concerning ownership,
editorial policy, personal opinions of the owners and edi
tors of the newspapers and 'propaganda analysis.' Dossiers
could thus be systematically organized about the opinions
and operations of the major organs of public opinion in
Latin America. . . . To assure comprehension of the 'issues'
being advanced in Latin America, the office sent 13,000
carefully selected 'opinion leaders' a weekly newsletter
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Mission in 1942, a public commitment to the development
of Brazil*s industrial system.

"Never had the world be

stowed so much prestige upon Brazilian efforts to industria
lize" (Dean, 1969:223).33
If changes in the world market and adjustments
between regional elites in Brazil dominated the Vargas
years, propositions such as Helio Jaguaribe*s on the impor
tance of a middle class during these years are clearly wrong.
Jaguaribe has argued that a middle class was directly res
ponsible for setting up the Estado Novo, and he associates
the industrialization of the Vargas years with a middle
class initiative.

In his view, the middle class seized

control of government in 1930, and in exchange for politi
cal acquiescence to oligarchical groups, expanded govern
ment employment opportunities for itself, through the crea
tion of superfluous jobs in a "Cartorial State" (Jaguaribe,
1969:169).

For Jaguaribe, the

which was to help 'clarify' the news. The coordinator
also arranged trips to the United States for the most in
fluential editors in Latin America and later scholarships
for their children" (Epstein, 1975:50-52).
33"The United States, urgently in need of an expan
ded list of Brazilian raw materials, had in return guaran
teed the delivery of manufactured goods to Brazil. Ship
ping space was strictly rationed, however; it followed that
it would be filled most efficiently, not with manufactures,
but with machinery so that the Brazilians might produce
the goods themselves.
Throughout the war, the Bank of
Brazil and the Office of Economic Warfare cooperated to
this end" (Dean, 1969:222).
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Vargas revolution of 1930 . . . represented the
political counterpart of import substitution: the
country, no longer able to import the consumer goods
it needed started to produce them at home (1969:169).
However, the middle class was
compelled by considerations of realpolitik to jettison
its political principles with the anti-democratic
coup of 1937 and the setting up of the Estado Novo
(1969:170).
Jaguaribe's argument depends on the assumption of
the existence of a middle class, on the misplaced identifi
cation of middle class interests with the forces which made
the 1930 coup and on a disregard of the regional readjust
ments between Brazilian elites and the government in the
context of a world economic system.

Furthermore, the em

ployment of middle income sectors in bureaucracies does not
mean that they control them.

Far from being created simply

to provide for middle sector employment, the bureaucracies
were the means of dominating and centralizing the nation's
political and economic resources in the face of crisis.
While we have seen that political groups among middle income
sectors acted and were manipulated so as to create a climate
of unrest which justified the imposition of the Estado Novo,
they do not appear to have been a separate class, but were
rather linked to various regional elites.

Neither the ALN

nor the Integralists nor the new bureaucrats in any way
"caused" the Estado Novo, nor can they be associated, as
Jaguaribe would have it, with the subsequent policy of
industrialization which the government adopted.

That was
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the result of particular world circumstances, which
changed at the end of the war.

In 1945 Vargas was deposed by the military and
elections were reintroduced to Brazil.

Brazil’s method of

development during the next fifteen years was based on
state investment and planning and foreign investment.

This,

intertwined with populist politics, had inherent consequen
ces which led to a highly favorable context for a military
coup in 1964.
By the war's end, Brazil was firmly under the poli
tical and economic hegemony of the United States.

The

United States emerged from the war at the height of its
economic powers, and no longer had any interest in Brazil's
independent industrial development.

Brazil's "heroic"

import substitution, which had been supported by the U.S.
war effort, a captive market and lack of foreign competi
tion, was coming to an end.

The United States began to

favor the interests of its own entrepreneurs against the
nationalism and protectionism of the Brazilian government
34
which had developed during the war years.

For example,

^ A s early as 1941, American entrepreneurs had
begun to examine the advantages of partnership and capital
association with Brazilian businessmen: "Foreign investors
are verifying that the combination of their capital with
that of national investors in the country which is being in
vested in, yields a certain degree of security in view of
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North American entrepreneurs who wished to protect their
35
trading and commercial positions in Brazil
found their
government more willing to assist their economic expansion
than had been the case in the pre-war years, when it had
frequently permitted debts to American exporters to remain
unpaid (Hilton, 1975:227),
It is highly probable that the change in United
States interests provided the context for deposing Vargas
and reintroducing elections in Brazil.

In other words,

the reappearance of electoral politics in the post-war
period was not merely a “return to democracy" in the flush
of the Allied victory, as suggested by a number of writers
(Pinsky, 1971:348; Odalia, 1971:358; Skidmore, 1967:79),
but an incident in the realignment of hemispheric economic
powers.

In Brazil, such realignment required primarily

the elimination or mitigation of Vargas' statist and
nationalist policies (Ianni, 1971:79).
In accordance with United States interests in

excessive economic nationalism" (Feurlein and Hannan, 1941,
cited in Ianni, 1971:137-8).
35
According to Gordon and Grommers, "the major
single motive for undertaking manufacturing activities
abroad was the desire to secure or maintain a footing in a
generally attractive market where government policies
leave no means of accomplishing this objective other than
by direct investment" (1962:147-8).
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Brazil, the American ambassador, Adolph Berle Jr., hailed
Brazil's return to a free press and anticipated return to
"constitutional democracy" at a luncheon
^

given by the
j

36

Moreover, as we have seen above, the North American war
effort had resulted in a considerable degree of influence
over editorial opinion in Brazil.

Stepan's (1971:99-101)

analysis of editorial opinion reveals that in 1945 the
legitimacy of the Vargas regime was being severely ques
tioned.

In addition, the military officers who made the

coup against Vargas had developed close relations with
American military officers as a result of joint service
overseas (Stepan,

1971:128).

After the coup, a spokesman

for the UDN, which had supported it, recommended that the
new government should
appeal to the foreign capital necessary for the
undertaking of national reconstruction and above
all for the development of our unexplored reserves,
allowing equal treatment and freedom for the remit
tance of profits (cited in Ianni, 1971:81)

Vargas had struggled^ with internal opposition
since 1930, especially from Sab Paulo's free trade, anti
industrialist PD, which by the end of the Sstado Novo had
become the UDN. The UDN appears to have provided the core
of civilian conspirators which finally brought down the
Goulart regime in 1964. See also footnote 14, p . 71.
37By 1946 the United States State Department was
able to report that "as far as foreigners are concerned, the
present Brazilian constitution has abandoned the national
ist perspective (which emerged in the 1934 constitution
and had been strengthened in that of 1937), and has res
tored a regime of equality among foreigners and nationals"
(cited in Ianni, 1971:82).
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The return of electoral politics and the penetra
tion of the Brazilian economy by foreign interests did not
mean that industrialization stopped or that the Government
abandoned its attempts to control the e c o n o m y : ^ both
efforts continued, although as Ianni (1971) has shown, the
administrations elected in 1945, 1950, 1955 and 1960 alter39
Coffee and

nated in their openness to foreign capital.

agricultural exports continued to be the most important
sources of foreign exchange, but by the 1950*s, industry
was Brazil's most dynamic economic sector,

limited only by

the small size of the Brazilian consumer market.

40

After

the first flush of post-war imports, which destroyed
41
Brazil's foreign credits,
import restrictions were set up

38Schmitter (1973:184) coins the term "democradura"
for ,fthe adaptation of a basically authoritarian polity to
the minimal exigencies of a formal democracy." See also
Leff (1968:109, 116-7, 125).
^ T h u s the Dutra (1946-1950), Kubitschek (19551960) and post 1964 governments' philosophies were “liberal"
and inter-dependent.
The Vargas (1950-1953), Quadros/
Goulart (1960-1964) governments attempted more autonomous
nationalistic development schemes.
^ M o r e l y and Smith's (1973) experiments suggest that
the smallness of the Brazilian market--because of i n e q u i 
table income distribution--need not have limited economic
growth. Leff (1968:82-84) argues that by discriminating
against exports, the protection of internal prices lowered
growth and industrial development rates. His argument is
especially interesting in the light of the export policy
adopted in Brazil in the 1970's.
^ S e e Baer (1964:45-48) and Furtado (1963:230-40).
Dean believes the credits were squandered because the indus
trialists fell out of favor with the Dutra regime, reflec-
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favoring capital rather than consumer goods imports.

A

general developmental policy emerged, based on the one hand
on state planning and investment and on the other on the
attraction of foreign entrepreneurs to build capital goods
industries and consumer durables (Baer, 1965; Ianni, 1971:
146; Cohn, 1971:308-9).
Many of the centralist policies of the Vargas years
were abandoned after 1945.

The 1946 Constitution gave

states and municipalities far greater autonomy than had been
theits between 1930 and 1945 (Richardson,

1969). However,

this was not a return to the Federalism of the First Repub
lic.

The political system which coincided with the new

general developmental policy depended on three interrelated
phenomena: a strong president, bureaucratic expansion and
electoral populism.
In 1945 there were no organized political parties
except on the left (Singer, 1965:68; Skidmore,

1967:54).

After a significant electoral victory in 1945, the Commu
nist party was again outlawed in 1947 (Skidmore, 1967:6576), and politics were dominated largely by the PSD (Par-

ting its liberal bias. Cohn (1971:305-6) disagrees with all
three and argues that the credits were useless anyway be
cause they were not transferable to pay the existing debt to
the United States.
"They could not be used in a more dyna
mic manner to solve the internal and external disequilibria
in the Brazilian economy (the British debt was used mostly
to acquire railroads controlled by that country in Brazil,
in a completely unproductive transaction)" (1971:306).
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tido.Social Deroocratico). the PTB (Partido Trabalhista
Brasileiyo) and the UDN (Uniao Democratica Nacional).

The

PSD was artificially created by the Vargas government be
fore it was deposed in 1945, and was drawn from the remnants
of old rural machines and new industrialists.

The PTB was

a government created, synd i c a l i s t labor party, and the UDN
was formed out of the old Sao Paulo Partido Democratico
and the Uniao Democratica Brasileira of the Vargas years.
The UDN united all anti-Vargas forces under its consis
tently liberal banner.

There were other parties, as well,

but none, including the political machine of Adhemar de
Barros (PSP— Partido Social Progressista). splintered off
from the old Partido Republicano Paulista. could attain
national expression without forming coalitions with one
the major three parties.
prominence.

of

Even these did not reach national

Nonetheless, they monopolized the electoral

and parliamentary aspects of politics (See Figure 15).
An electoral reform in 1934 had extended the suffrage
to women and expanded the electorate. Nonetheless, the right
to vote was still limited to the literate.

Less than

twenty percent of the population voted in the presidential
elections of these years (See Figure 16).

As Brazilian

electoral democracy developed, politicians were elected on
the basis of what material and ideological inducements they
could offer their supporters.

At the lower levels of

society the inducements could include free food, medical
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Figure 15.
First
Republic
and
early
Vargas
years
(18981937)

National and Paulista political parties

Partido
Republicano
Paulista
(1898-1937)

Partido
Democratico
(Paulista)
(1926-1932)
Frente Unica (SP - 1932)
Uniao
Democratica
Brasileira
(1935-1937)

Estado
Novo
(19371935)
Populist
years
(19451964)

Partido
Social
Progressista
(SP - 19451965)

Partido
Trabalhista
Brasileiro
(1945-1965)

Uniao
Democratica
Nacional
(1945-1965)

Partido
Social
Democratico
(1945-1965)
Military
Dictator
ship
(1964present

Alian^a
Renovadora
Nacional
(1965present)

Movimento
Democratico
Brasileiro
(1965present)
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Figure 16.

Presidential elections in Brasil

Date of
Election

President
Elected

3/1/94
3/1/98
3/1/02
3/1/06
3/1/10
3/1/14
3/1/18
6/13/18
3/1/22
3/1/26

Prudente de Morais
Manuel F. Campos Salles
F. Rodrigues Alves
Afonso Pena
Hermes da Fonseca
Venceslau Braz
F. Rodrigues Alves
Epitacio Pessoa
Artur Bernardes
Washington Luis Pereira
de Souza
Julio Prestes
Eurico Gaspar Dutra
Getulio Vargas
Juscelino Kubitschek
Janio Quadros

3/1/30
12/2/45
10/3/50
10/3/55
10/3/60

No. voters
(millions)

%
Pop,

.3
.5
.6
.3
.6
.6
.4
.4
.8

2.2
2.7
3.4
1.4
2.8
2.4
1.5
1.5
2.9

.7
1.9
6.2
8.3
9.1
12.6

2.3
2.3
13.4
15.9
15.6
18.1

SOURCE: Love (1970:9).
assistance, jobs, football tickets and local improvements
in public utilities.

None of the parties organized formal

mechanisms with which to develop a mass base, but developed
rather— and only in a few areas-- a series of informal
patronal ties to their constituencies (Leeds and Leeds,
1975:205).

Predominantly the electorate received lots of

populist demagoguery and was maintained in a dependent
position vis-a-vis the politician.

Thus, for example, the

favelas (shantytowns or squatments) of Brazil's major cities
were used by politicians as “currais eleitorais11 (electo
ral corrals).

The residents of each curral eleitoral

received favors from local ward heelers or politicians
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in exchange for their votes.

42

While elected politicians could and often did
create a climate of political unrest, they did not usually
pose serious threats to the autonomy of the executive.

As

numerous writers on electoral politics have pointed out
(A. Leeds, 1964, 1965; E. Leeds, 1972; Leeds and Leeds,
1975; Galjart, 1964, 1965; Moraes, 1970; Medina, 1964),
the populist politicians of the era expanded their electo
rates by appealing to new groups, such as the peasants of
the Northeast, or the urban poor.

However, since the

dialectic of populism was based on a limited and dependent
electorate, accompanied by fear of losing control to the
masses (Weffort,

1965:170; Ianni, 1970:198), a more secure

electoral base for a given politician often meant the sepa
ration and splintering off of that base from another group,
thus preventing the development of class p olitics.^

For

E. Leeds (1972:53-56) describes the recognized
utility of electoral corrals in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas.
An administrator attempting to remove a favela from the elec
toral patronage system by offering various improvements and
avenues to self help without requiring votes in exchange was
summarily dismissed in 1962.
"This attempt to grant politi
cal independence to favelas was of course, most threatening
to^legislators who depended on favelas for electoral support"
^ G r o s s (1973) describes the cultural substratum of
a patronage system through the analysis of peasant pilgri
mages in the Northeast.
He shows that among peasants,
vertical ties predominate to the almost absolute exclusion
of horizontal ties. See also Galjart (1964, 1965).
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politicians who did not develop patronal ties among the
poor, politicians of the l e f t , ^ who did, appeared espe
cially threatening because they had large lower class
followings.

However, all of the populist styles current

in Brazil at that time--ge_tu.lismo , aflhemarismo, janismo.
nacionalismo. and most regional rural mobilization
45
— operated to blunt class distinctions.

efforts

At the middle and upper reaches of society, patronclient relations connected the administrative and electoral
systems.

Singer has written that

each electoral position has a certain political
weight which depends on the number of jobs the in
cumbent can distribute, on the size of the budget
he controls, on the electoral income that the posi
tion can command through increased or improved public
services.
The ministries and /state/ secretariats
of roads and public works are, for instance, considered
to be positions of great political weight. This
follows from a number of facts; 1) these positions
permit the control of the railroads, which are consi
dered to yield a high electoral income because of
their large number of employees, 2) the construction
of roads and public works (bridges, buildings, etc. )
also controlled by these positions permit the manage
ment of enormous budgets, from which it is almost
always possible to derive a considerable income in

^*For discussions of the weakness of the left in
Brazil during this period, see Harding (1964), Arriaga
(1964), Weffort (1965), Ianni (1965), Cohn (1965), Poerner,
1968:197-200), Erikson,(1970:277-80), de Kadt (1970), Myhr,
(1972). All labor, student and nationalist movements
of any account were controlled by the government, whereas
political parties of the left were disunited and had no
independent popular bases.
. ^ S e e Weffort (1965), Singer (1965), Ferreira
(1964), Medina (1964), Couto (196b), Beiguelman (1971), de
Kadt (1970), on the various populist styles of the epoch.
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collusion with furnishers of materials and sub
contractors (1965:81-82).
Elected politicians were in general far too busy satis
fying their clients and maintaining their own power bases
from above and below to formulate policy.

Congress was

placed in "the weak tactical position of reacting /to the
president 'sj initiatives, administrative decrees and
faits accomplis.(Leff. 1968:125).
The developmental policy adopted in Brazil during
these years led to a kind of "entrepreneurial plebicitary
regime,

with the president himself in the role of the

Great Entrepreneur . . . "

(Cohn, 1971:310).

implement the ideology of developmentalism

46

In order to
which emerged

during these years, the presidents were able to establish
new "parallel bureaucracies" (Dalland,

1972:41-42), when

the existing ones were politically recalcitrant, or con47
trolled by opposition interests.
The bureaucratic reforms
of the Vargas years were to some extent abandoned so as
to permit a greater number of appointed positions (Graham,
1968:140-42; Siegel,

1966).

46See Bonilla (1963), Debrun (1964). Weffort (1965:
192); Ianni (1971:183-85), Leff (1968:139-45), on the deve
lopment and functions of nationalist ideologies at this
time.
^ M o t t a (1972:217) writes that "bureaucracy became
the institution that would revive the mechanism of elec
toral clans" through panelinhas. Bureaucratic inertia as
well as political opposition within given bureaucracies led
to the creation of autonomous and parallel agencies.
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Public employment soared, especially in the early
1960's (See Figure 17), expanding the bureaucratic middle
income sectors, and with it the myriad series of informal
cliques that Leeds (1965) describes as "panelinhas"

(little

saucepans).

These informal and primary groups, formed for
48
mutual benefit,
operated at every level of Brazilian
bureaucracies and electoral politics.
panelinha

Horizontally,

members took care of each other% needs; but

each panelinha was also inserted in vertical "tactical
corps of supporters" called an "isre-jinha" (a little church)
which allowed the benefits of patronage to flow up and
down the social scale (Leeds, 1965:392).
Several contradictory consequences followed from
this political organization.

In spite of the political

opening and the re-emergence of re gional power groups, the
executive was strengthened.

Although the 1950*s and early

1960’s had a politically unstable appearance,

49

the process

which Weffort was to call "the consecration of the State"

^Characteristically, a pane linha will consist of
"a customs official, an insurance man, a lawyer or two,
businessmen, an accountant, a municipal, state or federal
deputy and a banker with his bank" (Leeds, 1965:393). At
the lower or middle ends of the social scale, the profes
sions need not be so exalted.
^ T h e 1950's and early 1960's were filled with ex
plosive rhetoric on developmental, regional, constitutional
and partisan questions (see Skidmore, 1967; Debrun, 1964;
Hirschman, 1961; Ianni, 1971b, for examples).
There were
serious strikes (1953), a presidential suicide (Vargas,
1954), a presidential resignation (Quadros, 1961), and
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Figure 17.

Employment in the Federal Government.

a
o

I
I

SOURCE: Schmitter (1971:33).

R eprod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co p yrigh t owner. F u rthe r reprod u ction prohib ite d w ith o u t perm ission.

113
(1965:195) and the strengthening of the president was not
impeded.

The president's powers of appointment, bureau

cratic creation and the clientelism which characterized
electoral politics served in general to insulate him from
serious political pressures (Leff, 1964:126).
Clientelism, rather than electoral politics,was
the potential weakness in the system.
out

As Scott has pointed

in the language of political science, clientelism

and the attendant graft and corruption serve as “post legis
lative mechanisms for interest aggregation" (1969:326).
This means that those functionaries who did not have direct
access to situations in which policies were decided and
made into law, could in myriad and secret ways affect the
implementation of these laws in their own interests.

The

result was a drain on government resources and perhaps also
on government p o l i c y . ^

However, Erikson's analysis of the

Labor Ministry in the early 1960's (1970;140ff) shows that
clientelism could also be used programatically.

This

constitutional crises in which on one occasion an elected
president, and on another a vice president (Kubitschek in
1955; Goulart in 1961) were almost prevented from taking
office.
^®Leff goes so far as to suggest that the clien
telism and corruption in Brazilian bureaucracies during the
populist era acted as a kind of information tax on foreign
interests and businesses, and thus unwittingly and indi
rectly may have supported nationalist independent economic
development.
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occurred under Labor Minister Almino Affonso, whose
strategic use of patronage in the Labor Ministry and Social
Security Institutes began to impinge on national policy
making and to undermine the centralized, ultimately presi
dential, control of labor.

That Almino's efforts were

perceived as a threat to presidential strength, regardless
of the political ideology, is attested by his prompt
replacement as minister.
Nonetheless, while there was little threat to
presidential strength from within the political system,
the Goulart regime was toppled by a military coup in
1964.

On the surface, the coup was the result of presi

dential interference in military affairs and military
discipline (stepan, 1970).
plotters

His interference united civilian

with military plotters against him, and the

military plotters with uncommitted or pro-Goulart officers
within the army.
The underlying reasons for the coup, and for the
existence of plotters, however, were more complex.

By the

1960's growth had ceased, and the economy was plagued by
inflation.

In an expanding economy it is possible that

electoral populism and patronage might have been able to
meet the claims and expectations raised.

In a contracting

economy, populism created aspirations and tensions which it
could not resolve. These tensions themselves generated a
fear of loss of control to the masses, a fear expressed in
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the civilian plot against the regime.

Indeed, Jose' Nun

has argued that the combination of decreased economic growth
with increased working class organization and strength
(Nun, 1967:91)

led the military to act, in the interests

of a middle class to overturn the populist regime to
prevent "premature democratization" (1968:147).
Like other arguments which hypothesize a middle
class initiative in Brazilian development, this argument
depends on a number of fundamental misreadings of the
Brazilian situation.

First of all, as we have seen,

populism did not lead to increased working class organi
zation and strength.

The tenuous hold that labor leaders

had over rank and file workers, especially during the
1964 coup, attests to populism's ultimate weakness in
this respect (Erikson,

1970:280-84).

Second, although middle income sectors had in
creased dramatically as a consequence of bureaucratic
expansion associated with populism, especially in its
later years, there is no evidence that these sectors
as yet constituted a middle class.

Expectations that such

a class might form were characteristic of this period.
However, as Leeds (1965) has shown, the expansion of middle
income sectors reflected an expansion in the clientelistic
networks of the "classes" rather than the emergence of a
structurally discrete group.

This is perfectly apparent

in the mobilization techniques used by the civilian plotters
of the coup to include middle income groups in demonstra
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tions against the regime.

Siekman (1964) and Blume (1967)

have shown that the civilian organizers of the plot
against Goulart were a small group of industrialists and
businessmen (newspaper owners, editors, bank owners and
managers, lawyers, etc.) in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.
Many were affiliated with the liberal UDN and with North
American interests in Brazil.

Recruitment to the study

organization which they formed (IPES -- Instituto de P e s quisas e Estudos Sociais) was conducted in a "personal"
way (Blume, 1967:47). IPES drew on material from a North
American foundation (Siekman,

1964:148) and launched a

massive anti-communist and anti-Goulart campaign.

The

support which they generated among middle income groups,
for example, in the March for the Family and Democracy
in Sao Paulq was mobilized by personal telephone calls on
the part of industrialists' wives, as well as by television
and newspaper announcements (Foland,

1967; Blume, 1967).

Finally, it is interesting that Nun's position on
middle class power,

like that of most modernization theo

rists, coincides with a neglect of foreign economic and
political interests in the Brazilian situation.

His ana

lysis of the economic crisis suggests that Brazil was
developing in a vacuum.

According to Nun, the import

substitution process "exhausted itself" without the country
"having found a pattern of self sustained development" (1967:
91).

In fact, however, the economic crisis was inherent

in Brazil's relationship to the world economy— specifically
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with North American expansionism.

It is true that infla

tion, which at first had played a significant role in
generating the funds for Brazil's industrialization (Baer,
1965:103-105; Ianni, 1971:190; Wogart,

1972:167),51 was

reducing the buying power of lower income groups, increa
sing the cost of production and thus deflating profits
(Ianni, 1971:192).

Monetary stabilization was politically

impossible to impose and the economy had reached an
impasse.

Fishlow has shown (1973), however, that infla

tion was the result of the monopolistic way in which the
industrial sector was structured (1973:76) and of the
Government tendency to raise prices for public services.
In addition, he argues, the economic impasse grew out
of cycles inherent in the foreign dominated process of
import substitution.

This process is,

virtually by definition . . . bunched . . .
Import substitution
introduces new lines of

51-In Brazil the redistributive effects of infla
tion acted as a technique of forced savings (Ianni, 1971:
171); working class salaries were held below price raises,
with the effect of inflating profits and savings.
"Wor
kers did not necessarily suffer in their living standards,
but the increase of the living standard was slower than the
increase of the real national product. • . . The declining
share of the wage sector contributed to the large retained
earnings which were used by the private sector in its in
vestment program, while the higher investment proportion
of the government in comparison to its savings proportion
suggests that through the inflationary process, the govern
ment managed to transfer savings from the private to the
public sector. It is clear that the redistributive factor
of Brazilian inflation was able to work itself out because
the wage earning sector was not strong enough to insure
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domestic production . • . such activities there
fore experience initial rates of growth higher than
those possible over the longer term. Accompanying
inflation and balance of payments problems mask
the problem until too late . . . In Brazil, the
import substitution investment boom of the late
1950*s was soon followed by deceleration of product
growth in the early 1960's and a diminished incen
tive to invest . . . because much of it was foreign
financed, the ultimate balance of payments crisis
was intensified (1973:104-105).
National entrepreneurs became clients to the
government, not only because of the size of government
enterprises, but also because import substitution in con
junction with foreign investment led to a substitution of
entrepreneurs as well (Cohn, 1971:314; Dean, 1969:237;
Ianni, 1971:177).

As foreign companies came to control

important sectors of production (automobiles, electricity
and cigarettes were between eighty and ninety percent
foreign; pharmaceuticals and machinery companies were
seventy percent foreign /Cohn, 1971:314/), Brazilian
entrepreneurs were increasingly reduced to the status of
secondary partners to foreign capitalists and petitioners
to the central government.
Nonetheless, it is interesting that before the
1964 coup, it was the foreign companies, despite all their
advantages which were hit the hardest.
The foreign firms often assumed that on the basis
of their size, and especially their administrative
and technical know how, they would be able to domi-

the constancy of its share in the national product" (Baer,
1965:123-24).
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nate the local market . . . the foreign firms had
special disadvantages of their own. Their larger
size and expatriate managerial and technical staffs
contributed to higher overhead costs.
Because they
employed a "cost plus" pricing policy which attemp
ted to recover overhead costs in the markup, this
often placed them at a competitive disadvantage.
Furthermore, because of the foreign firms* reluc
tance (stemming from fears about the exchange rate
and political conditions ) to increase their capi
tal commitments in Brazil, they usually did not bring
with them sufficient working capital to provide sub
stantial suppliers credits to local clients. Hence,
they were sometimes at a competitive disadvantage
vis-a-vis domestic firms . • . Because of these
factors, when field investigation of the /capital
goods/ sector was undertaken in 1964, the foreign
rather than the domestic firms were bearing a dis
proportionate share of its excess capacity and low
profit margins (Leff, 1968a:36-37)•
This may help to explain the extremely favorable
environment provided by the United States for the 1964 coup.
More or less discreet efforts to co-opt leadership elites
had continued during the populist years as a continuation
of the pro-American propaganda campaign begun so success52
While American

fully during the World War II years.

businessmen were too afraid to participate directly in
the civilian plot to overthrow the government (Blume, 1967:
222), the American embassy supported the civilian plotters*

See Poerner (1968:28, 253) on the State Depart
ment's efforts to dominate the Brazilian Student Union
(UNE) in the early 1950*s, and on the creation of AUI
(Associacao Universitaria Interaroericana), a Brazilian and
American business as well as State Department financed
foundation whose objective was to introduce future politi
cal leaders to "good capitalism, as it is
exercised in
the United States."
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propaganda efforts.

53

A year before the coup, the United

States began to withold financial support from the Goulart
government and to actively seek out the president's poli
tical opponents to sabotage federal programs; these mea
sures and its support of political opponents of the govern
ment exacerbated the political and financial crisis (Stepan,
1971:124-25; Skidmore,

1967:322-23; Roett, 1968:322).

Mi

litary aid was even offered to the conspirators, but it
was refused.

Because it was refused, American officials

could state unequivocally that the revolution was "one
hundred percent purely Brazilian" (Skidmore, 1967:325-26).
Given the extent of North American interests and the in
ternal political structure of Brazil, however, it is in
appropriate to credit Brazilian middle income sectors with
the initiative for the coup.
Military Dictatorship (1964 to the present)
The pattern of Brazilian development during the
populist years was based on a strong executive, government
investment and the attraction of foreign capital.

These

features continue as cornerstones of development policy
after 1964 but on a scale not approached by previous
regimes. In spite of the closeness of ties between the new

■^Specifically with the publication of UNS. Instrumento de Subversao. by Sonia Seganfredo (Blume, 1967:215).
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Brazilian military government and the United States, ^
the course of Brazilian development after 1964 was not
that of a nation forcibly reincorporated into the hegemony
of United States imperialism.

55

The pattern that emerged,

most markedly after 1963, was that of a radically new kind
of economic development, spearheaded by a rapidly evolving
partnership between the Brazilian government and transnatio
nal corporations.

Increasingly,

the country has become the

site of manufacturing based on sophisticated technology,
buttressed by the highest forms of f i n a n c e . P e r h a p s more

^ S e e Stepan,(1971:124-28), Skidmore (1967:322-30),
Schneider, (1971) on the institutional and personal rela
tions between the Brazilian and the American military.
^ T h e nature of the political and economic changes
which occurred in Brazil from 1964 on were not immediately
apparent.
Some writers felt that Brazil had come even fur
ther into the American 11imperialist" domain in a regime of
"colonial fascism" (Ianni, 1971a:211; Jaguaribe, 1964:182;
Frank, 1964, 1964a, 1965), or one of restoration of the
corporativism of the Estado Novo (Schmitter, 1973; Erikson,
1972; Skidmore, 1973:31-32).
Others, as Cardoso (1973),
Morely and Smith (1973) and Fishlow (1973:101) have noted,
were concerned about the limits political conservativism
would place on economic growth.
If the argument put forth
earlier is correct, the Estado Novo and the centralization
which preceded it developed to protect Brazilian interests
from the impersonal rationality of the world market, whereas
the new Brazilian state exists to integrate Brazil into the
world market in a different way, which entails high rates of
growth.
^Technological sophistications appear in the forms
of the capability of manufacturing in situ jet planes, which
were hitherto imported.
Testimony to the financial sophisti
cation involved is the development of large investment banks
which began to appear as of 1966 (As Grandes Cpmpanias. ......
1973:75-82, et passim).
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importantly, these massive infusions of capital and
technology have been coupled with a major effort to pro
vide a new economic infrastructure which would articulate
the new economic order.

Should this effort be successful,

Brazil would stand alone in Latin America as a country
capable of becoming a sub-imperial power in her own right
for Latin America and with imperial aspirations of her
own in the rest of the underdeveloped market.
It is the argument of this thesis that only in this
context can we see the beginning of middle class formation:
that is, the formation of a group structurally separated
from the "classes" and performing distinct functions.
functions are especially important.

Two

The first is to enforce

in various ways the developmental and political policies of
the central government.

The second is to support the deve

lopment of Brazil's industries by providing an insatiable
market for consumer goods.

Both of these functions grow

out of the changing cirexamstances which followed the 1964
coup.
In order to understand these changes and the Brazi
lian "economic miracle," Cardoso (1973) has formulated the
model of "associated dependent development."

In this model

he emphasises that the process of associated development
cannot be understood as a function of purely national
initiatives: indeed, the nation state is reduced to the
role of a single administrative unit within an internatio
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nal division of labor, increasingly controlled by trans
national corporations (cf. also Wallerstein, 1974; Barnet
and Muller, 1974).

As the price for hosting technological

and financial transfers, the nation state must attempt
to guarantee internal stability while committing itself to
infrastructural development."^
In this course of development, a premium has been
put on speed by the government, probably prodded on by
transnationals, whose investments are under considerable
pressure elsewhere in the world from national governments
and whose commitments to areas that do not suit their
needs are notoriously fluid (Barnet and Muller,
81-83,

189-210).

1974:55-56,

No effort has been spared by the govern

ment to make Brazil safe for transnationals, from which
the successive governments believe that all the blessings
of economic development will flow.
In its headlong rush towards development, the
government has faced two major obstacles: 1) opposition
from major Brazilian industrialists, expressed primarily
in the arena of national politics, and 2) the problems
of massing sufficient capital to underwrite infrastruetu-

^Infrastructural development under state owned
corporations is the nature of the Brazilian government's
commitment.
But here also the transnationals are preemi
nent, as the government itself is not capable of produ
cing railroad engines, but General Electric is; nor is it
capable of producing telecommunications equipment, but
RCA is, to cite a few examples.
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ral costs, which are staggering.

Symptomatic of the

increasing opposition is the repression for which the
government has become notorious since 1968.

The capital

accumulation problem has led to the overhaul of the
Brazilian credit and taxation systems, accomplished pri
marily under the aegis of Minister of the Economy, A. Delfim Netto (1968-1974) (Fishlow, 1973).

Let us consider

each in turn.
Under populism, Brazilian industrialists participa
ted in the national government, albeit as clients.

Imme

diately after the 1964 coup, in which many of them took
part, it became clear that the new government was to leave
the door wide open to the penetration of foreign capital
and the rational workings of the market.

In effect, the

priorities of the government
were to the establishment of a functioning free
market system, perhaps even more than to the struggle
against inflation . . . In the long run these goals
were viewed as mutually compatible, indeed as indis
pensably linked: in the short run, they might conflict,
to the consistent disadvantage of stabilization
(Fishlow, 1973:80).
Brazilian industrialists without transnational
linkages needed some form of economic protection in order
not to be gobbled up by the transnationals.

The effect of

the government's free market policies were not long in
bearing bitter fruit as these industrialists began to be
forced into bankruptcy, or were bought out by transnationals
(lanni, 1971:262-65).

Increasingly imperiled by the exe
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cutive branch's free market policies, Brazilian business
men sought to fight back through the legislative branch of
government, in which they were still powerful.

Public

debate was focused on the issue of denationalization
(desnacionalizapao) of the Brazilian economy (Moreira Alves,
1972:163-78; Ianni,

1971:262, footnote 37).

For four years

(1964-1968) a feverish struggle ensued between the legisla
tive and executive branches of government.

In late 1968

the executive branch made its definitive move: through
a series of repressive actions it removed Brazilian industrialists cum politicians from power.

58

A series of Institutional acts, notably Institutio
nal Act 5 (AI-5) in 1968, removed politics to the near
exclusive domain of the president and his military advisors.
The political rights of many prominent politicians had
been abolished in 1964 and 1965.

The old parties had been

abolished in 1965 and were replaced with two government
parties, ARENA

J f o n g Y f l l l f l C f l > and a loyal

opposition, MDB (jtoiasa£.9. POTlgfiCgVifiSJtegafeteitg) °

Indi

rect elections for the president and state governors were
instituted at that time. While the formalities of indirect
elections are maintained, state governors were removed at
the president's will.

In 1968, however, federal, state

and municipal legislatures were recessed, and when recon-

^ F o r the "igniting spark" of the 1968 military
shift, see Schneider (1970) and Moreira Alves (1973).
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vened, stripped of most of their power*

Habeas corpus

was suspended; official violence reached new proportions,
with the aid of United States anti-insurgency training
courses.

While the poor had always been brutalized by

the police, arbitrary physical abuse and torture was
practised against members of the middle and upper income
strata for the first time, in an effort to stamp out the
wave of political terrorism which arose in response to the
repression.

Rigid censorship of the press and academic

community was instituted, and the climate of fear and poli
tical apathy which developed was shrouded by nationalist
public relations symbols created or inflated by the govern
ment.

In addition, courses in political indoctrination
59

are required at all educational levels.

The increasing control of political opposition
permitted the implementation of fiscal policies supportive
of capital accumulation.

Although many had been developed

before 1964, they had been at that time politically impos
sible to pursue.

These included policies to increase

federal revenues and create a rational capital market

-*^See Schmitter (1970), Truskier (1970), American
Committee (1970), Moreira Alves (1972, 1973), Rosenbaum
and Tyler (1972), Bishops (1973). The celebration of the
150th aniversary of Brazil’s independence included the
repatriation of Emperor Pedro ll's bones from Portugal;
these were sent on a funeral cortdge around the country.
Other nationalist symbols include the building of the TransAmazonic highway and heavily publicized disputes with the
United States over the price of soluble coffee.
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undistorted by inflation.

Rationalizing the capital market

created funds for government investment in infrastructure
(e.g. minerals, electric power, communications, transpor
tation.

See Quern e Quem, 1972:75).

Improved tax collec

tion (Hinnichs and Hahar, 1972) and nominally redistribu
tive (but actually instruments of forced savings and capi
tal concentration) federal institutions (BNH, FGTS, PIS,
P I N ^ ) have vastly expanded federal revenues.

Monetary

correction and "crawling peg" devaluations have reduced
financial uncertainty by preventing currency speculations
and the devaluation of financial balances through infla
tion (Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972:17-18).*^

Because of

The BNH (National Housing Bank) was founded in
1964 with an initial capital of one million cruzeiros. To
these funds were added those of the FGTS (Guarantee Fund
for Time of Service) formed in 1966 and based on an eight
percent payroll tax levied on employers. The FGTS is a
pension fund to which employees or their heirs only have
access on limited occasions: marriage, house building,
death or retirement (Hughes, 1972:128; Otero, n.d.t!09).
PIS (Program for Social Integration) is another pension
plan paid for by employers to which workers also have limi
ted access (Fishlow, 1973:11). PIN (National Integration
Program) is an effort to resettle the Northeastern poor
along the Trans-Amazonic highway. All of these plans are
forced savings mechanisms which finance Government deve
lopment programs.
61D. Kleinman*s letter to the New York Times
(Business and Finance, Sunday, April 28, 1974) emphasises
the creation or saving of capital rather than the halting
of inflation as the prime motive among the economists—
including himself--who developed the monetary correction
scheme.
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government incentives, export revenues have increased and
continued foreign investments have reduced Brazil's
shortage of foreign exchange.

Although the national debt

almost doubled between 1964 and 1971 (Cardoso, 1973:150),
international financial agencies have "found Brazil to be
an exeqiary debtor, and have maintained high levels of
lending" (Skidmore, 1973:24).
This style of economic development entails grave
social costs.

A number of writers have pointed out the

increasingly regressive pattern of income distribution
and the fact that the development of the industrial sector
is not expected to significantly increase employment
(Fishlow, 1972, 1973; Cardoso, 1973; Langoni, 1973; Hughes,
1972:134).

Even among the employed, the purchasing power

of real wages has been reduced, although the effects of
this may have been mitigated for some by increased credit
facilities.

Nonetheless, an increasing number of women

and younger people have felt the need to supplement
family incomes by joining the labor market, in spite of
the low salaries they receive (Langoni, 1973:15, 58, 83,
97).

The labor structure was reorganized under tighter

central control and the unions which had developed during
the previous decade outside the official structure were
abolished.

Syndicate leaders were replaced by men amenable

to the new government's wishes and political orthodoxy
is required of all office holders in the labor structure.
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In a very real sense, Brazil's growth depends on a poor
and politically docile population.
It is within this scheme that middle income
sectors have been called upon to perform new functions.
These sectors resemble their counterparts under populism.
Indeed, the trend towards increased bureaucratic employ
ment characteristic of that period continued after 1964,
if at a somewhat slower rate (See Figure 17).

Under

populism, however, bureaucratic employment among middle
sectors represented an extension of the ‘'classes*' and their
clientelistic panelinhas.

Since 1964 many of these net

works have been broken through bureaucratic reform.

Bu

reaucracies have been systematically moralized and ratio
nalized: they have been purgad of corrupt, clientelistic
and other undesirable elements.

"Influence," except at

the highest levels, has sharply decreased.

Whereas

corruption and patronage had previously served as "post
legislative mechanisms for interest aggregation," the
bureaucrats are now expected to lubricate the system for
"associated dependent development."

To quote Delfim

Netto, Minister of the Economy, and central architect of
the Brazilian miracle,
As far as the direct action of the government is
concerned, nothing is more important than 1) the
development of a truly efficient bureaucracy which
is conscious of and responsible for its actions,
2) the introduction of modern management methods
in government enterprises, including the creation
of a stable cadre of administrative and technical
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personnel. . • It is absolutely imperative to
modernize public administration • . . so as to
inculcate in the bureaucracy the values which are
compatible with the society we wish to build.
Without modernization . • . it will never be pos
sible to maintain the continuity of objectives,
because it is clear that on the level that really
counts . . . who administers the country is the
bureaucrat: he is the one who decides who does and
who does not pay taxes . . . In the case of indi
rect action, nothing seems more important to me
than . . . /to/ free the entrepreneur from sibylline
regulations, from contradictory economic policies
and from the ppygr of t£e, a^gjj.aKed^bu^eaucrat11
(emphasis added, cited in lanni, 1971:248-50).
In addition to their function as lubricators and
enforcers of government policy, middle income sectors have
been called upon to support the internal market through the
consumption of luxury consumer durables which the present
economic scheme emphasises (Cardoso, 1973:149).
process, the concept of classe media

In this

(middle class) has

become widely diffused through the media and is associated
with life style (clothing, appliances, automobiles, all
made in Brazil) and is increasingly identified with poder
consumidor. the power to consume.

Being middle class is

a matter not of political participation, but of political
neutrality and economic consumption.
Such a middle class is a far cry from that which
appears so frequently as a prime mover in modernization
theory.

This chapter has shown that Brazil*s political

and economic development has responded to changes in its
relations with other actors in the world economic system,
and not to initiatives from middle income sectors.

Further
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more, it has argued that until very recently, there has
been no middle class, but only middle income sectors,
which have been variously drawn into the privileged
arena of ruling elites.

This was true despite the expan

sion of middle income sectors as a result of over all
government centralization and economic growth, which
created more middle income positions.

Finally, recent

Brazilian history suggests that conditions now favor the
development of a middle c lass: we have hypothesized on the
basis of the historical evidence that a class formation
process has begun.

The following chapters present

fieldwork data in support of this hypothesis.

They show

how families of three distinct social origins (local
elites, immigrants and bureaucrats) have been affected by
shifting phases of Brazilian development in this century,
and how despite their dissimilar origins and varied careers,
they increasingly form part of a homogeneous class of
consumers, even to the point of expressing a shared
rudimentary consciousness of their position.
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CHAPTER H I
SANTANA, FROM THE TOP OF THE HILL, 1900-1930
The next two chapters will describe in detail the
three groups which field research suggested constitute
significant middle income sectors of Santana.

It will be

shown that the three groups--an old local elite, a foreign
born commercial sector and bureaucrats of rural origins-were distinct.

They had different social origins, pursued

different careers, emerged as politically visible actors
in different historical periods, and on the whole recog
nized their separateness from each other.

Nevertheless,

the three groups underwent, albeit in different time
periods, a parallel process of progressive exclusion from
political power with attendant economic implications.
Chapter V will show that these processes are leading to
what appears to be a shared consciousness of class based on
a sense of exclusion.

In Chapter IV I will concentrate

on the second two groups--immigrants and bureaucrats.
The present chapter deals with Santana's old elite,
which coalesced during the First Republic and was already
in decline by the 1930's.

The greater time depth in their

family histories allows for a more complete analysis of
the implications of political marginalization, and suggests
a model for the understanding of the careers of the
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bureaucrats and immigrants.

By the 1920's, Santana's

elite families had become intermediaries and brokers in
the larger political system of Sao Paulo.

They stood on

the lower fringes of the ruling class of the city as a
whole.

Their economic fortunes were intricately related

to the growth of Sab Paulo city between 1900 and 1930.
Political developments following 1930 sheared most of them
off from the city's ruling groups, and left only the most
fortunate with sufficient capital to be able to maintain
themselves for a generation or two.

Most of Santana's

elite families lived through a brief period of local
glory and then fell back anonymously into Santana's and
the city's growing middle income sectors.
In 1934 Santana was the most heavily populated
district north of the Tiete River, with 43,588 inhabitants.1
At the turn of the century, however, the area appeared to
have been hardly touched by the economic forces which had
transformed the city of Sao Paulo into a metropolis.

The

city council barely concerned itself with the lands to the
north of the city on either side of the Tiete River; its
attentions were limited to the requirement that landowners
keep a portion of their land in public service for open
pasturage and road maintenance (Mendes Torres, 1970:43).
In 1880 public transportation did not extend beyond the

*The area was already reduced by subdivision.
above, Chapter I, p. 48.

See
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bridge which crossed the Tiete River: the urban and rural
zones were divided by the hog pens which were established
that year on the northern and western outskirts of town,
including in Santana (Mendes Torres,

1970:52).

The main

building of the old Jesuit Fazenda Sant'Anna had been
decrepit and run down since 1863 when it had housed indigent
minors: ten years later it was more run down, housing
equally indigent smallpox victims.

Such development as

had come to Santana appeared limited to the establishment
of Sao Paulo's first regatta clubs on either side of the
river (1905) and the building of the Colegio Santana,^ an
expensive girl's boarding school perched high on the hill
overlooking the Tiete valley and the city beyond.

The

area appeared unpopulated and abandoned to the rich who
lived in the center of the city.

A wealthy coffee

baroness recalls the Sao Paulo of her youth:
We would take long carriage outings through the
suburbs.
We went to Braz, to Gloria and principally
to the Ponte Grande /Big Bridge to Santanq/ on dusty
roads, crossing uncultivated lands and sighting
here and there a poor hovel or a caipira 2hillbilly7
passing by with his little donkey loaded with the
sparse products of his garden, which he was going
to try to sell in the city" (cited in Mendes Torres,
1970:58).

2

For many years the massive structure of the
Colegio Santana and the adjoining chapel built by local
landowners were the only reference points in municipal
documents dealing with opening new roads or boundary dis
putes in the area. Santana was beyond the city limits for
many of the city's inhabitants.
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The baroness's impressions notwithstanding, Mendes
Torres's history of Santana (1970) provides some indica
tions that Santana's economy and population had in fact
begun to grow before the turn of the century.

Santana's

population had risen from 970 in 1825 to 7,000 in 1900
(Mendes Torres, 1970:11; Masarolo, 1971:85).3

Some of

this growirh in population is attributable to foreign
immigration.

In 1877 the Provincial Government established

in Santana a colonial nucleus for Italian immigrants*

By

1888 there were 136 persons in the colony (94 Italians
and 39 Brazilians) who planted corn, beans, potatoes
and vineyards.

While foreign immigrants did not flood

Santana as they did other central neighborhoods of the
city, their contribution was not inconsiderable and con
tinued well on into the new century.

An 1893 analysis

of the statistics of birth in Santana revealed that for
107 births, only 48 were to Brazilian parents.

By 1927

more than half of the student population in Santana was
of foreign extraction (Mendes Torres, 1970:66-67, 76, 110).

3Indeed, according to a local petition, the
smallpox hospital was moved out of Santana in 1878 because
of the “inhabitants of the /Italian./ colony of Santana, the
large number of carters and mule train drivers that come to
the capital from different parts of the state, the large
numbers of immigrants residing in the neighborhood of Luz
/across the river from SantanaJ and the large numbers of
carters and inhabitants in Luz and Santana," who presumab
ly might catch and spread the disease (cited in Mendes
Torres, 1970:60).

R e prod u ced w ith p erm issio n o f the co p yrig h t ow ner. F u rthe r re p rod u ction prohib ite d w ith o u t perm ission.

136
Santana's population growth was not only due to
foreign immigration, however.

We may infer additional

growth in the population from the city records which
reveal that, beginning in the 1860's, land disputes and
requests to the city council for land increased in the
Northern Zone of the city.

In 1869 lands which had been

abandoned and which had been in the public domain for
over forty years began to be enclosed and sold privately
(Mendes Torres, 1970:50).

In order to prevent private

individuals from planting rapidly growing trees and thus
being able to claim the land as private property, the city
council ordered the area ploughed under (Mendes Torres,
1970:50).

Disputes continued during the rest of the

century, with complaints to the city council about the
difficulty of maintaining boundary lines: markers were
constantly stolen,

leaving the lands unenclosed, and

thus in the public domain.

In 1881 a commission set

up to study the land claims concluded that
in reality the public has been in possession for a
long time, but even when proven that a piece of
land is of private ownership, it would be convenient
to expropriate it for the public's utility (cited
in Mendes Torres, 1970:56).
The meadow near the Ponte Grande over the Tiete was
declared in the public domain, but the decision was over
turned the same year by the Provincial Government, thus
opening the way to increased settlement and real estate
development in Santana.
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In 1889 on the eve of the declaration of the
Republic, Santana was declared a separate district of
the peace; by 1900 Santana was allotted 3.2 percent of the
budget for city improvements (Masarolo,

1971:85).

portation to and from the district had improved.
1865 the Ponte Grande

Trans
In

over the Tiete had been repaired,

and in 1893 the Cantareira Railroad through Santana was
inaugurated.

It was built to improve contact between

the growing city and the waterworks and reservoirs which
fed the city's water supply from the Cantareira mountains
north of Santana.

But, by the beginning of the century

it was being used by passengers, as well as to transport
agricultural produce to the city's municipal markets
(Mendes Torres, 1970:112).

In addition, Santana was

serviced by horse drawn trolleys which provided suffi
ciently bad service to incite two riots in 1906.

The

animals were unhitched and the trolleys were set on
fire and sent rolling down the hill.

The service was

replaced in 1908 by an electric trolley service
(Mendes Torres,

1970:90).

A commercial center was forming in Santana
although the main street there
looked more like a road than a street, still
travelled by mule trains and ox carts, with low
wattle and daub houses, immense yards surrounded
by bamboo or vine fences, and with little illu
mination (Mendes Torres, 1970:90).
In between the fenced yards along the main street were
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hardware stores, grocery stores (secos e molhados). and
saddle and leather goods shops and blacksmith and car
pentry shopp.
house.

By 1913 Santana had its first movie

In 1911 the center of Santana had 651 buildings.

By 1918 the number had more than doubled to 1707 and the
main streets had been paved (Mendes Torres, 1970:93,102).
The area was fully electrified in 1922 along with the
city’s more distant neighborhoods such as Jardim America
and Ypiranga.

In the early part of the century, Santana

had sixteen public schools and by 1927, the student popu
lation alone was at least 10,812 (Mendes Torres, 1970:84,111).
Mendes Torres is of little assistance in explain
ing the reasons for Santana’s development during the first
three decades of the century, beyond stating the obvious
fact that the area's growth was a spin-off of the growth
of the city.

Santana was affected, just as other neigh

borhoods in Sao Paulo were, by the city's growth.

The

family histories which I collected in Santana suggest
some of the specific ways a growing metropolis affected
the economy and social stratification of one of its
outlying neighborhoods.
The lands north of the Tiete River, including
Santana, were never coffee lands; they supported a mixed
economy based on agriculture and pasturage.

Landowners

raised cattle, grew sugar, beans, corn, manioc and fruit.
According to elderly informants in Santana, the larger
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establishments at the turn of the century, included lumber
yards, carpentry shops and brick and charcoal factories.
In addition to this, the area's most important economic
activity, dating back as far as the eighteenth century
consisted of the fattening and sale of mule and horse
trains which came from Braganya and Atibaia to the north.
It was because of this trade that landowners had been
required to maintain the roads in good conditions and
allocate part of their lands for open grazing (Mendes
Torres, 1970:43).
According to informants who had been part of the
elite which emerged in Santana over the first two decades
of the century, the city's growth affected their family
fortunes in a number of interrelated ways.

For large

local landowners and animal dealers, who formed the core
of the elite, animal sales increased as did trade in
general.

In addition, the area acquired urban real estate

value which further stimulated commercial interests and
construction.
As the city grew, an increasing number

of horses

and mules were sold to its expanding public services,
which used them for transportation, sanitary and security
services, at that time all based on animal traction.

The

most important buyer of animals was the growing Sao Paulo
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State Militia (Focyft.P.ybUE? d<j> gap.gsyjfl)4 which estab
lished its headquarters on the city side of the Tiete
River on the road to Santana in 1901.

The market for such

sales increased again in 1906 when the Forga Publica began
its expansion under French military advisors.^

To meet

this growing demand, local landowners, now with enclosed
fields, either bought whole mule and horse trains for
resale or rented out pasture land.

At least two local

landowners introduced dairy cattle, selling the milk
locally and across the river to the city.

6

Other landowners

and entrepreneurs established grocery stores and supply
houses for the animal trade.

Landowners who did this,

often in conjunction with other activities, moved their
families from their fazendas (large farms, rural establish
ments) and built houses in Santana on the slopes of the
hill.

^In 1909 an Army post for the 10th Pursuit
Company was established in the old Jesuit fazenda house.
It had housed transient military contingents since 1893.
In 1916 the main house, slave quarters and other outbuild
ings were torn down and a new fort was built. This insti
tution’s need for animals must have contributed to the
growth of the grazing and animal sales economy, although
it was not mentioned by any informants as a purchaser of
their families's animals.
^See Chapter II, p. 70.
^The home of one of these landowners, who was also
a druggist in the center of the city, was frequented by
law students who would spent "whole nights" having contests
over who could drink most freshly drawn milk at a single
try (Mendes Torres, 1970:83-84).
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We may estimate the importance of Santana's
growing commercial center from the traffic which passed
on its main street.

Although in 1926 the use of Santana's

local side streets by vehicles (either motorized or animal
drawn) was among the lowest of the neighborhoods around
city exits, Santana's main road, leading north to Atibaia,
Bragampa and southern Minas Gerais carried almost as much
traffic as the roads leading to the port of Santos or to
Rio de Janeiro, albeit predominantly animal drawn (Mendes
Torres, 1970:108-10).
In addition to the commerce which supplied the
animal trade, another activity which contributed to the
new elite's consolidation of wealth was local retail
commerce.

Santana's elite families supplied their own

needs from the more prestigious stores in the center of
the city:
Os comerciantes vendiam pro pessoal la de baixo,
pra caipirada id do Juqueri, Atibaia, Braganja.
Compravam na cidade pra vender aqui.
Nos iamos
pra cidade pra f a z e r a s compras.
Os outros compravam
dos mascates . . . Sao Paulo era tab pequeno que
compravamos da cidade, no Caltabiano, na Casa Machado
. . . e, telefonava pra casa, e eles mandavam os
meninos levar pra casa, e la escolhia. «
The storekeepers sold to the people down below, to
the hillbillies from Juqueri, Atibaia, Bragan^a.
They bought in town for resale here. We would do
our shopping in town.
The others would buy from
the travelling salesmen . . . Sao Paulo at that
time was so small that we would buy in town, at
Caltabiano, Casa Machado /stores which informants
said were prestigious and expens ivej . . • yes,
we would telephone the store, and they would send a
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boy with the merchandise and we would select it
at home.'
Besides selling animals, dairy farming and
commercial retailing, many local landowners developed
their lands, or sold them to real estate developers.

The

disputes with the municipality over the private as against
public ownership of land, which were characteristic of
the late nineteenth century, continued until 1918, when
public and private domains were clearly demarcated north
of the Tiete, leaving most of the flatlands by the river
and on the slopes of the hill in private hands.

8

A

modest real estate boom ensued as houses were built, sold
or rented to Santana*s growing population (Mendes Torres,
1970:107-108).
As far as one can tell from the names of early
Santana landowners mentioned by Mendes Torres, many may
have been relative newcomers to the area.

Elderly

informants are vague about how their ascendants acquired
land other than by inheritance.

In view of the undefined

status of much of the land at the beginning of the centu
ry, it is possible that unscrupulous means may have been

7Unless otherwise noted, all of the following
quotations were translated by the writer from interview
protocols.
Q

The land on which the airfield was subsequently
built remained in the public domain as a cavalry ground
for the Forca Publica. The State penitentiary property
was purchased from a private owner.
See Chapter I, p.38.
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Q

used.

Some of the landowners were of foreign, generally

northern European, origins, although by the turn of the
century, and certainly by the 1920*s, they were considered
11locals."

Only the nicknames such as "Chico .Frances" or

"Pedro Alemao" (French Chico, German Peter) betrayed their
non-Brazilian heritage.
Depois, esses estrangeiros^acaipiraram se. 0
franees, ou o alemao ja nao era lingua caseira.
Os frlhos e os netos todos casaram e ficaram aqui,
e faziam parte das familias.
Besides, these foreigners became Brazilianized
Aiterally, became hillbillies/* French or German
was no longer spoken in the home.
The sons and
grandchildren all married and stayed here, and
were part of the families.
The group also included foreigners of more recent
arrival, also northern European, who were of relatively
high socio-economic status.

They were bank managers in

the center of the city, liberal professionals, or ran
commercial enterprises.

Some of them acquired Santana

land by purchase or through marriage into landed families.
Most of the liberal professionals, however, were
Brazilians, not Europeans.

These came with their families

from areas in the interior such as the western part of the

For example, while informants are understandably
vague on this point, there does seem to have been a cause
celebre in the early part of the century involving the
double murder of two sisters, both major land heiresses.
They were killed by their husbands, one of whom had migrated
to the area, while the other was a landowner in his own
right and an important animal trader. The murders were in
the idiom of crimes passionals but observers were quick
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v’ale do Paraiba or the north of the state which were in
agricultural decline.

These families were typical of the

middle income type discussed by Marques de Saes (1973):
migrants from areas in decline, but highly educated and
politically well connected.

Families such as these bought

land in Santana, and provided valuable political contacts
to the local elite's political "pool."
It is possible to describe the outlines of a
"division of labor" among Santana's elite families: as we
shall see below, the local landowners and entrepreneurs
clearly controlled the most important economic resources,
land and trade, as well as the grass roots mechanisms of
electoral politics.

However, the liberal professionals of

Brazilian agrarian origins seem to have provided additional
intermediary links to the larger political system beyond
Santana.

Heads of these families were not ward heelers

or political bosses, but they ran the local party organi
zations, both for the Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP)
and the Partido Democratico (PD).

For instance, the

individual who owned the civil registry— an important
political plum— had spent much of his early career
acquiring ever larger, more important registries in the
northern part of Sao Paulo state, presumably by participa

te note the real estate sales and developments effected
by the animal trader. The other husband went to jail.
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ting in rural electoral machines, before he came to Sao
Paulo in the early 1920's.

In Sao Paulo he acquired a

labor accident registry in the center of the city, and
later a civil registry in Santana.

He lived and practiced

medecine in Santana, where he was for many years the
head of the local branch of the PRP.
In my sample, it was generally individuals like
these who came to Santana from areas in the interior,
who were cited by their descendants as having had per
sonal contacts with prominent political figures of the
First Republic, although, as we shall see, local indi
viduals had them as well.

Informants indicated that such

connections, ranging from various degrees of cousinhood
and god-parenthood, existed, and formed part of the
social and political capital upon which they could draw. ^
Moreover, it appears that the wives of such individuals
contributed significantly to setting the "tone" of local
life.

According to informants, they were far more pro

minent than other local women in organizing the religious
charities and festivities for which many informants
remember Santana of the First Republic.
Yet, regardless of this rudimentary internal

^ S t a t e governors and national presidents who
were mentioned were Rodrigues Alves, Heitor Teixeira
Penteado, Washington Luis and Julio PresteS. Mayors
and deputies mentioned were Pires do Rio, Franco da Rocha,
Francisco Morato, Alcantara Machado.
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division, the Santana elite appears to have been united
and highly self conscious of its local position.

For these

families, the population consisted of “as families"

(the

families)--themselves--and "a italianada la de baixo"
(literally "the Italians down below," referring to those
of the colony and others who lived on the meadowlands by
the river)— people who were socially as well as geographi
cally at the bottom of the Santana hill.
In part, the consciousness and solidarity of the
elite was cultural and derived from a sense of what it
meant to be of "good family."
Santana era urn bairro bom. Naquele tempo nao tinha
Jardim Europa, Jardim Paulista.
Santana tinha urn
dos melhores colegios: o Colegio Santana reunia
meninas do interior de boa familia e as de recursos
no bairro.
Minha irma foi la. Era um bairro de
familias medias, abastadas, os pobres estavam mais
la pra baixo.
Nao eram da elite dos juizes e desembargadores, dos advogados la da cidade, mais
eram de boa familia.^ Em Santana eramos mopas ricas.
Tinha negrinha,pra so ve>de empregada.
Santana was a good neighborhood.
In those days
there was no Jardim Europa or Jardim Paulista /ex
pensive neighborhoods in contemporary Sao PauloJ.
Santana had one of the best schools in the city.
The Colegio Santana's students were girls from
good families from the interior, and those of
means in the neighborhood. My sister went there.
It was a neighborhood of middle families, well off
families.
The poor were further down fthe hill/.
The families weren't of the elite of the attorneys
and supreme court judges of the city, but they
were of good family.
In Santana we were rich girls.
You should have seen the number of little black
girls there were as maids.
Good families participated in religious and
charitable efforts, such as the organization of bazaars
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and the maintenance of the chapel of the Colegio Santana
at the top of the hill*

We may surmise that the periodic

festivities which often extended over several days contri
buted to a sense of familism and class:
Levava uma vida social pacata e simples: os passeios
da minha epoca era quermesse, bailes em casas conhecidas.
Havia urn clube recreativo, mais o meu pai nao
admitia que frequentava clubes . . . a igreja era o
lugar que convergia mais o sentimento do bairro.
Dona Albertina ajudava os padres^ organizava as irmandades e as quermesses. Ela reunxa as mo^as pra fazer
as barracas, se vestiaro de baiana . . . tinha core to
com banda de musica, barracas de Maria Antonietas, ^
era Und o .
Nos ficavamos olhando da jane la do cartorio . . . os homens de terno branco^com bengala de
ebony . . . eram bem fiaquentadas, nao eram do povinho
nao.
Nao xa muito preto, era fino, podia ir mo^a
sozinha. Ate os soldados que fam eram de boa familia,
tinham dinheiro pra gastar. Assim que ganhavam os
fundos pra acabar a igreja.
We led a peaceful and simple social life: the
amusements of my era were church bazaars and balls
in the houses of families we knew.
There was a
recreational club, but my father would not permit
us /girls./ to go there . . . The church was where
the neighborhood feeling converged most. Dona
Albertina helped the priests, organized the brother
hoods and sisterhoods11 and the bazaars. She got
the girls together to decorate the booths, they
dressed up as Bahianas
. . . there was a bandstand
with music, booths full of /women dressed in/ Marie
Antoinette /costume§7, it was beautiful.
We would
watch from the window of the registry office, the
men in their white suits with canes of ebony * . .
They were well attended, they weren't bazaars for
the little people.
Very few blacks attended; it
was refined and young women could go alone. Even

^Religious lay organizations.
1^Regional Brazilian costume for women from Bahia.
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the soldiers who went Were of good family— they
had money to spend. That's the way they got the
money to finish the church.
In addition to religious functions, purely social
occasions set the elite families apart from others and
bolstered their sense of class:
As festas: as festas de Sao Joao, com trezentas ^
pessoas que vinham da cidade toda. 0 Chico Frances
fez promessa, e fez por sete anos. Caro? Limao, boi,
empregados, £e ja tinha. Abobora, batata, ja tem.
Hoje e caro por causa do uisque. Faziam baloes de
forma de
elefante, pioes . . • eram em casas grandes,
com toalha de crochet amarrado com fita. Festas lindas,
com fogo de artificios, bala de estalo que puxava e
saia sorte, doces tradicionais; levava uma semana
pra fazer cisne de bala, rosinha de papel pros convidados levar.
The parties: the St. John parties'^ with three
hundred people who came from all over the city.
Chico F r a m e s made a vow*5 and had a party every
year for seven years.
Expensive? Lemons,sides of
beef and servants you already had. Squash and
potatoes you had. Today its expensive because of
the whiskey.
They made b a l l o o n s i n the shape of

13Finished in 1925.
1ATraditional festivity in June.
^According to Gross's (1971) study of religious
vows and pilgrimages in the Northeast, a vow or a promessa
"is a kind of private contract between a man and a saint
whom he regards as particularly powerful." The object of
the promessa is not to get something, "but rather to repay
the saint for a prayer answered" (1973:142-3).
The vow
may involve a pilgrimage, a physical offering at the saint's
shrine, money offerings, acts of penance and even musical
offerings.
In this case we do not know What moved Chico
Frances to make his promessa. but he vowed to celebrate
St. John's feast day with a party every year for seven
years.
^ P a p e r balloons, levitated by hot air.
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elephants, tops . . . the parties were in big houses
with crochet tablecloths, twined with ribbons.
Beautiful parties, with fire works, party favors
that exploded and told your fortunes, traditional
sweets: it took a week to make candy swans and paper
roses for the guests to take home.
Many informants compared Santana at that time to
a small town in the interior, where everyone knew everyone
else, and where owning land and a store entitled one to
leisure.

A younger informant attempted to capture the

relationship between leisurely appearance and prestige:
Todos tinham fazenda e loja. Agora as lojas estao
com mercadoria antiquissima, que ninguem compra.
Chegavam la de terno branco, com bengala, abriam as
vinte mil portas e sentavam pra ler o jornal . . .
£a e fechava pro almopo, fechando as portas outra vez.
Dax voltavam, abria outra vez, ficavam ax, lendo
jornal, batendo papo no terraco, tudo muito quieto,
muito distinto.
They all had fazendas and stores. Now the stores
would have extremely old merchandise which no one
buys. They arrived there in their white suits,
with their canes, opened the twenty thousand doors,
and sat down to read the papers . . . they went and
then they closed for lunch, closing all the doors
up again. Then they would come back, open up again
and stay there, reading the paper, chatting, on the
terrace.
It was all very quiet and very distiiiguished.
The nostalgia and affectionate surrealism of
such reconstructions significantly omit any reference
to the mechanisms of power by which the Santana elite
developed and maintained its local prominence as interme
diaries in the larger political system.

Clearly enough,

members of this group did not simply plan parties and
read the newspapers in a social and political vacuum.
These were merely the visible symbols of their less visible
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economic and political control of the neighborhood and of
their links to higher political structures.

Historical ,

genealogical and interview data suggest what some of
these mechanisms were.
We have seen above in Chapter 11 that an important
feature of political life during the First Republic was
coronelismo. or local bossism.
ismo

The literature on coronel-

in Brazil is extensive (cf. Nunes Leal, 1948; Santos,

1961; Cruz, 1959; Nogueria, 1961; Torres, 1965; Queiroz,
1967; Pang, 1969, 1973; Della Cava, 1970; Nason, 1973),
and describes large patronage and kinship networks as well
as a good deal of electoral fraud and local level violence
especially in the rural interior.
mechanism

Coronelismo was the

which guaranteed the Politica dos Governadores

through local elites who acted as intermediaries in the
larger system.1^

Local elites and local coroneis perpe

tuated regional and state elites by systematically excluding
ail opposition to the dominant political party of the area
through fraud and violence.
Santana was no exception in this scheme.

Through

the use of kinship and patronage, the Santana elite not
only controlled the neighborhood and regularly returned

*^The best analysis of the intricate connections
maintained by local coroneis and their clients with national
and regional power structures is to be found in Della
Cava (1968, 1970).
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electoral majorities to the dominant Partido Republicano
Paulista. but it controlled as well the most important
economic resources of the area.

Through consanguinity

and marriage, the families were able to consolidate their
control over land and local commerce.

Of the thirteen

families in my sample which descended from the elite in
question, for example, eight were already established
in Santana by 1900.

Of these eight, five shared a common

ancestor and in addition were bound by numerous affinal
ties.

Figure 18 is adapted from geneaologies of these

five families, some members of which married later arrivals.
By indicating family involvement in landownership, commerce,
politics and the liberal professions, it illustrates the
extent to which kinship and marriage facilitated the concen
tration of resources and political power.
Thus, for example, during the 1920's, Santana's
politics were controlled by a coronal from Juquerx^® the
municipality to the north of Santana.

His daughter was

linked affinally to an important landowning family in
Santana by her husband's brother's marriage.

The local

1^Informants were vague about who controlled
Santana before the coronal from Juquer£.
It was possib
ly a coronal (who was a captain) from Guarulhos, to the
west.
In any event, no central city politician was
important in Santana until the advent of Adhemar de
Barros after the end of the First Republic.
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Figure 18.

Santana's Elite, 1900-1930
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political boss who represented the coronel. was one
Eugenio Braga, who according to informants, was also
a tax assessor and head of the municipal department in
charge of Sao Paulo's rivers and marshes.

Braga and his

brother married into a prominent landowning family
indicated in Figure 18 and thus became landowners in
their own right.

Braga's ward heeler (cabo eleitoral)T

Jose Goya, was tax inspector and a Justice of the
Peace.

His brother was an officer of the Forya Publica:

his daughter married into a family with heavy commercial
as well as real estate interests--which was itself rela
ted to Braga's wife's family.

Among these families alone,

then, various local interests were tied into the affairs
and benefits of municipal government, and we have sugges
ted above that Brazilian liberal professionals of rural
origins provided additional important links to the higher
levels of the Partido R epublicano Paulista.
The key to political domination in Santana was,
as elsewhere in Brazil, control of the electorate, and
a kinship idiom, if not kinship, worked here too.
Borrowing Weffort's phrase, the political relationships
of coronelismo were only "quasi-political, a single
dimension of the general social dependence of the voter"
(1965:176), which was both masked and reinforced by the
extension of fictive kinship.

Compadrio (co-parenthood)

bound the elite, but it could also be used, especially
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in Santana's rural areas to the north, to control the
electorate.

Thus, we may presume that the corone1 from

Juqueri's fame for humility and liberalism with the lower
classes was politically useful.
0 coronel era muito simples, muito humilde, muito
liberal.
Era tudo na mesa, branco e prSto junto.
A nossa casa era refugio do Dr. Washington Luis.
Um
dia estava ai um caboclo compadre--um dos mil-e chegou o Dr. Washington, tambem compadre.
E coitado do cabSclo, ficou todo atrapalhad^o, que nao
sabia usar garfo.
0 coronel falou, "0 me^e,^ nao se
avexe nao, coma can colher, que o compadre e gente
mesmo."
The coronel was very simple, very humble, very liberal.
Everyone sat at the table, blacks and whites together.
Our house was the refuge of Dr. Washington Luis.
One
day a peasant compadre was there--one of the millions-and Dr. Washington, who was also a compadre. arrived.
And the poor peasant got all embarrassed because he
didn't know how to use a fork.
The corone1 said,
"Don't worry, eat with a spoon, because the compadre
is real people."
But the coronel did not depend solely on his own clientele
forged in this way through paternalism and god-parenthood;
his political boss and ward heeler in Santana regularly
returned majorities to the PRP.

Precisely how Braga and

Goya controlled the votes is not known.

There were no

reports of the electoral fraud and violence which typifies
coronelismo and the First Republic.

But then, we need not

assume the grossest characteristics by which coronelismo
operated.

In view of the contacts with municipal govern-

19

Leeds (personal communication) argues that the
more common usage is "rico e pobre" (rich and poor) rather
than "branco e preto" (black and white.).
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ment controlled by the political boss and the ward
heeler, and the informal social and political capital of
other elite families in Santana, there is no reason to
suppose that extra legal rather than illegal methods
might not have been used to recruit the electorate.

Thus,

a close relative of the ward heeler!s spoke of him as
follows:
Ele ganhava eleipao por fazer^favores pros
outros.
Por isso morreu pobre, nao guardou nada
para ele.
Nas enchoites retirava as families la de
baixo das aguas; quando andava de bonde, pagava pra
todos, e depois, em *46 pagava as fotografias pros
pobres.
Goya quando pedia o favor, £a la com a
pessoa mesmo pro "sim" ou "nao" na hora. Dizia que
carta era muito^facil esquecer.
Tudo mundo ia perguntar na casa dele, e naquele
tempo a gente era leal, e o politico era honesto.
Ele foi Juiz de Paz por dez anos.
Ele era bom . . .
nas eleicoes levava sacola de lanche pra dar pro
pessoal la na fila.
He won elections by doing favors for people.
That's why he died poor, he didn't keep anything for
himself.
In the floods he would rescue the families
down below from the water; when he rode the trolley
car he would pay for everybody, and later, in '46,
he paid for the photographs for the poor. Goya, when
he asked someone for a favor [tor someone elsq7» he
went there with the person for a "yes" or "no" on the
spot. He said letters were too easy to forget.
Everyone went to ask /who they should vote torj
at his house, and in those days people were loyal, and
the politician was honest. He was Justice of the Peace
for ten years.
He was good . . . during elections, he
would take bags of food to give to the people standing
there in line.
But, in another context, the same informant added:
Naquela epoca, ate'’ os mortos votavam.
In those days, even the dead voted.
The importance of Santana to the dominant PRP in the
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1920*s is suggested by its extraordinary population growth.
As I noted earlier;

its population had grown from 7,000

in 1900 to 43,588 in 1934, an increase of over five hundred
percent in thirty years.

The large number of students

alone in the mid 1920*s suggest that a goodly number of
the population was literate and eligible for legitimate
recruitment into electoral politics by the local political
machine.
Although Santana was a semi-rural suburb, controlled
by a rural coronel to the north, it also formed part of the
urban vote.

It will be recalled that in the 1920's, Sao

Paulo's PRP was faced with the vocal opposition of the
newly formed Democratic Party (Partido DemocratI c q --PD).
This was especially so because of the publicity surrounding
elections, which would have

been absent in small towns of

the interior.

electorate grew more

As the urban

critical,

political competition against the PD led to electoral
recruitment among the city's foreign working class popula
tion by the PRP.

According

to Fausto,

The PRP . . . attempted to include /non naturaiiasedj
foreigners in its domain, frequently making use of
their "votes" to falsify elections: the PD tried to
appear as the legitimate heir to the best Paulista
traditions.
The manifesto announcing Julio Prestes's
candidacy [tor the PRP presidential nomination of
19307, for example, was published in Arabic and
other foreign languages, causing great scandal among
the democrats, who did not spare Julio Prestes for
becoming a great man, "even in Turkish" (1972:36).
In accordance with this PRP tactic, Santana's
elite participated in specifically urban ways of mobili-
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zing votes.

In the 1920's the head of the Santana PRP

(who had the labor accidents registry in the center of
the city) travelled to the legislature in Rio de Janeiro
to fight for working class legislation to protect factory
workers from the "extra-judicial arrangements of industrial
ists in Rio and Sao Paulo" (A Gazeta /Sao Paulo_7,1950, 1/5:
12).

Even the women of the Santana elite participated in

church activities which aimed at educating and mobilizing
the working class of the city.

One informant, who seemed

aware of the political and paternalist nature of such
organizations, described her activities:
Eu trabalhava na Irmandade dos Anjos, fazendo
teatrinhos pras mocinhas com Dona Albertina.
Depois
trabalhei na Juventude Operaria Catolica /JOQ/ com as
operarias, pregando pros direitos operirios. Fazia
reunioes, e dava^ aula de religiao, corte e costura,
aulas de forma^ao moral pras mopas . . . Fazia
festinha de Pascoa e Natal. Era tudo coisa de
igreja, mais tinha gente que depois se tornou politica.
Na JOC eu estava fazendo uma protecab, tava fazendo
uma caridade, sendo boa pras operarias.
I used to work in the Sisterhood of the Angels,
putting on little plays for the girls with Dona
Albertina. Later 1 worked in the Catholic Workers
Youth movement, with working class girls, preaching
for the rights of the workers.
I would organize meetf
ings, give classes in religion, sewing classes, classes
in moral development to the young women.
I had little
parties at Easter and Christmas*
It was all church
business, but there were people who later became politi
cal. At JOC I was doing protection, charity, I was
being good to the workers.
In the context of heated electoral contests, the
value of an urban neighborhood machine which regularly and
quietly returned large majorities to the dominant party
appears unquestionable.

Santana (and probably other neigh
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borhoods in Sao Paulo) appears to have developed an urban
variant of First Republic coronelismo which was important
to the Sao Paulo Republican Party and which linked its
local elite to the power structure of the city and state.
No other hypothesis seems to account for the rapidity of
the Santana elite's political decline after 1930, when
such machines were no longer necessary to the oligarchy.
In the 1920's however, the Santana elite did
not foresee

the possibility of a political shakeup which

could affect their position.

They were supremely confident

and secure in their superior position in the neighborhood.
The electoral arena was probably the only one in which,
on occasion, the distinction between as familias and a
italianada la de baixo or a. g a ^ i y ^ a was permitted to
lapse.
However, the closeness of the families at the
top of the hill and the dominance of the PRP in Santana
is not meant to imply that there were no political
disputes, or that there was no representation of the
opposition PD in Santana.

Disputes existed, but the

families were not split by the reformism and dissent
being voiced in the city's main newspapers.

The factions

in the municipal government of Sao Paulo had been com
pared to "two little carts which transported the money
out of the treasury . . . /witti7 terrible emulations over
which would carry away the most money" (Horse, 1972:316)
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Thus, in Santana, splits occurred over the distribution of
spoils, but always within a context of familism and class.
For example, one dispute which was biou^it to my

attention

was over the control of judgeships within the PRP.
Meu cunhado organizou um partido, tambem do PRP, mas
em oposicao ao eleitorado do Braga nas elei^oes pra
Juiz de £az de Santana. Eram eleitos pelos habitantes do bairro.
0 Braga controlava os operarios, os
comerciantes, o pessoal la de baixo.
Os pro&sseres
estavam todos do lado do cunhado, mais apenas fizeram
oposicao na eleicao, que era pra tres juizes e tres
suplentes.
So ganharam um juiz e dois suplentes.
My brother-in-law organized a party, part of the PRP,
but in opposition to Braga*s voters, in the elections
for Justice of the Peace of Santana.
They were elec
ted by the residents of the neighborhood.
Braga
controlled the workers, the merchants and the people
down below.
The teachers were all on the side of
the brother-in-law, but they only formed an opposi
tion in the election which was for three judgeships
and three replacements.
They only got one judge and
two replacements.
Similarly, the Partido Democratico was represented
in Santana, and indeed, it was organized in much the
same way as the local PRP, except for the absence

of a

coronel. whose counterpart was to be found in the upper
ranks of the PD organization in the city.

Thus, the head

of the party organization was a Brazilian liberal profes
sional, a dentist and a pharmacist, who had come to
Santana from the interior of the state in 1923.

When the

PD was formed in 1927, he became the head of the party
organization, but the PD*s political boss was a local
man, just as the PRP*s political boss was.

The PD

political boss was an important figure in commerce and
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real estate, whose family had been in Santana since before
1900.

This individual frequently argued over political

matters with the boss of the PRP--who was his brother-inlaw.

According to informants, if arguments became too

heated, one of the two would present the other with a
suckling pig to restore amicable relations.

I heard of

no political disputes in Santana at that time which split
the elite, or which did not occur within such a shared
sense of familism and class.
A sense of "being above" political dispute permeates
the accounts of the 1924 Tenente revolt in Sao Paulo.

In

1924 the dissident General Is idoro Dias marched from the
Santana military barracks to the fforjpa P u b lica headquarters
in the city.

Much of the city cheered the rebels on,

providing the kind of diffuse support which made the
Tenentes appear much more powerful than they actually
were.

20

The Santana families did not participate in this

"When they entered Sao Paulo during the 1924
revolt, the revolutionaries were received with cheers;
during the course of the fight, the soldiers in the open
trenches on the streets . . . received cheers from the
neighboring residences. A Legalist lieutenant . . . spoke
of his men's resentment before the hostility manifested b£
the people of^Sao Paulo. Young ladies from Cagapava, Mogi
das Cruzes, Sab Jose dos Campos, Taubat^, came to meet the
trains bringing government troops and would incite the
soldiers to join the rebels.
'The humble and ignorant
vegetable saleswoman of the neighborhood would close her
complaints on business with the picturesque invective,
"It doesn't matter, Isidoro is coming!" This was also the
psychology and language of the laborer, the unemployed
cook and it may be supposed, even of the beggar, who was
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euphoria; most simply ran away during moments of political
turbulence:
Em '24 Santana estava ilhado# e a Ponte Grande ja
era trincheira. As families fugiram. Eu vim de
earropa de padeiro pra ver a minha noiva. Consegui
passar porque conhecia muitos dos oficiais da Forpa
Publica e do Sxercito.
Escapamos pra fazenda do
Bispo em Tremembe.
In '24 Santana was surrounded and the Ponte Grande
was a trench /a battle ground/.
The families ran
away.
I came in a baker's carriage to see my fiancee.
I managed to pass because I knew many of the officers
of the Forca Publica and the Army.
We escaped to
the fazendk of the Bishop in Tremembe.
The Santana elite's sense of being above political dispute
and in local control is nowhere more apparent than in the
May 24, 1930 issue of the local newspaper, Sant'Anna-Jornal.
The dominance of the PRP appears to have been unquestioned
and not even worthy of note.
local PRP meeting.

The first page announced a

The second page was given to poems,

notes on hygiene, an article on the evils of gossip,
gambling and usury, and another on social events.

In the

lower right hand corner of the second page was a column,
"Noticiario," whose third item down announced the Prestes
victory over Vargas in the national presidential election.

also affected by the crisis,'" (Fausto, 1972:62).
Speaking of the^l930 coup, another informant
said, "Tivemos bastante medo em '30. Pulamos o muro pro
vizinho e fumos pro sxtio do Braga. Eles ate que vieram
nos buscar" (We were very frightened in 1930. We jumped
over the wall to the neighbor's and went to Braga's sitio.
They even came to get us).
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Under the current regime it was a foregone conclusion,
not worthy of any more note than the announcements of
regional festivities, public park plantings and unsolved
crimes.
The 1930 coup, however, took the leading families
by surprise.

Unlike other occasions, when they had

returned from running away and found their control of the
neighborhood intact once order was restored, this time
the Sao Paulo oligarchy was undergoing a redefinition of
its political position within the Vargas regime.

Elections,

upon which the power of local families so heavily depen
ded, were repeatedly postponed, and the Santana families
participated in the growing Constitutionalist fervor
which developed in Sao Paulo over the next two years.
When the Constitutionalist Revolt broke out in
1932, Santana's leading families joined in the general
euphoria.22

As many explained, "Precisavamos nos libertar

22Morse (1972:326-28) provides a description of
this state: "Hen, women and children, including doctors,
technicians and professionals rushed in crowds to the head
quarters of the movement asking to be sent to the front, or
to offer their services . . . units of volunteers were
formed to fight by the side of the Forqa Publica.
50,000
were finally sent to the front . . . Honey contributions
were abundant.
The Gold Campaign received offers of gold
objects to a value of more than 3,000 contos from the
interior, and more than 6,000 from the capital. A public
subscription to help the families of the soldiers collected
1,000 contos in three days.
The women who organized the
Egg Campaign received millions of dozens of eggs for the
trenches and the hospitals. A group of Syrian women began
another campaign to obtain waterproof raincoats.
Indus-

R eprod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co pyrigh t owner. F u rthe r re p rod u ction p rohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

163

das ataduras da ditadura" (We had to liberate ourselves
from the bonds of dictatorship).
enlist did so.
the streets.

The men old enough to

Young men who stayed behind were mocked on
Many of those too old to enlist organized

civilian battalions to maintain public order in the city,
while the Forca Publica were fighting the Federal troops.
The wives and daughters of the families at the top of the
^
-v. 23
hill joined Sao Paulo*s "auatrocentao"
women in organi
zing the Gold Campaign, sewing bees, mess hall and troop
morale festivities.

They became "godmothers" for the

battalions leaving from Santana’s barracks, which had been
taken over by Constitutionalist forces, and formed wel
coming committees for the returning soldiers.
Nunca mais vai haver uma coisa parecida, tao linda.
Trabalhamos na penitenciaria fazendo colchbes,
trabalhamos no salao do conservatorio da Liga das
Senhoras Catolicas com as mogas de alta sociedade
que famla.
Era honra escolher feijao e fazer
comida.
Trabalhamos em grupos caseiros, costurando
ou cosinhando. Todos foram.
Era tudo mundo a
trabalhar juntos . . . esperando noticias.

trial, commercial and wholesale associations joined the
movement.
Foreign residents, who were accused of absen
teeism in 1924, also joined the movement.
The policing
of the cities was left in charge of civilians; in spite
of this there was no vandalism and crimes of violence
decreased . . . The troops received chocolates, canned
goods, wine and toothpaste in great quantities, but in
spite of the valorous industrial effort, not enough war
materiel,"
23
The term "ouatrocentao" originated at this time.
It refers to families who have lived in Sao Paulo for
four hundred years, and in a more general way to Sao
Paulo's "upper crust,"
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There will never again be anything like that, so
wonderful. We worked at the penitentiary making
matlresses, we worked in the music room of the
League of Catholic Ladies, with the women of high
society who went there.
It was an honor to pick
over beans or to cook. We worked in groups at
home, sewing or cooking.
Everyone participated.
It was everyone working together . . . waiting for
the news.
And, when it was all over, they returned home,
as shocked and bitter as the rest of the population,
crying "betrayal."
People accused the Forjpa Publica of betrayal
because it surrendered, even though it was in a militarily
untenable position (Silva, 1932:415-20).

The real problem

lay with Sao Paulo's political leaders, who had through
rhetoric and through the media, manipulated the public
and aroused entirely unreal expectations (Silva, 1932:
127-29).

For Santana's families the betrayal ultimately

destroyed them as a group.

Whereas the city's elite,

composed of coffee planters and industrialists, were able
to adjust and accomodate to the new order, the Santana
families were ultimately destroyed as a local politically
influential group because they lost their most important
resource, the electoral control of the neighborhood.
We have seen that Santana's elite had been
intermediaries in the city's larger political structure,
and I have suggested that their importance arose not
from the material resources they controlled, but from
the number of urban votes they could contribute to the
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PRP.

As long as they were important electoral inter

mediaries, they controlled the neighborhood, maintained
their cohesiveness and maintained their links to more
important politicians.

In the absence

of elections,

under Vargas, their connections with the city's oligar
chy decreased, and the politics they represented became
obsolete.
The process of their marginalization, however,
was not immediate and absolute, except in the case of the
coronel. In 1932 the Santana political machine was attacked,
a task which was relatively easy to accomplish in the
absence

of elections.

The machine was run by two indivi

duals, the coronel from Juqueri and the cabo eleitoral.
Under the new regime, legal proceedings were instituted
on a number of charges against the coronel and the ward
heeler's office was set on fire by persons unknown. In the
words of their children,
Quando perdemos a revolupao de '32, abriram processo
contra meu pai, dizendo que era aproveitador, que a
fazenda era de politica— sem ver os documentos. Foi
um processo por caltLnia e infamia, e ele ganhou.
Aquele que acusou f o i condenado a de spesas e quarenta
dias de prisao, e o gai teve a satisfapao de ganhar
num regime de oposipao. ^Provou que era heranca
materna, que os filhos riao eram empregados publicos,
e,se fosse pratico, nossa situapao seria outra, e
da£, foi homenageado publicaments pelo povo de Santana.
When we lost the revolution of '32, they brought a
suit against my father, saying that he had taken advan
tage, that his fazenda derived from politics--without
looking at the documents.
It was a suit of calumny and
infamy and we won. The man who accused him was con

R eprod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co p yrigh t owner. F u rthe r rep rod u ction prohib ite d w ith o u t perm ission.

166
demned to pay the expenses and to spend forty days
in jail, and father had the satisfaction of winning
under an opposition regime. He proved that /the land/
was a maternal inheritance, that his children were
not public employees— if he'd been practical our
situation would be different— and then he received
public homage from the people of Santana.
Getulio entrou, e puseram fogo na reparticao dele
na Ponte JSrande. Dax vieram fazer vistoria na
reparticao dele, e ele foi citado como modSlo.
Getulio came in,
Grande on fire.
and it was cited

and they set hisoffice by the Ponte
Then they came to inspect hissection,
as a model.

While both were eventually found innocent of any
wrong doing, their political careers and the careers and
social prominence of the local elite associated with them
began to decline.

When the coronel died on his fazenda

he was a forgotten figure.

The ca b o 's decline took a bit

longer.
After Sao Paulo's defeat in the Constitutionalist
Revolt, what was left of the Santana political machine was
taken over by Adhemar de Barros, a young city-side politi
cian of the PRP, in a process that suggests the shifting
nature of the coalitions between actors in the larger
political system and the individuals who act as inter
mediaries on the local level.

Adhemar de Barros is best

known as a Sao Paulo politician of the populist era.
However, as a young congressman in 1933, he had wished to
organize a working class wing of the PRP (Cabral, 1962:29),
and it is during this time, according to informants, that
he first made contact in Santana.

When the 1934 Consti
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tution reintroduced elections, he took Goya on as his
cabo eleitoral.

Clearly then, upward connections could

still be made during the Vargas years by a good ward
heeler, but they depended on the stability of the electoral
process, which was again abolished by the declaration of
the Estado Novo in 1937.

When elections were reintroduced

after the Second World War, Adhemar de Barros formed in
Sao Paulo what was probably the most powerful electoral
machine in the country (Skidmore, 1967:67-68), but Goya
was passed over.

According to one of his descendants,

Em *46 Goya quis continuar na politica do mesmo
jeito.
0 eleitor jque pedia o candidato.
Ele
nunca impunha.
Nao tinha interesse pessoal^ Ele
eonheceu Adhemar la na sede. Adhemar era medico,
e queria tratar da filha dele por que era cabo
eleitoral.
Ele foi lancado em Santana pelo Goya
em '33 ou '34. Ate que usaram a garagem pra
contar cedulas.
Dai, depois da elei^ao de '46,
Adhemar nao precisou mais, e demitiu os cabos.
Nao foi o Goya que abandonou, nao.
In *46 Goya wanted to continue in politics in the
same way. The voter would ask which candidate he
should vote for, he never imposed one. He had no
personal interest.
He met Adhemar at party head
quarters. Adhemar was a doctor and wanted to care
for his daughter because he was a ward heeler.
Adhemar was introduced in Santana by Goya in '33 or
*34. They even used his garage to count the ballots.
Then, after the election of '46, Adhemar didn't
need him anymore, and he dismissed his ward heelers.
It wasn't Goya who abandoned him at all.
Goya's betrayal by the supreme politician of a
later era provides a symbol of the political decline under
gone by the whole Santana elite as
of

a result of the passing

the First Republic. Ultimately many of the families

also lost wealth, although their economic decline was
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generally less meteoric.
It is tempting to ask about the relationship bet
ween political marginalization and economic decline.

The

analysis is complicated, however, because Santana's
economy was also changing.

In particular, dairy farming

became unprofitable in the early 1920's when the city re
quired that milk be pasteurised, thus raising the cost of
production.

The sale of animals to the city services

collapsed with the advent of the automobile, and the grow
ing real estate value ofthe land undercut what
of the grazing economy.

was left

Animal traders who did not have

a land base on which to graze their mules and horses were
increasingly at a disadvantage.

An informant speaks of

her husband's career:
#Foi duro.
0 negocio de animais caiu de uma vez.
0
municipio de Sao Paulo usava os animais pra agua,
lixo e pra Forca Publica.
0 automove1 substituiu.
Foi um momento dificil . As filhas ja grandes, na
escola, e as viagens eram tudo prejuizo. E' que tinha
de vender logo por falta de pasto, e depois era
dificil vender. Aqui nao tinhamos pasto. Antes
alugavamos, mais foram vendendo pra loteamento. Foi
uma fase muito ruim.
It was hard.
The bottom fell out^ of the animal
business.
The municipality of Sao Paulo used the
animals for water, garbage and the For^a Publica.
Automobiles replaced them.
It was a difficult moment.
The girls were growing up, they were in school, and
every trip lost money. We had to sell them fast
because we had no pasture and later it became hard to
sell them. We didn't have pasture here. Earlier we
had rented the land, but it got sold for real estate
development.
It was a very bad phase.
There were three general avenues followed by
Santana's elite families after the 1930's.

Urban real

R e prod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co p yrigh t ow ner. F u rthe r rep rod u ction prohib ite d w ith o u t p erm ission.

169

estate development increased in importance, as did careers
in the professions and salaried employment.

Each

possibility, moreover, could involve outmigration from
Santana and brutal downward economic mobility.
Real estate had provided a source of profits as
early as 1915.

If an entrepreneur was not already a local

landowner, commerce had provided a financial springboard
to amass real estate holdings, during the 1920's.

The

careers of a number of individuals were similar to that of
this informant's father, who was a leading member of the
Santana elite.
Meu pai foi um dos primeiros a construir aqui em
Santana.
Ele chamava de "galinheiro pros pobre"
aquelas casinhas la em baixo.
Ele que era o antigo
BNH. A rua ate que ta com o nome dele. Ele tinha
loja de secos e molhados, depois herdou os terrenos,
e viveu fazendo as casinhas.
Ele era um bonachao
. . . quando tava velho sentava la no terrapo com
o bolso cheio de balas que dava pras crian 9 as que
chamavam ele de vovo. Tava sempre com charuto.
Ate o pao que ele dava tinha cheiro de charuto.
E^ as mulheres vinham pagar o aluguel, e as criangas
recebiam balas. E^ muito dessas casas ainda sao
nossas, viu.
My father was one of the first to build here in
Santana.
He called those little houses down below
"chicken coops for the poor."
was the old B N H . ^
The street even has his name.
He had a dry goods store,
and then he inherited the land and spent the rest of
his life making the little houses. He was a sweetheart.
When he was old he would sit out on the terrace with
his pockets full of candies which he would give to the
children, who called him grandfather.
He always had a
cigar.
Even the bread he gave smelLed of cigars.
Yes,
the women would come and pay the rents, and the chil
dren received candies. Many of those houses are still

^BNH,

National Housing Bank.
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ours, see.
Alternatively, real estate holdings which had been
split by inheritance could be reconsolidated by marriage,
or purchase from disadvantaged relatives.

Thus, Gilberto,

a prominent merchant and animal trader married a land
heiress, and, as her relatives died, bought their shares
back from their widows or children.

However, with the

decline of the animal trade, the commerce which serviced
it became an increasingly rare source of base capital.
It became

a rare occupation after 1930.

Very few male

descendants of commercial families continued on in commerce
or continued to amass capital.

Many began to live off

unearned income from their lands, and generated little or
no earned income of their own.
-Esse foi dolce far niente . . .^ um capitalista.
-Vivia de renda, tinha tuna porpao de casas.
-Tinha um armazem, mais vivia de renda, era proprie
tor io.
-Nao fazia nada, vivia de renda, mais naquele tempo
nao precisava tanto dinheiro.
^
-Era proprietario, dolce far niente. Ia gastando e
vendendo.
-Eram simples, todos proprietaries eram simples,
mais tinham fama de rico . . . bruta fama de rico.
-That one was dolce far niente . . . a capitalist.
-He lived on income, he had a bunch of houses.
-He had a store, but lived on income. He was a pro
prietor.
-He did nothing, he lived on income, but in those days
one didn't need so much money.
-He was a proprietor, dolce far niente. he would spend
and sell.
-He was simple, all proprietors were simple, but they
had the reputation for being rich . . • damned repu
tation for being rich.
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Real estate development was not, however, a
lasting source of income for Santana's elite families.
Paradoxically, it was only a successful way of maintaining
wealth as long as it wasn't sold.

Bolaffi has shown that

low municipal land taxes together with municipal invest
ments and improvements sent urban land values soaring (1975:
82).

Thus, while many la downers developed their land

and built rental houses, profits from this source were
dampened by a rent control law introduced in 1930 (Bo
laffi, 1975:79) and the highest profits were ultimately
for those who kept their lands intact.

25

Some of Santana's

elite families were able to keep their land and maintain
themselves secure in their sense of familism and class,
but many others were brutally downwardly mobile.

A number

of individuals took lowly positions in the bureaucracies,
became doorkeepers or janitors in the public schools or
street salesmen.

Thus, an informant speaks of her sibling's

children:
Nao tenho muito contato com esses . . . sabe, os
pais morreram, os filhos foram criados na casa de um

25

In 1949, an informant's father, who had been part
of the old elite, gave an interview on the progress of the
neighborhood to O Jornal das Noticias. At that time,
two twin houses on a main street in Santana rented for
Cr.300.00 and Cr.2,500.00, respectively. The difference
reflects the landlord's inability to raise the rent except
for a new tenant. According to the same interview, a large
house on Av. Voluntarios da Patria, Santana's main street,
cost Cr. 100,000.00 in 1925.
In 1949 just one square meter
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parente. Estudaram pouco e comeparam a trabalhar.
Tiveram algum terreninho pra ajudar, casas de
heranca que deu pra comprar ^outras casas se quiserem. As mulheres casaram so mais ou menos, £e ve,
sao trabalhadores, mais nada de riqueza nao. Sao
remediados.
Outros ficaram pobres, pobres, pintador de parade, porteiro de grupo. A renda acabou, je
renda tern de fazer renda.
Vendiam e comiam. §e ve
como e o Destino.
I don't have much contact with those . . . you know,
their parents died, the children were raised in a
relative's house. They studied little and began to
work. They had a little land to help, houses they
inherited which they could have sold to buy others
if they wanted.
The women only married more or less
well; you understand, they are hard working, but
there is no wealth there.
They get by. Others
became poor, poor, wall painters, doormen for public
schools. Their income finished, and incane has to
generate income.
They sold to eat.
You see how
Destiny is.
Of those who sold land, many sold unwisely or too
rapidly.

Some did not realize the value of their lands

until too late.

Thus another informant speaks of her

family's fortunes;
Meu avo tinha uns 900 hectares no alto de Santana,
Tucuruvi e Mandaqui.
Nao ligou muito com os terrenos
porque tambem tinha fazenda grande com fabrica de
tijolo, carpintaria, gado e plantio. Dividiu a
fazenda entre os oito filhos^ mais porque nab cuidou,
muito ficou grilado. Dai, la pro fim da vida, vendeu
um terreno prum portugues, a parcela.
0 portugues
vendeu pruma compania de loteamento, fez fortuna e foi
embora sem fazer o resto do pagamento, Fizeram lotea
mento, con casas operarias, e da do, coitados. Agora
tao querendo as escrituras, e nao pode, por que a
terra & nossa.
Ele nao pagou, ne. Legalmente a
terra e nossa, mais a gente tern de pagar os melhoramentos, o que e claro nao podemos^fazer.
Imagine
pagar todas essas casirihas. Entao os advogados

of frontage cost that much, excluding the cost of the
building (0 Jornal das Noticias. 1949, 12/14:5)
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falaram pros operarios pagar a divida do portugues,
so que muitos nao querem, com razao. E o dinheiro
que resta, vai tudo pros advogados, ne.
My grandfather had 900 hectares in the heights of
Santana, Tucuruvi and Mandaqui.
He didn't worry
too much about that land because he also had a large
fazenda with a brick factory and a carpentry shop,
cattle and agriculture.
He divided the fazenda and
the land among the eight children, but because he
hadn't taken care of the land, much was lost to
squatters. Then, towards the end of his life, he
sold some land to a Portuguese on time. The Portu
guese sold to a real estate development company,
made a fortune, and went away without making the
rest of the payments.
The land was developed with
working class houses, and itte a shame, poor things.
Now they want title to the land, and it can't be,
because the land is ours. He didn't pay, right.
Legally the land is ours, but we would have to pay
for the improvements, and its clear we can't do that.
Imagine paying for all those little houses.
So then
the lawyers asked the workers /who lived in then?/ to
pay the Portuguese's debt, but many of them, quite
rightly don't want to. And the money that's left,
it all goes to the lawyers.
Many sold land to underwrite a life style, to pay for their
children's educations or dowries: others faced competition
from larger or unscrupulous developers.

All in all, a lot

of land was dissipated and was not a basis for maintaining
wealth.

Only a few families still had land after two

generations.

For most, their situations were like these

informants's:
Nossa chacara agora tern dezesseis casas.
0 pai loteou tudo, mais gastou dinheiro, tava muito hipotecado,
e o Banco ficou com tudo.
Our land now has sixteen houses on it. My father
developed it all, but he spent money, it was heavily
mortgaged, and the Bank got it all.
Nossa familia herdou bastante, inclusive aquele
predio na Avenida Sao Joao . . . aquele nos bebemos
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andar por andar. A geracao nao soube manter. Alguns
vao equilibrando, mais nao e mais aquela fortuna.
Our family inherited a lot, including that building
on Avenida Sao Joao /important city-side avenue,
lined with skyscrapers^ . . . That one we drank,
floor by floor.
The generation didn't know how to
maintain its wealth. A few of us have managed to
balance /our budgets^, but its no longer that fortune.
Increased education and careers in the professions
was not a panacea either.

Among the more successful elite

families there was a clear movement away from the rela
tively independent positions of control over land, commerce
and real estate to a dependence on salaries.

Thus, among

the children of Santana's elite, commerce was replaced by
the liberal profesaons: doctors,
tants and school teachers.
liberal professionals.

lawyers, dentists, accoun

Similarly, the women married

To the extent that one can judge

from the genealogies of the more successful elite families,
the trend towards liberal professionalism continues among
their children and grand-children, although increasingly
as dependents on salaries from large firms, and where it
exists at alL, on a vastly reduced land base to generate
unearned income.

There does seem to have been enough

among a few families to provide a cushion for at Least
two generations, if it was carefully managed.

Thus,

within the family which drank its inheritance “floor by
floor," a more successful member finishes her tale of
loss of family fortunes with the following caveat:
S preciso muito equilrbrio, muito controle, se nao,
nao da mesmo.
Eu, o, eu seguro as arreias.
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One needs much equilibrium, very much control,
otherwise it is not possible.
I, I really hold
on to the reins.
For some of the older liberal professionals, such
control seems to have been necessary, because they did not
earn that much.

Although we may speculate over what might

have been the case had these families been able to main
tain their political capital, many of Santana's professio
nals appear to have had a limited clientele.

A prominent

but elderly dentist explaining his present difficulties
suggests the social and political isolation possible for
even a relatively successful

descendant of Santana's

elite:
No meu tempo tinha tudo, medico, advogado, economista,
eu tinha conhecimentos de todas as classes. Muitos
foram politicos. Mas agora, nesse bairro--com consultorio no bairro— nao se ganha mesmo.
Esse bairro
esta ficando ruim pra tudo. Cheio do pessoal antigo,
conservador, pad duro--e dificil. Agora Santana
ficou um bairro de passagem. Os velhos nao^pagam,
os mais novos vieram de outros bairros, e ja tern os _
seus dentistas.
E os bairros populares tern um montao
de dentistas de terceira categoria.
In my day, I had everything, doctors, lawyers, econo
mists /as patients7. I knew all the classes. Many
were political.
But now, in this neighborhood--with
an office in this neighborhood--you really don't
make money. This neighborhood is getting bad for
everything. Full of old, conservative and stingy
people.
Now Santana has become a neighborhood of
transients.
The old ones don't pay, and the younger
ones come from other neighborhoods and already have
their dentists. And the popular neighborhoods have
millions of third rate dentists.
Among the families who did not become poor,
especially those of the Brazilian liberal professionals
who had less invested in the neighborhood, the area
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became increasingly defined as a changing neighborhood,
a place to leave, a place for poor soldiers and immigrant
working classes.

Many such families left the area.

They

sold their houses and moved away to other parts of the
city, and their descendants explain the move as a conse
quence of the neighborhood's turn for the worse.
Pai era medico e dentista.
Tinha duas farmacias,
dois carros e um casarao. Rico mesmo nab era, mas
com nove filhos, todos estudando, se formando, as
meninas tomando^aulas de piano . . . ele estava bem.
Nos saimos de la por que Santana foi considerado
bairro operario, com a policia, que eram pobres.
Soldado de policia nao era considerado de sociedade.
Nos tinhamos parentes em outros bairros, em Sta.
Cecilia, em Perdizes.
Quando eu era menina, tinha
muito italiano, turco . . . vendiam carvao, miudos,
as verdureiras com burrinho e dois cestos do lado.
Os turcos que eram engra^ados--mordiam o dinheiro.
Eram considerados de classe baixa, mas , subiram mais
do que a classe media. Fizeram um montao de dinheiro.
Father was a doctor and a dentist, he had two phar
macies, two cars and a huge house. Really rich he
wasn't, but with nine children all studying and gra
duating [in the professions/ and the girls taking
piano lessons, he was well off. We left that place
because Santana was considered a working class neigh
borhood, with the police, who were poor.
Soldiers of
the police were not considered to be part of society.
We had relatives in other neighborhoods, in Sta.
Cecilia, in Perdizes.
When I was a girl, there were
lots of Italians and Turks in Santana. They sold
charcoal, innards, women sold vegetables from donkeys
with baskets on either side of them. The Turks were
funny--they bit the money.
They were considered
lower class, but they rose higher than the middle
class.
They made a mountain of money.
In a few cases, Santana women married into immi
grant commercial families and moved away.

While these

marriages appear to have been financially sound, since the
resulting families at present live in the wealthier
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neighborhoods of Sao Paulo, and are said to be socially,
politically and economically well connected, they were
against the racist ethic of elite Santana in the 1920's
and 1930's.

As one informant told me,

Na minha epoca casavamos com medico, advogado . . .
Quando Eugenia casou com um Italiano, estranhamos.
Ele nao era bopal, mas ja dava pra estranhar.
Diziam que o que vale e o dinheiro, mais que choca,
choca muito, v£u.
In my day we married doctors and lawyers . . •
When Eugenia married an Italian, we thought it
strange. He wasn't gross, but it was strange.
They said it was the money that counts, but
it was shocking.
It is unclear, however, what the circumstances were
for most of the outmigration, since contacts were subse
quently broken.
status jobs.

Many became extremely poor, in low

The overall picture is one of decline and

disintegration.
The themes of decline and disintegration are
suggested in Figure 19, which expands the genealogy
given in Figure 18.

It was drawn from four informants,

two in the second generation and two in the third.

While

these informants could not give the collateral line,
descended from the cousins of the first generation ("Adults
by 1900"), and became increasingly vague about family
members whose careers began between 1950 and 1972, the
genealogy nonetheless reveals the range of trajectories
possible for the descendants of one of the major landowners
of Santana.

Downward economic mobility was possible for
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members of such families even as the elite was forming:
thus, in the first generation, two out of ten individuals
and their nuclear families were impoverished because of
unwise land sales between 1910 and 1920, and their descen
dants lost contact with the rest of the families.
In the second generation, more than half were
lost to the family.

Among forty-two cousins (excluding

affinals) twenty-two individuals became poor and family
contact was broken.

£ our did not become poor, but infor

mants were not sure where they lived.

Those who were

successful in the second generation and formed the core
of the Santana elite, did so, as we have seen, on the
basis of commerce and real estate.
already living on income.

Many, however, were

Just under half (thirty out

of sixty-three individuals) became poor in the third
generation.
broken.

Seven did not become poor, but contact was

Again, over half of the generation's members

were lost to the group (thirty seven out of sixty-three).
Because so many of the descendants of the poor second
generation members are lost to genealogical isckoning in
the third generation, this is almost certainly an

under

estimation.
The families who lost their land base in the first
or second generations do not seem to have been able to r e 
coup their losses: by the third generation, many are in
lowly employment: policemen, bus drivers, wall painters,
and one of the women had become a domestic servant.

In
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Figure 19, for example, only one male descendant of one
of the impoverished branches was able to improve his
economic position.

His father had been a municipal

bureaucrat of low to middle level ("Ganhava d o uco . e
nao tinha jufzo" — He earned little and had no sense), and
his siblings continued in lowly bureaucratic or salaried
positions.

He on the other hand, began his career as a

laborer in a sweets factory:
Trabalhava como oper^rio numa fabrica de doces,
fazendo goiabada. Come^ou por baixo m e x e n d o tacho
de doce.
E s s e j e fez. Tern pequena industria, nao
sei de que.
Nao e nada de riqueza, mas ta bem.
He worked as a leborer in a sweets factory, making
guava paste.
He started at the bottom, stirring the
pots of syrup.
This one made himself. He now has
a small industry, I don't know what of. He's not
rich, but he's all right.
The difficulty in making a successful economic career
without private resources was recognized by some informants,
who felt that
E preciso nacer de classe media: E difficil a pessoa
ganhar dinheiro sem uma ajuda por traz.
One must be born middle class: it is difficult for a
person to make money without some financial backing.
The genealogy in Figure 19 suggests that in order
for some descendants to keep their wealth, others must
systematically loose it.

In this respect, the cross

cousin marriage between members of the second generation
is suggestive of the process.
were landed.

The woman and her siblings

She married a cousin with extensive commer-
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cial interests, who subsequently acquired land from her
siblings, who together with their descendants became poor.
The issue from the cross cousin marriage, however, main
tained a degree of wealth through the third and fourth
generations.
In addition to economic decline undergone by many
of the descendants of Santana's elite, there is dispersal
and the end of social cohesion.

Marriages within the

group decrease and the social activities which had identi
fied and united the Santana elite in the 1920's ceased.
People who left the neighborhood were largely forgotten.
Indeed, photograph albums filled exclusively with gradua
tion pictures are revealing in this instance.

They attest

to the status importance of higher education in the li
beral professions in the 1930's and 1940*s.

It is ironic

and symbolic, however, that the photos in the albums I
saw were simply annotated with the profession and the
date of graduation, and not the individuals' names.

When

these had moved out of Santana, they were forgotten and
their families lost track of.

They are now anonymously

part of Sao Paulo's middle sectors, dispersed through the
city.

1 was able to interview a few such individuals, and

while they remember their lives in Santana clearly, they
have formed other social circles and have only sporadic
contacts with families remaining in Santana, if any, Ii general,
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neither those who stayed nor those who left attempted
to maintain contact.
Thus, over time, the Santana elite, which had been
closely knit in its control of the political and economic
resources of the area during the First Republic, has
gradually disintegrated.

People blamed themselves when

they referred to "the generation's inability to maintain
its wealth," or to various relatives' "lack of sense," or
inability to "marry well," but the forces which had led
to social cohesion in the 1920's disappeared in the
following decades.

Socially the group has disbanded.

The

sense of familism and class which united them as against
other people during the First Republic--the sense that the
world was defined as consisting of "as famxlias" and "os
pobres la de baixo"--exists only in the memories of infor
mants.

Politically, these families and their descendants

lost positions of local prominence and political status
and never regained them.

Economically, many have become

brutally poor and others control no resources beyond their
ability to work and bring in a salary.

Among the families

interviewed the salaries have not generated capital.

They

are spent in a controlled way on consumer goods.
Santana's elite only formed a group with shared
access to political power and property for a short period
of time: the polity of the First Republic included Santana's
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elite in its mechanisms of domination and permitted and
encouraged its development as a group.

Although we have

revealed no direct relationship between their marginali
zation from political power and their subsequent economic
decline and dispersal, it is interesting that a similar
sequence, albeit on a lesser scal^ appears to characterize
the careers of the immigrants and bureaucrats who will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
SANTANA, FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE HILL, 1930-1972
Unlike the families at the top of the hill, the
families with which I am concerned in this chapter never
formed a single identifiable group.

This chapter deals

with people whom the elite at the top of the hill had
dismissed as a italianada la de baixo. os pobres la de
baixo (the Italians at the bottom, the poor down below).
In fact, during the 1920's and 1930's, these people did
live at the bottom of the hill, but they were generally
not working class people.

They belonged to what we have

broadly defined as middle income sectors.

One group,

the immigrants, included families with modest truck farms
before the 1930's and with moderately successful commer
cial and real estate enterprises after.

The other group,

the bureaucrats, were not as well off initially.

Most

came from impoverished landowning families who migrated
from declining rural areas of the interior.

Once in the

city, however, these families benefited from the fact
that they were literate (See Chapter II, pp. 76-77).
Only a small percentage of the Brazilian population fell
into this category.

They were absorbed by the expanding

bureaucracies of the Vargas and populist years and
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achieved middle level incomes despite their initial po
verty.
During the Vargas years and especially under
populism, the immigrants and bureaucrats formed friend
ships and interlocking networks (sometimes lasting for
two generations) which enhanced the political and eco
nomic status of both groups.

The key to most of these

relationships appears to have been the accessibility of
government resources which increased dramatically from
1930 to 1964, and which are now in a process of sharp
contraction.

Following the military coup of 1964 and

especially since 1968, both groups have lost influence
with government.

In other words,

they have undergone a

process of marginalization which parallels that described
for the old elite of Santana in the previous chapter.
This chapter assesses the current situation of bureaucrats
and immigrants in the light of this parallel,
Santana changed in the 1930's.

From a distant

underdeveloped area, where the rich of the state might
send their daughters to boarding school, and the rich
of the city might drive out for a day's recreation in
the countryside, it became over the course of three
decades a commercial entrepot between Sao Paulo and the
interior.

By mid century it would lose most of its

rural aspect, and in the next twenty-five years it
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would lose all the visible reminders of its distinctive
past.*'

The "tone" of the neighborhood changed most

dramatically after 1930, however.

The quality of the

neighborhood's leisure was no longer dominated by the
good ladies from the top of the hill.

It is said that

Santana became known not for the church bazaars, or the
cabaret on the top of the hill which had been popular
with the local elite in the 1920's, but for the quality
of its Italian restaurants, movies, circuses, football
and boxing clubs.

In the 1930's, the Tatu Club, which

had been a center for Republican Party politicians in the
previous decade, became a soccer club frequented by the
sons of foreign immigrants and rural Brazilian migrants.
Changes in the quality of the neighborhood's
retail commerce were more important.

According to

informants, commerce soared in the 1930's and was increas
ingly dominated by foreign immigrants or their descen-

Some of the roads remained unpaved, but by 1950
truck farming had virtually disappeared.
The neighborhood
was increasingly connected to the center of town as flood
control measures on the Tiete improved and a new bridge
was built over it in 1942.
In 1948, the last of the
elite chacaras (estates) was sold, and the land developed
into residential villas.
The main house became a private
maternity hospital and a smaller outbuilding became a
children's library.
In 1964 the Cantareira train was
removed to make way for a new avenue in Santana which
would extend the city's north-south artery into the neigh
borhood.
By 1974 the massive structure of the Colegio
Santana would be destroyed to make way for residential
highrises.
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dants.

By the time immigration was cut off in 1930,

small industry in the form of textile, furniture, soft
drink, printing, glue, food processing and carpentry
establishments were interspersed among the older supply
houses and dry goods stores

of the main streets of

Santana.
The development of Santana's local economy was
clearly stimulated by the increase in Sao Paulo's popu
lation.

After 1930, when foreign immigration decreased

sharply because of changed immigration policies (See
Chapter II, p. 85, fn. 27), such growth was primarily
due to internal migrations by rural Brazilians who came
to the city from regions in agricultural decline.

Be

tween 1934 and 1939 the city's population increased by
over 300,000 people at an average of over 50,000 indi
viduals a year (Cavalcanti,

1972).

Santana's popula

tion had increased most dramatically in the first three
decades of the century, so that by 1934, it was already
the most populous district in the Northern 2one of the
2

city.

After 1934, its growth rate was outstripped by

2
We have seen the local elite comment on Santana's
change from a neighborhood of '‘good families1' to a neigh
borhood inhabited by the poor and working class.
In the
1940's social scientists studying Sao Paulo's growth
defined it as a working class satellite to the city (See
Hermann, 1944:36; Araujo, 1941:71).
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the working class neighborhoods which surrounded it
(See Figure 20).

Nonetheless, its population continued to

grow at a respectable rate.
Figure 20. Population growth of the Northern
Zone of Sao Paulo, 1934-1950.
Subdistricts

1934

Santana
43,588
Tucuruvi
24,632
13,542
Casa Verde
V. Naria
,
5,722
N. Sra. do 0
7,866

1940

%

1950

%

55,081
33,761
22,120
15,281
13,436

26.3
37.5
64.4
167.0
70.8

90,198
88,720
58,571
54,373
51,012

63.7
162.8
164.7
255.8
279.6

SOURCE: Mendes Torres (1970:111)
In addition to the general population growth
of the whole area, many of Santana's immigrant families
were able to develop commercial interests in the area
because of changes in the structure of the commerce
which had been controlled by the elite.

We have seen

that the elite's commerce developed primarily to ser
vice the animal trade.

The retail commerce which they

controlled was linked to the animal trade in that much
of their merchandise was sold in the interior, along
the animal trade routes.

Local retail commerce had

always been shared with travelling salesmen, mascates.
3
who where most frequently of immigrant origins.
With

^See the informant cited above, Chapter III, p.
40: "The storekeepers sold to the people down below, to
the hillbillies from Juquox, Atibaia, Bragan^a . . .
The others would buy from the travelling salesmen."
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the decline of the animal trade, we have seen that the
occupations of the old elite changed from commerce to the
liberal professions and real estate development

thus

providing an opening for the expansion of immigrant
commercial concerns.
It was thus on the basis of rural migration from
the interior and the decline of commerce linked to the
animal trade that Santana's immigrant families were
able to develop a local, relatively strong and far more
varied commercial center along the main streets of the
neighborhood than had been the case when the elite fami
lies from the top of the hill controlled commerce.

Real

estate developments proliferated and the area became
studded with stylistically undefined two story houses
(sobrados) and villas

(houses on a private road with a

turn around at the end).

Many individuals, besides

members of the elite, were able to participate in the
real estate boom of the epoch and a few of the truck
farms belonging to immigrants were subdivided for housing
plots and villas, which if unoccupied at first, were
soon rapidly filled.
Immigrants had been in Santana since the turn of
the century, with the establishment of the Italian colony.
Santana's immigrants do not seem to have been representa
tive of the bulk of Sab Paulo's foreign population: most
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of the city-side immigrants were impoverished Italian
peasants who were brought to Brazil to work in the coffee
plantations or to man the factories in the city at the
turn of the century.
tana's

In 1934 twenty percent of S a n 

population was foreign born, although many more

must have been of foreign extraction.

Only 3.5 percent

were Italian born; 8.09 percent were Portuguese born.
Santana and the neighboring districts of Casa Verde and
Tucuruvi had over twenty percent of the Portuguese
population in Sao Paulo, and in general, immigrants from
Portugal were not working class, but landowning truckfarmers (Araujo, 1941:73-83).

These factors suggest

that foreign immigration to Santana may have been of
a generally higher economic level than that to the rest
of the city.

While the immigrant families interviewed

in Santana were far from bourgeois, they were not of
working class origins either.

We do not know how repre

sentative these families were of Santana's foreign popu
lation, but it is certain that they had more resources—
land, capital, training--to take advantage of the commer
cial opportunities offered by Sao Paulo's growth than the
mass of foreign factory workers, or indeed, as we shall
see later on, than the Brazilian rural migrants who
came to Sao Paulo at that time.

Some of the foreign

families arriving in Santana were able to afford several
return trips with their families to visit Italy or
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Portugal, and all but one immigrant interviewed (or dis
cussed with their descendants) were literate on arrival.
By the 1930's many owned land or their own commercial en
terprises and were actively participating in Santana's
growth.

In general, this applies equally to the foreign

born immigrants who arrived in Santana before 1930 and to
the second generation immigrants (Brazilian born of foreign
extraction) arriving in Santana after 1930 (See Figures
21, 22, 23).
The careers of families arriving in Santana before
1930 do not in any way support Willems's (1975:197) hypo
thesis of dramatic social mobility among immigrants.

They

support, rather, Dean's suggestion (1969:50-51), discussed
in Chapter I, that foreign immigration reduplicated the
structure of the immigrants' countries of origin.

We may

surmise, then, that the Santana immigrants discussed here
were not alone, and that in addition to the laboring masses
and the few entrepreneurs,

individuals and families of

middle economic status also arrived in Sao Paulo.

Thus,

while the elite at the top of the hill had referred to the
population at the bottom of the hill as os pobres or §.
italianada la de baixo, many of these were neither poor nor
Italian, but Portuguese,

Syrians or Germans of middle income.

Moreover, while many informants of foreign
descent felt that the careers of their kinsmen consti
tuted modest tales of independent achievement in the
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Figure 21.

Professions of First Generation Immigrants to Santana, 1900-1930

Occupations

Before
1900

19001920

19201930

Salaries

factory
worker
artisan

trolley
car
driver
unknown

coffee
laborer
turned
factory
worker
(1)

Low

(2)

Medium
(0)

(2)
industrial
managers
in textile
factories
(2)

Totals

( 5)

(0)

( 2)

Independents.
Truckfarms

(6)

(5)

(0)

(ID

Transportation
(animal based)

(1)

(3)

(0)

( 4)

Commerce

import
company
(1)
carpentry
shop

restaurant
(1)
carpentry
shops

Industry
(1)
Totals

(ID

(4)
(17)

2 grocery
stores
bar
(3)

( 5)

carpentry
shop
bakery
furniture
factory
typography
(4)

( 9)

(8)

(36)
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F ig u r e

22.

P r o f e s s io n s o f Second G e n e r a tio n Im m ig ra n ts t o S a n t a n a , 1900-1970

Occupations

19001930

19301950

19501970

Salaries

soldier
2 factory
workers
construc
tion
worker
driver
(5)

5 fae=
tory
workers

gas
station
attendant

Low

Medium

2 tombstone
sculptors
accountant
head car
penter

2 book
keepers
6 sales
men
industrial
manager
(9)

(4)

(5)

(1)
TV publi
city man
industrial
manager
4 accoun
tants
(6)

Totals

(11)

(19)

Independents
Truckfarms
Transportation

(5)
3 animal
based
(3)

Commerce

(0)

Industry

2 carpen
try
shops

(2)
Totals

(19)

(0)
taxi
fleet
(1)
real
estate
3 stores
barber
tailor
salesman
baker
(turned
stockbro
ker)
(10)

(0)

( 5)

(0)

( 4)

gas station
owner

(1)

(li>

2 carpen
try
shops
wire fac
tory
valve
factory
textile
factory
bakery
(6)

5 workers
in family
owned car
pentry
shops
automobile
repair
shop
lamination
factory
(7)

(15)

(31)

(15)

(6 5 )
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new world, there is an interesting shift between the first
and second generations as regards careers that suggests
a measure of downward mobility, or at least a loss of
control over land and capital.

Among first generation

immigrants arriving in Santana before 1930, 19.44 percent
earned salaries and 80.55 percent owned their own busi
nesses: truck farms, transportation companies, commer
cial or industrial ventures.

The proportion of indepen

dent businessmen declined radically among the second
generation to 52.63 percent among those beginning
careers between 1900 and 1930 and to 54.83 percent
among those beginning careers after 1930 (See Figure 23 )•
Figure 23* Career comparisons between genera
tions of immigrants in Santana, 1900-1950.
First
Generation
1900-1930

I
Salaries
Low
Med ium
IndeDendents
Truckfarms
Transportation
Commerce
Industry
Totals

7
5
2
29
11
4
5
9
36

%

Second
Generation
1900-1930

N

19.44
13.89
5.55
80.55
30.55

9
5
4
10
5
3

13.89
25.00
99.99

-

11.11

2
12

%

Second
Generation
1930-1950

I

%

47.36
26.31
21.05
52*63
26.31
15.79

y±

45.16
16.13
29.03
54.83

1

---

10
6
31

3.22
32.26
19.35
99.99

10.53
99.99

5
9
17
-

-

In addition, there are suggestive differences
in the distribution of careers among the second genera
tion beginning careers between 1900 and 1930 and that
beginning careers after 1930.

While the proportion of
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salaries to independent enterprises remains more or
less constant, the proportion of low salaries decreases
among the second generation beginning careers after 1930.
Among the independents, there is a dramatic increase in
industrial and commercial enterprises in the second
4

generation beginning careers after 1930.

These data generally confirm informants' reports
of Santana's commercial growth after 1930, but they
suggest a number of other things as well.

First of all,

while the first generation immigrants had enough capital
to be relatively independent as truck farmers or owners
of animal based transport companies, they may have lost
land and capital because of difficulties with the
language and lack of understanding of Brazilian laws.
In some cases, the land appears to have been sold too
rapidly and at low prices to real estate speculators.
However, we do well to recall that during the early
part of the century the status of private property was
in the process of being defined in Santana.

According

to informants' memories and impressions, the Italian
colonists, for example, sometimes lost land because they

^Chi square tests were performed on all of these
comparisons; the only one which yielded unequivocal
results was that between the first and second generations.
However, because of the smallness and non randomness of
the sample, the results should be considered as sugges
tive rather than definitive.
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did not speak fluent Portuguese and did not understand
the tax laws.

Other immigrants or unscrupulous city offi

cials quietly paid the taxes and got access to title.

In

other instances, official surveys which could have proved
immigrant's boundary claims mysteriously disappeared from
municipal files (See Appendix IV-A).^

Such difficulties

do not find expression in informants' descriptions of
their first generation ancestors' professions as " landown
ing truck farmer,” but they are reflected in the increase
of salaried positions in the second generation.

Thus, the

difficulties which we would expect the first generation to
face affected the careers of the second generation.
Moreover, the fact that among the second generation
success--that is, higher salaries or increased commercial
opportunities^--seems to be related to whether a career
began before or after 1930 suggests two things.

First,

the less successful second generation careers

may

have been affected not only by a general

" (shakeout”

among the first generation families, but also by the

^Citations from informants which are too bulky
to be included here are found in Appendix IV.
^A chi square test on the significance of increas
ed high salaries after 1930 was only at .30. However,
the test on the significance of increased commerce after
1930 was greater than .10, suggesting that the variation
may not be due to chance.
However, as stated above in
Fn. 4, in view of the size and non-randomness of the sample,
these results are only suggestive and should be regarded
with caution.
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general labor glut of Sao Paulo's market during the
First Republic, which was specifically created by immi
gration policies favoring the coffee oligarchy (See
Chapter II, pp. 64-65 ).

Second, the more successful

second generation careers in commmerce beginning after
1930 suggest that improved commercial opportunities
resulted not only from the vacuum left by the elite
families as their descendants abandoned commerce, but
also from the population growth which characterised the
whole Northern Zone of the city.

To a degree, immigra

tion itself created markets for immigrant concerns.

But

by the 1930's, the height of the immigration period
was over.

We may then surmise that the improved commer

cial opportunities in Santana arose from a particular
kind of population growth which could support the
increasing variety of Santana's commerce: namely the
newly arrived bureaucrats.
The bureaucrats, who arrived in the late 1920's
and 1930's were able to pay for the goods and services
offered by Santana's commerce, but not for the more
expensive commodities handled by the commerce in the
center of Sao Paulo.

If the foregoing hypothesis is

correct, the result of the Vargas years was not only
to stabilize the downwardly mobile rural elites who
came to Santana as bureaucrats, but to contribute as
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well, through their creation, to the stability and
prosperity of Santana's commerce and the immigrants who
controlled it.
Most of the bureaucratic families who came to
Santana in the late 1920's and 1930's were from reasonably
wealthy,

landed backgrounds in their fathers' or grand

fathers' generations,

but had witnessed the precipitous

decline of family fortunes.

They had seen the value of

their production decline and the size of their landhold
ings decrease through inheritance to the point where a
large nuclear family would have difficulty supporting
itself.

In spite of this downward mobility in the

economic sphere, these families were relatively privileged.
They were literate, and in their towns in the interior,
they or their relatives had had the political and social
status of landowners, coroneis or cabos eleitorais. Such
individuals were used to prestige and to political
influence at least on a local level even though, as one
informant put it, "Os poderosos foram de tempo passado.
Nos ouase aue nao vimos esse poder" (^he powerful ones
were of bygone days.

We hardly saw that power).

Once in the city though, their literacy entitled
them to little in the 1930's, and their sense of social
status was incommensurate with the realities of their
new situation, as there was no one to validate it:
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Viemos pra Sab Paulo porque meu irmao, que tava na
Forca mandou vir.
Estava diflcil la no sxtio. Fomos
pro lado de Vila Formosa onde era tudo rua de terra,
casinhas . . . nao sei, estranhamos.
No interior
eramos familia de certa classe. Aqui era carroceiro . . . era diferente. Mamae arrazada.
Eu riao
tinha com quern conversar, saia quarenta e cinco
minutos a pe pra cidade pra passear.
Eu queria
trabalhar.
Tinha trabalhado na fazenda da minha
irma, mais nao gostava. Aqui queria trabalhar na
fabrica, e marquei com a noiva do meu irmao pra
me arrumar um emprego. De noite, quando falei pro
meu irmao, ele nao deixou, explicou, me mostrou a
diferenga de trabalhar em fabrica, que na nossa
situa^ao nao podia, que era melhor trabalhar numa
loja^. No dia seguinte falei pra mojia que^ meu
irmao tinha falado que a nossa posipao nao permitia
que eu fosse trabalhar em fabrica.
liiiihl Deu um
boro!
Eu so fiquei
inteligente depois de velha.
Fiquei envergonhada, brigou comigo, brigou com ela,
me mandaram de volta pra fazenda da minha irma,
onde me davam todo trabalho pesado . . .
We came to Sao Paulo because my brother, who was in
the Forqa Publica sent for us.
It was difficult on
the sitio /subsistence farm7.
We went to Vila
Formosa /working class neighborhood of Sao Paulo/
where everything was dirt roads, little houses . . .
I don't know, it was different.
In the interior we
were a family of a certain position.
Here there
were cart drivers . . . it was different. Mother
was exhausted.
I didn't have anyone to talk to,
I would walk forty-five minutes to go look at the
city.
I wanted to work.
I had worked at my sister's
fazenda but I didn't like it. Here I wanted to work
in a factory, and I arranged with my brother's girl
friend that she should find me a job. At night when
I told my brother, he wouldn't let me, he explained
and showed me the difference between working in a
factory, that in our position I couldn't, that it
was better to work in a store.
The next day I told
the girl that my brother had said that our position
would not permit me to work in a factory.
Iiiih!
There was trouble!
I only got smart after I got old!
I was embarrassed, they fought with me, with her, he
sent me back to my sister's fazenda, where they gave
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me all the heavy work . . J
The decline of familistic support for many of
these families is an added indication of their initial
downward mobility.

If there were wealthier branches

of their families in the city, they were often less
than helpful.

A few families did have such relatives in

Sao Paulo when they migrated, but most informants laughed
at the suggestion that such relatives might have helped.
Only one of my informants ever asked for help and was
disappointed.
Fui no Instituto Fontoura por indicagao de um
/
parente que estava melhor de vida, e trabalhava la.
Su era auxiliar de qurmico, mais a£ tambem nao tinha
futuro.
E, o comego nao foi muito fiicil, riao.
Aquele parente poderia ter ajudado bemjnais. Pensei
que 1 a trabalhar no escritdrio, mais nao, fui pro
setor dos operarios, puxando carrinho, engarrafando
0 produto. Fiquei muito chocado com o trabalho
bragal. Ademais, tava com um furunculo enorme
debaixo do brago, e s o f n aquelas^ dores. Foi tudo
a mesma coisa.
Naquele tempo, Sao Paulo era pequeno,
e nao oferecia as oportunidades de hoje.
E^os
parentes ajudavam, mais aqueles que podiam nao ajudavam tanto nao.
1 went to the Instituto Fontoura /a drug factor yj
through the advice of a relative who was better off,
and worked there.
I was a chemist's assistant, but
there wasn't much future there either.
Yes, in the
beginning it wasn't very easy.
That relative could
have helped a lot more.
I thought I was going to
work in an office, but no, I was sent to the workers'
sections, to push carts and bottle the product.
I
was very shocked with physical labor. Moreover,

^See Appendix

IV=B.
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I had an enormous abscess under my arm, and was
in tremendous pain.
It was always the same thing.
In those days Sao Paulo was small and didn*t offer
the opportunities of today.
Sure, relatives helped,
but those who could didn't help that much.
Unrealistic expectations of this sort underscore
the vulnerability of such families.

For the untrained

in a difficult job market, the opportunities provided by
the growth and stability of the bureaucracy during the
Vargas years stopped a process of vertiginous downward
social mobility.8

Literate Brazilians, eligible for

government employ, were provided with secure employment,
a modest but sure source of income, retirement benefits,
and access to government loans.

Most importantly, they

were reintegrated into a new scheme of government.

For

Santana families of such backgrounds, the last was of
special importance, for it was on the basis of their
new government connections that they were able to estab
lish new grounds for prestige and influence in Santana.
Of the twenty Brazilians ia my sample, who came to
Santana frcm about 1928 to 1950, all but three joined bu
reaucracies. In contrasty none of the eleven second generation
foreign immigrants who arrived after 1930 did, although

8There is a parallel here between the careers of
the second generation immigrants beginning their careers
during the First Republic.
We have hypothesized that
these, too, were affected by the labor glut caused by
First Republic immigration policies.
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one was connected to the For^a Publica as a tailor (See
Figure 24)*

A few of the bureaucrats had lived briefly

in other areas of the city before moving to Santana.
They came to Santana because housing was cheap and it
was close to the center of the city, where many held jobs
in the State Office of the Treasury, the Department of
Public Health, the Ministry of Education, the Department
of Water and Sewage, and in the For<pa Publica (See
Figures 24

and 25 ) •

The For<pa Publica provided almost half of the
bureaucratic employment among Brazilian migrants inter
viewed.

A degree of mobility through the ranks had

been possible in the For^a Publica since 1915.

In 1924

mobility was limited to the literate: earlier basic
education courses had made mobility through the ranks
possible even for illiterate, volunteers, but in 1924,
these were abolished and officer training programs which
only accepted literate individuals were instituted (Fer
nandez, 1972:233).
Publica

The age of grandeur of the Forca

had terminated in 1932: with the defeat of the

Constitutionalist Revolt, it fell under Federal control.
Yet, despite the personal humiliation of being associa9
ted with a defeated institution,
careers were made

^An informant who participated in the 1932 revolt
as an officer in the Forca Publica explained: f
"0 que houve mesmo em '32, o que se nota, e. a ambi-
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Figure 24. Professions of Brazilian Rural Migrants and
Second Generation Foreign Immigrants to Santana, 1930-1950.

Occupations

Brazilians

Foreign
Immigrants

Totals

&«:eaucirats,
Forca Publica
Sducat ion
Other

8
4
5

Water &
Sewage
Dept, of
Health
Treasury
bookeeper
driver

(17)

(0)

(17)

NonBureaucrats
Independents

barbershop
owner
real estate
dealer

( 2)
Salaries

Totals

accountant

furniture
factory
independent
income
real estate
dealer
garage owner
2 store owners
supermarket
owner
electrician
(8)

(10)

tailor
store
manager
accountant

( 1)

(3)

( 4)

(20)

(11)

(31)
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there.

In the 1930's it became possible to get univer

sity training through this institution, which otherwise
would not have been available to the volunteers.

In

fact, volunteers to the For^a Publica had a far lower
level of preparation than did individuals who joined the
public health services, the teaching bureaucracy or
various ministries in desk jobs. Perhaps it is because
the requirements were lower than in other bureaucracies
that familistic networks in the Forga Publica appeared
much stronger than in other bureaucracies.(See Figure 25)•
While relatively few individuals interviewed did so,
those who were able to take advantage of the university
training offered by the Forca Publica could, after
retirement, start private businesses as civil engineers,
veterinarians and doctors.
3ureaucratic

employment provided stability and

new opportunities to families which were in tight
straits.

This was recognized by many women of rural

£ao desmedida dos politicos que queriam recuperar
os cargos perdidos com a revolucao de *30.
Insuflaram o povo contra a Forcpa. Chamavam de traidor, de
judas, desciam dos bondes. Chamavam as meninas na
escola de filha e irma de traidor."
"What happened in '32, what one notes is the unmea
sured ambition of the politicians who wanted to
recuperate the positions lost with the revolution of
'30. They encouraged the people against the Forga.
Called us traitors, judases, got off trolleys. They
called the girls at school daughters and sisters of
traitors."
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migrant background who married bureaucrats:
Na^ minha epoca casavamos com funcionario, o que
nao pode chegar a fortuna por muito esforpado
que seja.
0 trabalho pro estado da menos dinheiro
mas mais garantia.
In my day we mariied public servants, who can't
make fortunes no matter how hard they try. Working
for the state yields less money but more security.
Of all the bureaucrats interviewed, those who
joined the For<pa Publica were most explicit in their
recognition of the possibilities for upward mobility
inherent in the new structure of opportunities offered
them.

The following citation is from a volunteer's

graduation speech:
Ha dezessete anos batia eu as portas deste
Batalhao, onde hoje vos reunis para, por meu
intermedio, homenagear a tradicional hospitalidade
desta terra de Sao Paulo . . . Quando rememoro o
passado, e comparo o pouco que sou ao nada que
era, sinto um orgulho infinito e creio nos destions gloriosos do Brasil . . . Uma terra onde o
pobre, com o esforco proprio pode estudar e progredir, tendo apentis como limite o limite de suas
proprias forpas, nao pode deixar de ser forte.
A historia de minha vida e a historia anonima de
muitos.
E'a de uma infancia pobre, de uma adoles- ^
cencia perigosa sujeita a tentapao do vicio, atraves
de uma camaradagem nociva . . . Aos oito anos perdia
o meu pai. Aos nove ja me encontrava vendendo o
suor do meu rosto pelo pao de cada dia. . . com o
espirito aventureiro cheguei eu a Capital Federal.
No Rio conheci de tudo.
Convivi com a escoria de ^
sua sociedade, e realmente sofri . . . dias de miseria e de desanimo.
Ha/ momento na vida de cada um de nos que representam se'culos de intenso viver.
Esses momentos eu
os vivi^entao.
Era Julho de 1924. Rebentara a
revolucao.
Sem objetivos fixos alistei me a um
batalhao de voluntarios que nao chegou a vir a Sao
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Faulo.
Sozinho, sem recursos, descrente dos que,
como serralheiro com a minha falta de sorte poderia
adquirir; bastante orgulhoso e independente para
pedi-los, decidi alistar-me na For^a Publica de
Sao Paulo.
Bendita a hora feliz de minha inspira^ao.
Aqui encontrei, na disciplina e no trabalho, a
orienta^ao segura que minha inexperiencia exigia.
Aqui, no exemplo dos meus chefes, completei minha
forma<pao moral.
Aqui estudei.
Casei-me.
Tive filhos, que em
Deus esperc^ terao melhores dias que os meus.
Aqui consegur chegar a capitao e obter o tltulo
de medico.
Seventeen years ago, I was knocking at the doors
of this battalion, where today we are united to
celebrate, throughjne, the traditional hospitality
of this land of Sao Paulo . . . When I recall the
past, and compare the little I am to the nothing
that I was, I feel infinite pride and belief in
the glorious destinies of Brazil . . . A land in
which a poor man, can through his own efforts
study and progress, having as a limit only the limits
of his own strergth cannot be other than strong.
The story of my life is the anonymous history
of many.
It is the tale of an impoverished child
hood and a dangerous adolescence subject to tempta
tions to vice through unwholesome aquaintances . . .
When I was eight, I lost my father.
By the time I
was nine, I was selling the sweat of my brow for
my daily bread . . . with an adventurous spirit I
arrived in the Federal Capital.
In Rio I knew
everything.
I lived with the dregs of its society
and I truly suffered . . . days of misery and
depression.
There are moments in the lives of each of us
which represent centuries of intense living.
Those
moments I lived then.
It was July 1924 and the
revolution broke out. Without any fixed objectives
I enlisted in a battalion of volunteers that never
reached Sao Paulo. Alone and without resources;
with a lack of faith in the resources that a metal-
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worker with my lack of luck could acquire; too
proud and independentfto beg for jrhem, I decided to
enlist in the ffqrca Publica of Sao Paulo.
Blessed the happy hour of my inspiration.
Here I found, in discipline and work, the secure
path which my inexperience required.
Here, with the example of my superiors,
pleted my moral development.

I com

Here I studied.
I married.
I had children,
who God willing will have better days than mine.
Here I have managed to become a captain and to
obtain the title of d o c t o r . ^
It is clear from these and other statements by
the Brazilian rural migrants interviewed that they felt
that they were starting their lives at the bottom, saved
from absolute proletarianization only by the security
of the jobs in the bureaucracies which became available
at that time.

They came to Santana because the neighbor

hood was relatively cheap and they were poor.

None of

these families was able to buy land, or a house when
they moved to Santana.

Although they now all own their

own dwellings, when they moved to Santana they rented
the "chicken coops for the poor" being built by the
families at the top of the hill, or more usually, houses
built by immigrants or their descendants.
The beginning of a symbiotic relationship

103ee Appendix

IV-C.
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developed between many bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic
families: at first it was a relation between ethnic
groups.

Foreigners, especially Italians, were discrimi

nated against by the Law of Two Thirds (See Chapter II,
p. 85-6) and the limitation of bureaucratic employment

to the Brazilian born.

Social prejudice was expressed

by foreigners and Brazilians alike.

Older Brazilian

informants comment on "unfortunate" marriages between
Italians or Syrians and Brazilians, but in fact such
marriages appear to have been rare during the 1930's.
According to a 1941 survey of the population of Sao
Paulo,

foreigners generally married each other because

the Brazilians they were exposed to were most often of
either a lower or a far higher economic status (Araujo,
1941:72).

Because of this legal and social discrimination

immigrants in Santana could only gain access to govern
ment resources through bureaucratic personnel who acted
as intermediaries

for them.

They became slightly more

integrated into the existing political scheme than
might otherwise have been the case, in the absence

of

even nominal participation in electoral politics.'*'*'
However, as the Brazilian born replace the foreign born

*^Among the families interviewed only two in
formants admitted to having relatives who joined or
participated in the Integralist or Communist movements
of the 1930's.
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of whatever extraction, the families became defined by
their direct or indirect access to government.
The relationship was recognized.

The bureaucrats

provided a market fcr land, commerce and industry which
were in immigrant hands, and in return for the relatively
cheap rents given them, gave access to ieito.

Jeito

(literally, "manner," a way to fix or arrange things) is
the ubiquitous Brazilian word meaning the ability to
get by, to manage, generally by the successful manipula
tion of one's personal connections.

It has to do with

the creation of clientelistic networks and is usually
applied when there is the expectation of mutual aid.
Through their friendships with the bureaucrats, the non
bureaucrats got access to informal
tion and assistance.

channels of informa

The "municipal benevolence,"

which da Silva Mendes (1958:222) holds responsible

for

the mushrooming of housing developments in Santana
during these years, probably had its roots in many such
relationships.

Besides the acquisition of building

permits, informants mentioned tax exemptions, housing
loans from the Gaixa Economica (State Savings Bank),
special consideration for their children's application
to State schools, legal advice, a few bureaucratic
positions for the Brazilian born and even the use of the
rare telephones in Sao Paulo, which even now are only
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available at

exorbitant prices or to people with

connections.
Friendships between the bureaucrats and non
bureaucrats were hardly ever formalized during the Vargas
years.

Among the families studied only one marriage

occurred’between a bureaucrat--a Forga Publica officer—
and a landed woman of Italian descent.

IVhile this

marriage expressed a union of material and social capi
tal and can be considered as expressive of the bureau
crat-immigrant relationship discussed here,

I do not

know how frequent such marriages may have been in Santana
in the 1930's.

Most of the bureaucrats interviewed who

came to Santana in the late 1920's and early 1930's were
already married and starting families.

Among the For<pa

Publica officers interviewed who married foreign women,
the women were most often working class women whom they
had met in the center city industrial neighborhoods
surrounding the Forga Publica headquarters.
During these early years in Santana, the immi
grants appear to have gotten the better part of the deal:
they had capital and the bureaucrats did not.

The

bureaucrats provided them with opportunities to utilize
their capital assets.

The bureaucrats, however,

gained

prestige, which would later be formalized through god
parenthood, marriages--in the next generation--and occa
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sionally in joint business ventures.

For example, one

voung Forca Publica officer, after having graduated from
engineering school,formed his first business partnership
with his old immigrant landlord.

According to the land

lord's daughter,
Nos conhecemos o Cel. Thomas faz tempo. Ele era
vizinho nosso quando veio pra Santana. Alugava a
casa do papai.
Ele era carpinteiro fino, trabalhava em construpoes, fez todo o trabalho de madeira
pra igreja Sao Bento,
Fapai era dTtimo construtor,
so que nao tinha forma^ao.
Era arquiteto autodidata.
Ele se deu bem com o Coronel, que nao tinha experiencia.
Entao ficaram socios, e trabalharam juntos,
fizeram uma por^ao de casas quando papai loteou o
terreno.
Quando papai se aposentou, o Cel. Thomas
fez a minha casa. Continuamos muito amigos.
We have known Colonel Thomas for a long time. He
was our neighbor when he came to Santana.
He rented
father's house. Father was a fine carpenter, he
worked in constructions, he did all the wood work
for the church of Sab Bento,
He was an excellent
builder, although he had no formal training.
He
was a self taught architect.
He got along well
with the Colonel, who /had a degree but_7 had no
experience.
So they became partners and they
worked together.
They built a lot of houses when
my father developed his land. When my father
retired, it was the Colonel who built my house.
We continue very friendly.
Naturally the opportunities were greater for
the bureaucrats who had been able to acquire sufficient
training in their bureaucracies to be able to set up
independent enterprises.

The friendship and patronage

extended to the immigrants could then lead to economic
gain through the acquisition of commercial clients.
Thus, the Cel. Thomas, mentioned above, received a few
prestigious city side contracts, through connections
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made in the For^pa Publica. but the bulk of his business
was in Santana among immigrant and other non-bureaucra
tic families.

While Cel. Thomas's career was exception

ally successful, eventually all of the bureaucrats benefitted from the friendships formed with immigrants and
their families during the Vargas years.
The relationship begun between bureaucratic
families and non-hureaucratic families became completely
symbiotic during the populist years following the reintro
duction of elections, because then immigrant friends and
business clients became the bureaucrat^ political clients.
The 1950's were prosperous years.

Santana's

commerce continued to be fuelled by population growth in
the neighborhood and the area ( See Figure 26).

The

Figure 26. Population growth in the Northern
Zone of Sao Paulo, 1950-1970.
Subdistricts

1950

Santana^
TucuruvL
Casa Verde
V. Maria
^
N. Sjra. do 0
Limao
V. Guilherme
V. Nova Cach oeir inha

90,193
88,720
58,571
54,373
51,012
..a
_a

1960
120,284
175,653
79,226
94,118
62,439
51,837
41,202
24,172

%

1970

%

—

200,490
255,515
99,405
116,916
141,863
70,232
74,450

66.68
45.46
25.47
24.22
127.20
35.48
80.69

—

30,924

27.93

33.35
97.98
35.26
73.09
22.40
--

aThese subdistricts were created in 1965.
SOURCE: Mendes Torres (1970:111,171); IBGE
(1970:90).
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bureaucracies continued to absorb Brazilian migrants from
rural areas at an even greater rate (See Figure

17 ), and

migrants of foreign descent arriving in Santana during the
1940's and 1950 !s were able to set up independent commer
cial enterprises.

Commerce and real estate continued to

be the main investments.

Various voluntary associations

were formed in the neighborhood during these years.

Bran

ches of the Rotary and Lions Clubs and the Sao Paulo
Commercial Association opened in Santana as did a local
store owners' association.

Members in all of these asso

ciations included prominent commercial figures, as well
as the new local politicians, many of whom were bureau
crats who had migrated to Santana during the Vargas years.
In addition to Santana's continued growth, the ex
pansion of bureaucracies and the reintroduction of elec
tions under populism promoted the careers of bureaucratic
and non-bureaucratic individuals alike.
of both groups

It gave people

advantages which had been absent during

the Vargas years.

Electoral politics meant that every

man and woman could be a small scale politician and
join a political machine.

The implication of this

new situation for immigrants is expressed by the son of
an independent salesman of foreign descent, who said:
Uma vez meu pai ajudou tom vereador por duas
coisas: ele queria finaneiamento pra uma casa e
nao tinha liga<£oes politicas.
Sem liga^o'es era
dificil conseguir finaneiamento. A segunda coisa
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era conseguir uin lugar no estacionamento munici
pal.
Isso recefceu. 0 finaneiamento ele nsio
conseguiu, porque o vereador nao podia, nao era
bastante importante, entao ele foi falar com
o Gel. Joao id da ____ que tava ligado com o
grupo do governador . . . Meu avo tinha ajudado
o irmao dele num negocio . . .
Once my father helped a councilman for two
things.
He wanted financing for a house and he
didn't have the political connections.
Without
such connections it was difficult to get financing.
The second thing was to get a parking space in
the municipal parking lot.
That he got.
The
financing he didn't get, because the councilman
wasn't important enough and couldn't do it. So
he went to speak to Cel. Joao from _____ who was
connected with the governor's group. My grandfa
ther had helped his brother in some business . . .
While I have little specific information on
such relationships among men, it is clear that populism
provided opportunities for mutual career advancement
for bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats alike.

Thus, when

a popular commercial figure's religious affiliation
was

being discussed, informants laughed and

said,

Ah, esse ax que e politico, faz umbanda,espiritismo,
vai pra missa todo domingo, e tudo projegao, e £e
ve que deu bem, ne?
Ah, that one is really a politician. He does
umbanda. spiritism, goes to church every Sunday.
It's all projection, and you see how it's worked
out, don't you?
While they would not provide details on the connections
it is clear that for this non-bureaucratic individual as
well as for others, there were linkages to be found
through Rotary, Lions and commercial associations,

in

party political associations or in the bureaucracies
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themselves.

There was always a ieito. a person could

always help, and in the process, help himself.
The populist years were particularly significant
for the bureaucrats.

As in the First Republic, electoral

politics provided special opportunities for those in a
position to manage votes.

Most of Santana's elected

politicians after 1945 were of bureaucratic backgrounds.
Many more bureaucrats ran for political office.

They

were not elected, but they acted as sieves for patronage.
Although the bureaucrats never reached the power and
position of the old top of the hill elite, the reintroduc
tion of elections greatly enhanced their political and
economic fortunes.
According to a number of local politicians,
Santana's re-entry into electoral politics was enthusias
tic and at first violent.

A shooting occurred at a poli

tical meeting outside the Santana church and there vras
a riot in the neighboring district of Tucuruvi.

I was

unable to get more detailed information on these incidents
other than that they were connected with the Communist
electoral victory which occurred in Santana and elsewhere,
in spite of the lack of local Communist Party leadership
in Santana.

12

After this initial outburst, however, and

^According to a local politician: "£u nao sei
_se acabou o fenomeno do Communismo.
Agora ninguem se"
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the subsequent prohibition of the Communist party, Santana
politics were controlled largely by the right wing parties
which developed after the second World War (See Chapter
II, PP.104§).
Santana politics were largely defined by the
complementary trends of Adhemarismo and Janismo (Beiguelman, 1971:325) which dominated the politics of Sao Paulo
during the populist years.

Adhemar de Barros, a doctor,

began his political career in the 1933 elections for the
Constituent
67-8; Cabral,

Assembly as a PRP delegate (Skidmore, 1967:
1962:29; Bloem, 1955:44).

During the Vargas

years, when Federal control over the states was maintain
ed by a presidentially appointed interventor, Adhemar
was one of the interventors for Sao Paulo.

In 1946 he

ran for Governor of the state and was elected.

It is

said that his party machine, the Partido Social Progres
sists (PSP) was the most corrupt of all the allegedly
venal post war parties.

Adhemar's own motto was nRouba

mas faz11 (He steals but gets the job done).

manifests por razoes compreensivas1* (I don't know if the
phenomenon of communism is finished.
Now no one manifests
himself for understandable reasons).
13
The husband of one of the Santana informants
kept his accounts.
There were two ledgers, one private
and one public.
Both were burned after Adhemar*s death
in 1969.
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Adhemar's political strength seems to have come
from Paulista industrialists and old PRP elements.

In

Santana he took over Goya's PRP electoral machine and a
few of the old elite families at the top of the hill
joined his electoral camp.

His electoral strength

derived from what Weffort has described as the. "politics
of love" (1965:179), a generous paternalism which pro
mised everyone a share of Sao Paulo's extraordinary
post war economic growth.

According to Weffort's analy

sis of the 1962 elections in Sao Paulo state, his main
electoral supporters in the state were among economically
marginal landowners or independent businessmen who looked
towards the state for protection, assistance and genero
sity.

They did not expect specific policies, but "a

power which cared for the little man" (1965:180).
Weffort continues,
From this follows the importance attributed by the
adhemaristas to distributive activities.
The
image of a leader, easily accessible to his follow
ers suggests a behavioural style for the administra
tive bureaucracy which vitiates the impersonality
of the laws. Finally, the typical adhemari^ta
whether "progressive" or "conservative" imagines a
protective, helpful State to which one can appeal
in cases of difficulty, without the technical obsta
cles of a rational and impersonal administration.
It is this structure which permits the small land
owner, the "lumpen" and marginal salaried man the
certainty that he will survive, even if defeated
in the violent competition stimulated by capitalist
development, and above all the certainty that he
may keep his aspiration of access to higher posi
tions (1965:180).
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Adhemar's main opposition was from Janismo.
Janio Quadros was a primary school teacher who began his
political career unaffiliated with any of the main Paulista political parties.

Janio provided the only signifi

cant opposition to Aahemar's "politics of love," by
promising justice, austerity and an end to corruption.
His was the rhetoric of "a revolugao do tostao contra o
milhao" (the revolution of the penny against the million),
of the end of politicagem (politicking— and corruption)
and of non political administration (Ferreira, 1964:261-3).
His political strength derived purely from his electoral
appeal, which eventually led Sao Paulo's major parties to
back him in the elections for state governor in 1955. In
1960 he became president of the republic.

Whereas

Adhemar's electorate was largely among the petty bourgeois
of the interior or in industrial neighborhoods whose
populations were composed of impoverished recent migrants
from the Northeast or other areas of Brazil (Weffort, 1965:
181-2; Ferreira,

1964:239-40), Janio's appeal was basi

cally to the urban electorate (Sloem:1955:70).

According

to Weffort, Janio's appeal was to segments of the urban
working class and to middle income sectors who had no
political connections, who expected no favors and who were
increasingly dependent on their salaries for survival.
Weffort argues that the
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Janistas are more stable /than the adhemaristas?
in the sense that as a working class, or proletarianized middle class . . . they have not much to lose
with capitalist development . . . they do not turn
to the state cherishing hopes of personal protection
but with hopes for justice, for what matters for them
is no longer the expectation of favors, but their
own ability to work . . . they expect justice and
unconditional application of the law from the state
(1965:18.2-3).
Both Janio and Adhemar were supported in
Santana.

Many of Santana's elected officials to munici

pal, state and federal legislatures were of adhemarista
backgrounds, but Janio derived much of his personal
electoral strength from the Northern Zone of Sao Paulo,
including Santana (Bloem, 1955:70).

We shall see, how

ever, that the distinction which Weffort makes between
adhemaristas and janistas does not really apply to the
families interviewed in Santana.
We have seen in Chapter II that populism inter
related the electoral and administrative systems at the
higher socio-economic levels.

Bureaucracies and pane-

linhas within them became the institutions through which
electoral clans were revived (Mota, 1972:217), and the
rivalries of electoral politics were expressed by pro
motions or appointments within given bureaucracies.
Among the bureaucrats interviewed in Santana,

the

Secretariats of Health, Education and Finance and the
Forga Publica were the loci for the rivalries of elec
toral politics.

They could deal with favorable place-
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ments and appointments for teachers, doctors and dentists
as well as with legal and financial advice.

14

Patronage

possibilities were particularly important in the Porga
Publica because of the opportunities for diverting mate
riel.

It was allegedly a bastion of Adhemarismo because

of an improved automatic promotion law passed by Adhemar
in the early populist years.

According to a number of

informants, advancement could depend on the ability to
mobilize votes outside the bureaucracy and political
standing within it.

The ability to mobilize votes for

a given faction depended

on willingness to bring the

benefits of government to friends who did not have them.
Attempts, for instance,

to check the redistribution of

construction materials and automobile parts to private
ends, were at least on one occasion penalized by delayed
promotions.
In the political climate of 1972-73 it was un 
reasonable to expect informants to describe past achieve
ments in the area of patronage and corruption.

Under

standably, discussions of politics and patronage were

^Teachers in the public system are assigned
schools throughout the state.
To receive a desired
teaching location, usually in the capital, teachers are
required to pass periodic examinations. It was commonly
felt that people with connections got the placements
they wanted.
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usually concluded with statements of this sort:
Eu nao gostava, nao gosto de^ politica.
So faco
por obriga^ao.
A politica e' falsa, eu tenho
impressao, acho que todo politico antes da
Reyolujao, se nao fizesse, favores aos eleitores,
nao seria eleito.
Nao ha' mais aquela gloria do
politico, de se valorizar a si proprio.
Esse
negocio do jeitinho melhorou noventa porcento.
Ainda existe.
Eu nab tenho me servido^ e nunca
gostei.
Se me servia antes, era pra nao passar
de bobo.
1 didn't like and I don't like politics.
I do
it because it is a duty.
Politics are false, I
have the impression, I believe that if the politi
cians before the Revolution didn't do favors for
the voters, they wouldn't have been elected.
There
is no longer that glory of the politician, that
high self esteem.
This business of the jeitinho
/diminutive for ieito7 has improved ninety percent.
It still exists.
I haven't used it and never liked
it.
If I used it before, it was so that I wouldn't
appear as a fool.
Many families helped others get jobs, presumably
through patronage and ieito: few were as explicit as
this woman, who was committed to the Adhemar network
because her husband, after several years of only being
able to find work as an accountant in the interior, got
a job in a Sab Paulo city bureaucracy through Adhemar's
political machine:
Nos procuramos sempre votar por pessoas honestas,
nunca por interesse, dentro daqueles conhecidos
que podem fazer alguma coisa.
We always try to vote for honest people, never for
self interest, among those people we know who can
do something.
Generally, however,

I received gossip about

tax evasion, political appointments, promotion delays,
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disappearance of government materiel, which became more
specific as it became more distant from the social milieu
of Santana, usually up the social scale, or as it moved
into the realm of legal or semi-legal favors or ieito.
As was the case during the First Republic,

there was no

evidence of gross corruption among Santana informants
or Santana politicians, but again, as with the First
Republic, we need not assume, or look for the grossest
characteristics by which coronelismo or electoral populism
were known.

Small scale favors and ieito

were

implicitly and explicitly accepted as the currency of
electoral politics.

This was made clear by one infor

mant, who said that she, rather than her husband, should
have been the politician

because, while his reputation

for scrupulous honesty yielded him a great deal of
prestige and respect, it did not yield the necessary
vote when he ran for electoral office.

According to

this same woman, who had a large network of friends
and clients,
Raro a semana que acontece que nao dou algum conselho. Essa semana ate que foi banal.
Em geral eles
perguntam pra mim, por que tenho idade e ja sei
muito, e tenho uma grande rede de amigos. Tou
sempre pedindo pra alguem ou dando . . .
It is rare that there is a week when I don't give
someone advice.
This week was actually banal.
Gene
rally they ask me because I am old and now I know
things and I have a large network of friends.
I
am always asking £for information/ for someone or
giving information.
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On a later occasion, she talked about people's voting
behavior: some people asked her every year who they should
vote for, or if they hadn't seen her, voted blank (votaram
ew branco). One man, whose vote she was soliciting, told
her that he had the highest respect for her candidate, but
that the opposition candidate had taken his child to the
First Aid Station (Pronto Socorro). nQ que se pode dizer
i?" (What can you say to that?) she
concluded
This instance suggests yet another parallel with
Santana politics during the First Republic.

Electoral

politics provided the opportunity for women to move out
side their domestic interests,
by dispensing favors.

to assist their husbands

Some women who sewed for charity

regularly delivered their handiwork to poor families prior
to elections to check on their voting intentions.

Other

wives of bureaucrats prided themselves on their abilities
to collect votes in return for favors: the use of a tele
phone, assistance in job placements, the acquisition of
documents (birth, marriage certificates, records of edu
cational careers), free medical care or legal advice are
just a few examples of the kinds of favors they could
bestow among friends and acquaintances.

It is highly pro

bable that charitable and religious organizations provided
other areas for informal political activity, just as had
been the case earlier among the elite families.
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In addition to the small scale favoritism and
vote mongering described above, the effects of populism
on bureaucrats went even further.

Inflation, which is

generally held to be contrary to middle income interests,
ironically favored the bureaucrats, because it was easy
for them to borrow money.

While bureaucrats had only

modest salaries, they also had access to loans from their
institutions or from the State Savings Bank (Caixa Economica).

This was especially so among the officers of the

For<pa Publica. who had a mutual loan association, the
Caixa Beneficiente.

Taking advantage of inflation and

an anti usury law passed during the Vargas years which
forbade interests higher than twelve percent, they
borrowed money to build or buy houses.

Indeed, buying

or borrowing on time in the inflationary years, before
the institution of monetary correction following the
1964 coup, were prosperous enterprises because the value
of what was eventually repaid, or paid, even with interest
became so much less than the original value (Simonsen,
1969:133).
Such loans were important to many of the bureau
cratic families interviewed.

Whereas they rented houses

when they first came to Sartana, during the populist period
they began to acquire their own properties.

Owning one's

own house, or having a casa propria, is an extremely
important criterion for social status and mobility:
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Gabriel Bolaffi describes an unpublished study on Bra
zilian political attitudes and aspirations,

which

revealed that owning onefe own house was the main aspira
tion among urban Brazilians (1975:75).
Subjectively, the acquisition of a home becomes
the main evidence of success and the conquest of
a higher social position.
Objectively, the casa
propria not only improves access to credit lines,
but liberates the family budget from the inexorable
monthly obligation to pay rent (1975:75).
According to Otero and Amaral (nd:34-5), between 1938
and 1964, when the National Housing Bank (BNH) was formed,
housing loans were available to the public (in addition
to those loans we have discussed above, available to
bureaucrats or those with political connections) only
through the Previdencia Social, or Social Security system.
Because of inflation, this institution was unwilling
to make long term credit generally available, and during
those years only 120,000 housing units were constructed
with such loans in all of urban Brazil (Otero and Amaral,
nd:40-47).

We may judge, then, of the importance of the

loans the bureaucrats received through the Forcpa Publica*s
Caixa Beneficiente. or through the Caixa Economica, simply
by virtue of their employment.

•^By Lloyd A. Free, undertaken in 1960. Accor
ding to Bolaffi, the results of studies in countries
considered to be politically unstable, including Brazil,
were not published.
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Of the twenty families arriving in Santana
between 1930 and 1950 in my sample, ten of the seventeen
bureaucrats among them acquired houses through state loans,
one was provided with an apartment on which only a main
tenance fee, equivalent to a very low rent, was required,
and only four did not get houses through public financing.
Two informants did not know how their parents (long de
ceased) acquired the houses they were now living in.

Of

the fourteen families interviewed who arrived in Santana
between 1950 and 1970 from rural areas, eight worked in
government offices, and of these, six acquired their
houses through government loans.
It is possible that some individuals attempted
to transform state loans into productive capital.

Al

though I do not know how common a procedure this may
have been,

I was told of a middle level bureaucrat who

attempted to do so.

Money was borrowed, allegedly to

build houses for elderly female relatives, but in fact
the man was attempting to set up a small plastics factory.
He would not have been discovered had not competition
from larger firms led him to bankruptcy and to the
discovery that all of the elderly relatives for whom
he claimed to be building were long dead.

Regardless

of the possibility of turning such loans to other uses,
they were clearly an important economic resource for
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the bureaucratic families. If they were not large
enough to generate investment capital, over time signi
ficant proportions of the bureaucrats' salaries were
diverted from rent payments to other concerns.

In

addition, we have seen above that the ability to get
government loans for non-bureaucratic families was also
a political resource which could generate electoral
assistance.
All in all, then, the relations of populism
provided a margin of comfort, prestige and savings which
otherwise would not have been available to bureaucratic
families, and through them to their clients and friends
outside the bureaucracies.

These observations have some

bearing on Weffort's description of populism among
middle income sectors in Sao Paulo, which we discussed
briefly above.

Especially with regard to the adhemarista

political machine in Sao Paulo, he argues that the re 
lationships between the politician and the people were
not "quasi-economic."
It is important to note that for the majority
this relationship is an expectation rather than
a concrete probability [of assistance/.
Even if
we attribute exceptional efficiency to the
adhemarista machine, or to the state's welfaristic abilities we cannot conceive of more than
a minority receiving direct assistance (1965:181).
The Santana research suggests that the bureaucracies
and the bureaucrats who staffed them provided a more
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important means of redistributing wealth and resources
than Weffort supposes.

Unlike the middle income sectors

he describes, as recruited primarily by the charismatic
styles of the two political leaders of Sao Paulo (petty
bourgeois adhemaristas from the interior in need of
protection, or proletarianized middle income ianistas
in Sao Paulo city demanding austerity and justice), the
Santana bureaucrats seem to have had specific resources
to use in the populist game.

Thus, whether the Santana

bureaucrats were adhemarista or ianista (and they seem
to have been both on occasion) they all used the same
general techniques in recruiting voters and acting as
sieves for patronage through favors.
These conclusions are consistent with Leeds's
(1972) and Leeds and Leeds's (1972, 1976) studies of
populism in favelas in R.io de Janeiro.

Personalist ties

and clientelism were central to the populist organiza
tion which did not permit the development of mass party
bases, and they extended up from proletarian favelas
through bureaucracies to national political figures.
These ties were based on an exchange of material goods
for votes, and both in favelas and among the middle
income families interviewed in Santana, the quality of
life was materially improved.

The limits to such dis

tributive activities should not be looked for, as does
Weffort, in the inability of any political machine or
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state welfare institution to deliver goods and assistance,
but in the political system itself which required con
tinued dependence on the politician.

As Leeds and Leeds

have written about favelas,and the Brazilian political
system,
Pi built in limit exists as to what the Brazilian

politician can offer in terms of urban services
for a give la— for he must be careful not to
give too much. * . If the conditions he is osten
sibly trying to improve are in fact improved
!,too much" he will have lost his raison d'etre
in the favela and consequently, will have lost
a significant portion of his power base. Thus,
the politician's interest must be fundamentally
one of perpetuating the system in which he operates
(1972:211);
From this perspective, the effects of political
activity such as Santana's on the larger political
system appears to have been negligible.

During these

years none of Santana's politicians or bureaucrats were
close to the levels of policy formulation, nor were
local politicians of the brand which polarized the
population.

In fact, favors seem to have knit groups

of higher and lower economic status into a.web of
mutual interest.

However, we have discussed in

Chapter II the potential draining effect of clientelism
on the government's ability to implement established
policy.

While the drain was clearly small scale and

indirect among the Santana families,

if such relations

existed among middle level bureaucrats in all the bureau
cracies in the city, state and nation, the scale would
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have been of an entirely different order.
In listening to some informants reminisce about
their careers during the populist years, one has the
impression of a great bustling activity, an euphoric
juggling of many balls at once, upon which depended one’s
self esteem and social status.

Upward, social mobility,

or at least a comfortable stability was in the populist
context felt to be a strong probability.

For middle

income families like those interviewed in Santana the
blurring of class lines which characterised populism
in Brazil seems to have provided an ideology of independent individual mobility (for all that it was in fact
dependent on the redistribution of state resources), which
could seemingly be measured by their expansion of social
contacts and political activity.

Much of this has changed

in the years following 1964.
The events following the 1964 coup put an end
to much of Santana’s political activity.

While all infor

mants claimed to be relieved and grateful for the military
intervention, there is some evidence that families like
these are being separated from the sources of influence
and capital accumulation which were present during the
populist years.
It may be noted that while all informants were
preoccupied and frightened by the chaotic appearance of
politics in the early 1960’s, none of the families inter
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viewed participated in. the anti-Goulart mobilization
efforts in Sao Paulo which were described in Chapter IX.
While all were aware of the mobilization efforts, none
was enthusiastic or felt that the coup reflected a
"middle class movement" or an effort to benefit a
middle class.
Nab participei em '64. Nem as amigas,
Eu de
politica, assim, na rua, nada.
Nunca me limei a
essas coisas. Uma filha de Rosarioj:omou parte.
Achei urn pouco errado, nao devia, nao era negocio
dela.
I did not participate in '64. Nor did my friends.
Politics, like that in the streets, I don't like.
I was never attracted to such things. One of
Rosario's daughters took part, and I thought it
was a bit wrong.
She shouldn't have, it was
none of her business.
A revolujao nao foi da classe jriedia nao. Preservou a classe rica.
A media nao tinha tanto a
perder.
Quern perderia era o rico . . . o fator
preponderante foi o Exercito Brasileiro.
Pode
ser que, teve uma peninha Americana, maia nao
sei, nao.
The revolution was not a middle class revolution.
It preserved the rich class.
The middle class
didn't have so much to lose.
Who would have lost
would have been the rich.
The most important
factor was the Brazilian Military. Possibly there
was a little American feather in there, but I don't
know.
Nao sei se foi bem da media ou da rica.
Da pobre
nao foi nao. Aquela passeata que comepou tudo . . .
as chefes eram da classe, alta. A classe media assim,
deixa elas fazer.
Eu nao fui c^ue nao gosto dessas
coisas.
Eu soube pela televisao, pela radio--todo
mundo soube. Tambem pensavamos que ia ter quebra
pau. A policia nao interferiu. / Geralmente, a
policia dava en cima mesmo.
Negocio de politica
nab quero saber nao.
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I don't rightly know if it was a middle class or
an upper class revolt.
It wasn't a revolt on the
part of the poor. That march that started every
thing, the organizers were of the upper class.
The middle class, you know, let them do it.
I
didn't go because I don't like that kind of thing.
I knew about it through television, radio--everybody knew.
We also thought there would be fighting.
The police didn't interfere.
Generally, the police
would be very violent.
I don't want to know about
politics.
While most of the families seem to have been
disconnected from civilian efforts to oust Goulart,
they are largely ardent supporters of the military govern
ment.^

Nonetheless, there is evidence that the benefits

of the new government are at best mixed for families
like the Santana families.

Santana is an eminently staid

neighborhood, and few of the families have had any di
rect experience with the repression to which the working
class and student groups were subject.

While the re 

pression has affected the tone of political conversation,
the families were more seriously affected by the centra
lization measures of the new government which took the
form of the moralization of middle levels of the bureau
cracies .
Shortly after the coup, a number of moraliza
tion campaigns and investigations into corruption

^According to an informant's letter in 1975,
many of the Santana families interviewed voted ARENA--pro
Government--in the 1974 elections, which were notable for
the resounding victory by the opposition MDB in the coun
try.
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occurred.

While these were reminiscent of the moralist,

ianista rhetoric of the previous decade, they were con
ducted by the military.

These "quasi-judicial proceed

ings" (Schneider, 1971:61) had the effect in Santana of
breaking up oanelinhas.

As far as I know, only one

individual was "cassado" (lost his political rights) for
alleged corruption.

However, bureaucrats who had pre

viously helped each other and their clients now feel
that to maintain their own positions they must often
refuse favors.

In some cases they have gone out of their

way to prejudice relatives and former clients in order
that they may themselves remain above suspicion.
Thus, one highly placed individual in the office
of the state treasury demoted or transferred to small
towns in the interior a number of individuals for whom
he had originally found jobs, or assisted in promotions.
In another case, a woman, whose husband formed part of
an important Santana panelinha

requested a favorable

transfer for one of her relatives from a man whom her
husband had helped, and received a form letter citing
legislative articles and items as reasons for which her
request could not be met.

She was outraged;

Imagine, citar artigos e items pra miml Hu, que
conhe^o eleha t a n t o tempo! / Hu nao tava pedindo
alguma coisa desonesta, so pra ele ver se era
possivel fazer alguma coisa.
2 ele ja me conhece
bastante pra poder dizer simplesmente, e ou nao
e possivel. Artigos e items, hah! Quero ver
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qus artigo e item diz que a mulher dele pode
usar o chofer e o carro oficial pra vir
comprar sapatos na 'voluntariesI So' quero ver!
Imagine citing articles and items to me.
I, who
have known him for so long.
I w a s n ’t asking for
anything dishonest, just for him to see if it was
or wasn't possible for him to do something. And
he knows me well enough to be able to tell me
simply whether it is or isn’t possible. Articles
and items indeed!
I want to know what article
and item says that his wife can use the official
car and driver to go buy shoes on Voluntarios!
I just want to know that!
Yet another famil}'’ with a few building plots in Santana
was shocked that a cousin in the m a y o r ’s office had
not warned them of an impending zoning law which would
devalue their holdings unless they got building permits
approved before the passage of the law.

The ability

to cement friendships with favors and government infor
mation has sharply decreased.

Influence and prestige

of course still exist, but among fewer people than
appears to have been the case before the military
reforms.
Among the bureaucrats in my sample, the majority
from the Forpa Publica and other bureaucracies are
retired now, and spend their days at home.

Only a

minority was able to set up independent businesses
during the populist years.

A yet smaller minority

was able to continue in political life, generally in
appointed positions and often at fairly high levels.
While these few individuals could, from their positions,
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continue to provide a few appointments for qualified
friends or clients, their apparent success in weathering
the political changes since 1964 has meant relatively
little in terms of an increase in their personal power
or influence within their bureaucracies.

Although they

are at higher levels than they were before, power seems
to have moved yet higher.

They are valued as administra

tors simply, and as such can be replaced by other adminis
trators.

One relatively successful bureaucrat in Santana

was aware of this, and told me that he always kept his
papers prepared for an immediate withdrawal when the time
should come.

Another, who had been appointed as the head

of an important state run enterprise, found that there
were limits even to his administrative rights in the
purchase of equipment.

When he refused to sign a

contract with a large foreign firm, because he considered
it exploitative, he appealed to the minis ter who had
appointed him for support.

Instead, the minister signed

the contract.
Although there were strict limits to the power
and influence of even the most successful bureaucrats,
those few who remain continue to be men of prestige in
the neighborhood, and they are appealed to for assis
tance when the random violence of the Sao Paulo police
infringes on the Santana community.

For example, when

a man who had been drinking with relatives at a local
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bar was accused by another of parking his car illegally,
within minutes he found that the whole block was surround
ed by military police cars.

The accuser had been a

plainclothes policeman and he had the whole party taken
to jail.

An observer immediately called an influential

bureaucrat, who arrived at the jail within the half
hour with a judge and two district attorneys to "observe"
the proceedings.

7.'7hile all were released an hour later,

my informant felt that the fact that the plainclothesman
had been drunk, and wrong about the parking violation had
had much to do with it, and that a disproportionate amount
of prestige or ieito (four influential bureaucrats) had
been necessary to settle what should have been the most
inconsequential of legal inconveniences.
In addition to the general lowering of levels of
influence, the fact of official violence and its random
ness has also affected the ease with which people speak
of politics.

Among some* a surface indifference masked

fears of dangers that even they might face from police
randomness.
Z^proibido falar.
0 que ve/no jornal e o que se
pode falar.
z'medo, ne? z'meio amarrado, ne?
Nao pode tocar em pontos que o Governo nao gosta.
Nao podemos nem eleger Governo! ^ K y so falar em
vereador.
Ninguem sabe quais sao os pontos
proibidos . . . entao ninguem fala.
0 DOPS, eles
expreme a gente pra saber o que s a b e . ^ S e ^ a gente
sabe um pouco mais, ex subversivo, entao e melhor
nao saber nada. Dax, nao quis mais saber de
politica.
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It's forbidden to talk.
What you see in the papers
is what you are permitted to discuss.
It's fear,
isn't it?
It's all tied up, isn't it? You can’t
discuss matters which the Government doesn't like.
We can't even elect a Government!
We can speak
only about councilmen.
Nobody knows anymore which
are the forbidden topics, so nobody speaks at all.
The DOPS ^Department of Public Order/, they squeeze
you to find out what you know.
If you know just a
little bit more, you are a subversive, so then
it's best not to know anything.
When I realized
that, I didn't want to know about politics anymore.
Although some of the families I came to know
well were aware of the more terrifying aspects of police
repression, of rumours of people who had disappeared and
been tortured, others maintained an attitude of blind
indifference:
Habeas corpus?
0 que que eu quero saber aisso? Hu
nab preciso, nao fiz nada de erradot Quando precisar,
ai me preocupo.
Habeas Corpus? What do I care about that? I don't
need it, I haven't done anything wrong I When I need
it, then I'll worry.
Yet others would not, or could not believe reports of
official violence and repression.

The following is

condensed from my field notes.
I brought up the subject of the student who was
run over by a truck while attempting to escape
arrest with Sr. Lorenco. As far as I had been able
to make out, a week or two earlier a notorious
police torturer had been assassinated by an alleged
ly terrorist group on Copacabana beach. Massive
arrests occurred throughout the country.
In Sao
Paulo they included a student in the Geology Depart
ment at the University of Sao Paulo (USP) who was
arrested on bank robbery charges.
On the day on
which the robbery allegedly occurred, the student
was said to be, depending on accounts, either in
the hospital or on a field trip. These considera

R e prod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co pyrigh t owner. F u rthe r re p rod u ction pro hib ite d w ith o u t perm ission.

239

tions, however, did not affect the police, who took
him into custody. According to the official ver
sion, the student attempted to escape and was run over
accidentally by a truck.
However, when he was de
clared dead, the police refused to return the body
to the parents for burial.
It was commonly suspec
ted that the body would show signs of more than being
run over.
On the day of the Mass of the Seventh Day,
the USP campus was crawling with police. At the mass,
which took place in the center of the city, the arch
bishop made a reference
in his sermon to the Romans
who had returned the body of Christ to his parents
for burial. At the close of the ceremony, the con
gregation stood up and sang a song which had been
banned for political reasons for several years.
According to a reliable source, many who were in the
church that day were arrested the. following day,
although they were released, apparently unharmed
at the end of the week.
I told Sr. Lorenco that I had heard that the
accident with the truck had been staged and that
the student was a Ire ad 37 dead when he was run over.
I asked him if he thought this was possible, and
also why he thought the police would not return
the body to the parents.
He ignored the second
question and made light of the first by saying that
it was very hard to know what to believe unless
one saw with one's own eyes,
ne, however, found
it hard to believe that the police should have
lugged a dead body, placed it in the middle of a
heavily trafficked avenue, and then given the go
ahead to a truck to run it over, all this without
anyone noticing.
He closed the discussion by
observing mildly that this kind of conversation
probably could not occur in a non democratic
country like Russia.
Where every man and woman had been able to be
a small scale politician, people now turn away from
politics and anything verging on the explicitly manipu
latory :
Os politicos, essa gente, so come.
Mao precisamos
de representantes que nao fazem nadav Houve uma
epoca que politica era quase distrajao.
Hssas
mesas redondas na televisao, que se insultavam,
mais aquelas fofocas, brigas, tudo isso, gramas
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a Deus, ja acabou. Hoje ha respeito, calma. Foi
otimo a
atitude do Governo feehar o p arlamento e
diminuir o poder dessa camarilha. Atingiu a classe
politica, a classe privilegiada que estava no poder.
Esse pessoal ganhava rios e rios de diriheiro. 0
povo trabalhava dez horas por pouco e viam toda ^
aquela gente trabalhar pouco e ganhando muito— nao
pode. Essa politicagem era pra cegar.
Os ricos
eram assegurados. A classe media e o pobre nab
viam nada.
The politicians, those people, all they do is eat.
We don't need representatives who don't do anything.
There was a time when politics became almost an
entertainment.
Those round table discussions on
television, where they would insult each other,
that gossip, those fights, all that, thank God, is
over now. Today there is respect, calm.
The Govern
ment's attitude in closing parliament and reducing
the power of that gang was excellent.
It hit the
political class, the privileged class which was in
power. Those people made rivers and rivers of money.
The people worked for ten hours a day and saw all
those people working little and making much— it can't
be. All of that politicking was blinding.
The
rich were safe. The middle class and the poor
couldn't get a thing.
Just as political marginalization preceded

econo

mic decline among the elite families at the top of the
hill, the enforced and self enforced political paralysis
attendant upon fear and decreased opportunities for in
fluence within government may have an effect on the eco
nomies of many Santana families.

As we have seen in

Chapter II, the present regime has rationalized the
economy and the bureaucracies; according to many infor
mants this rationalization has brought certain apparent
benefits.

Older informants can see that their children

are materially better off than they themselves were when
they started their careers: educational facilities have
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proliferated and continue to expand.

Most informants

send their children to private schools anyway.

Financing

for homes is no longer a matter available to the few with
connections: in principle all of their children may have a
casa propria, apartments or vacation homes, for that
matter, with financing from the National Housing Bank
(BNH)c

The proliferation of consumer credit card orga

nizations

in theory permits the younger generation of

Santana families to have almost anything, from trips
around the world, to automobiles, apartments, speed
boats, electric gadgets such as ham radios and sophis
ticated stereo equipment and color televisions--all on
long term credit.
However, while the decrease of redistribution
through corruption and influence in the bureaucracies
assures the government of greater control and better
cost accounting, it removes a margin of maneuverability
for the Santana families.

Bribery, tax evasion, inte

rest evasion, currency speculation, featherbedding
and the whole intangible area of favors, all of these
undercut financial predictability for the government.
But for the Santana families they had provided a margin
which probably could be calculated in financial terms:
for example, if legal advice is

not available from a

friend, lawyers cost money; if one cannot use connec
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tions to get a child into a free and good state school,
a private one must be paid far;*^ if materials at a
given bureaucracy are now carefully controlled, one must
pay for one's own construction materials; if a friendly
official will not grant a building permit, one must spend
more on meeting building code requirements and so forth.
There are no longer any special advantages in
working in government and bureaucrats are no longer at
the apex of a system of privilege
non-bureaucrats.

and redistribution to

According to one informant, bureaucrats

are salaried people just like anyone else.

Everyone pays

taxes, everyone pays into pension or other programs
which contribute to the concentration of resources for
the creation of capital markets controlled by far larger
interests than those of the Santana families.

And, while

the families interviewed who have their own commercial
enterprises consider themselves to be in stable and even
prosperous condition, a casual walk on Santana's main
commercial streets reveals an increasing number of branches
of large city-side stores, where local commerce had pre
dominated .

*^In the past fifteen years the number of non-accredited private universities has increased to the point that
many degrees are invalid. The proposed automatic accredi
tation of such schools will devalue the diplomas of pre
viously established institutions. Education is no longer
a matter just for the "classes." See Veia (1975(380) :74).
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Furthermore, the extension of consumer credit may
turn out to be a mixed blessing.

It may be said that in

strict cost accounting terms the combination of populism
and inflation gave the older generation of Santana bureau
crats and non-bureaucrats the opportunity to “get some
thing for nothing."

Inflation and low interest rates

did not favor those who were selling on time, but it
did favorrthose who were buying on time, because as we
have seen, the value of what was repaid decreased over
time.

The combination of inflation, low interest rates

and the kinds of information and favors that were struc
turally available to bureaucrats and their clients under
populism permitted many individuals to acquire property
and to attempt to generate productive capital.

From

this perspective, it is clear that in the long run,
not only will the younger generation pay for what they
get in a way that the parents never did, but also,
because of higher interest rates and monetary correc
tion it is highly unlikely that they will be able to
generate a capital base which will free them from de
pendence on their salaries.

Not incidentally, they will

contribute with their monthly payments to the creation
of capital markets which will increasingly exclude them •
All of this suggests a picture in which the
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resources of middle income families like the Santana
families may be skimmed off to their financial disadvan
tage.

In spite of explicit statements to the contrary,

there is among many Santana informants a sense of unease,
a sense of loss of prestige, of position and opportunity.
While this sense of unease will be examined in more
detail in the following chapter, two informants* observa
tions are appropriate here.

The first, an i n f o r m a n t s

description of her father's funeral rites suggests the
discrepancy between a public servant's expectations and
the new reality.

The father had been a Colonel from

the For^a Publics. who in his retirement had become a
self taught intellectual and author of many books.

Even

in retirement he continued to think of himself as prima
rily a military man, and frequently recalled his wound,
sustained in the face during the 1932 Sao Paulo revolt.
Both he and his family expected that when he died he would
be buried with military honors as a kind of capstone to
his illustrious career:
Ele sempre quis honras m i 1itaresv e falava que
tinha direito. ^Dizia que se nos negavamos, ele ia
sentar no caixao e dar um grito de raiva.
Dai, no
enterro, eu fiz tudo pra ter ^esses quatro soldados
e toda^honra. Has o chefe la' do quartel dizia que
ele nao tinha direito, que era aposentado, essas
historias la. Na missa do setimo dia, caiu uma
arvore e abriu o sepultamento dele. Hinha i r m a ^
ficou com tanta raiva que quando abriram o caixao
e ^ela viu que a ferida tinha aberto e tava vazando
la" no rosto dele, ela falou, "Pai, o Senhor nao
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preeisava dos quatro soldados e as honras militares.
0 Senhor tern em vez dos soldados quatro filhos ao
lado do seu caixao, e em vez da bandeira brasileira,
tem o ceu azul que esta en d m a de todos nos.*' liiih,
e ai tinhamos medo que vinha o DOPSt "E em vez das
honras^militares o Senhor tem os seus livros que
rolarao pelo mundo." Foi emocionante. E a For^a
Publica so^mandou dois soldadinhos. Um professor,
muito
ilustre que tambem falou na missa, se virou
pra esses soldados e disse que agradecia a prasenca
deles, m a s queJionras militares na missa nao eram
necessarias, e nao fazia falta, porque so iria impressionar os presentes, e como a filha, minha irrna,
tinha dito, o Coronel tinha os livros que impressionariam o mundo.
Mas dax, na missa de trinta dias, ele teve
honras. Acho que ficaram com vergonha. Eu tenho
todos os recortes de jornais, as hamenagens feitas
pelo Governador, pelos Institutos. E a Forpa Publica
viu que tinha feito uma gafe.^
Abriram a Casa
Anchieta, la'' no Patio do Colegiov Que eu saiba
nunca fizeram is so antes pra reza missa de trinta
dias. De um lado tinha a bandeira brasileira,
do outro lado a bandeira de Sao Paulo. E o conego,
com quern eu tinha falado antes que papai morreu,
quando ele tava no hospital, ele fez um discurso
lindo, lindo, lindo, que pra ser militar, tinha
que estar no sangue, que a gente ou nasce militar
ou nao, ne. Ele sentou praea soldadinho, e chegou
aos mais altos^cargos, se eaucou,
se ens i n o u ^
flrances, alemao, tan to que quando^veio a Mis sao
Franeesa, ele foi interprete.
Nao sei, falou
,
muito bem. E minha mae notou um dos soldados la,
um jovem, reto olhando pra frente, ma s com as
lagrimas caindo no rosto.
He always wanted military honors when he died,
and he told us he had a right to them. He said that
if we denied them to hi®, he would sit up in his
coffin and shriek with rage. Then for the funeral,
1 did everything to get those four soldiers and all
the honors.
But the head of the barracks said that
he didn*t have the right, that he was retired, that
kind of story.
On the mass of the seventh day a tree
fell down on his grave and opened it up. My sister
became so enraged when they opened the coffin and
she saw that his wound /from the 1932 revolt/ had
opened and was draining there on his face, that she
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cried, “Father, you didn't need those four
soldiers and military honors. You have instead of
the four soldiers, four children by your coffin,
and instead of the Brazilian flag, there is the blue
sky which is above all of us."
Iiiih, then we were
afraid that the DOPS /Department of Public Ordeizj
would cornel "And instead of military honors, you
have your books which will roll around the world."
It was impressive. The Forca Publica only sent
two little soldiers, and a famous professor who
also spoke at the mass, turned to these soldiers
and said that he was grateful for their presence,
but that it wasn't necessary, because military
honors would only impress those present, and as
the daughter had said, my sister, the Colonel
had his books which would impress the world.
But then, on the mass of the thirtieth day, he
got honors.
I think they were ashamed.
I have
all the newspaper clippings, the eulogies made by
the Governor, the Institutes. The Forga Publica
saw that it had made a gaffe . They opened the
Casa Anchieta in the old College Square— as far as
I know, they have never done that before for a mass
of the thirtieth day— and on one side there was the
Brazilian flag and on the other the flag of Sao
Paulo. And the priest, whan I had spoken to before
father died, when he was in the hospital, made a
beautiful, beautiful speech, that to be a soldier
it had to be in one's blood, that a person is either
born to be a soldier or not. He volunteered as a
private and reached the highest positions, he
educated himself, taught himself French, German, so
much so that whan the French Mission was here, he
was an interpreter.
I don't know, he spoke very well.
And my mother noted one of the soldiers there, a
young man, standing straight and looking straight
ahead, but with tears streaming down his face.
The second informant had hesitant but explicit
reservations about the progress of her sons' careers.
While she and her bureaucrat husband had worried and
saved to be able to put them through school, and while
all four sons were securely employed in large firms as
salaried liberal professionals, she feared that none
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of them would be able to repeat her husband's success
in becoming financially independent.

While she recog

nized that his success was not the norm, she felt that
circumstances had changed so much that even he might not
have been able to make it were he starting all over again
today.

According to her, it was not only the steady

drain of the debt load on their houses and other consu
mer goods which limited their capital accumulation, but
that the opportunities for and information for indepen
dent investment were narrowing.

The example cited was

the new zoning law, discussed above, which, by requiring
larger frontages for high rise buildings, not only
devalued small plots, but made it expensive for the
owner to continue paying taxes on land which yielded
nothing, until an adjacent piece came on the market.
Larger city-side construction firms, she pointed out,
could wait and then would comfortably buy out the
whole block.
Possibly the importance of the consumer
economy which so clearly characterised Sao Paulo in
1972-1973 is that it blinds people to such losses.
However, it should be pointed out that what families
like the Santana families lost— bureaucrats and non
bureaucrats alike--they never had in a formal sense,
nor indeed as a group.
rights.

They had privileges and not

Although the privileges were part of a struc
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ture, they were easy to remove: groups of people were
not attacked, but rather the privileges were redefined
as individual aberrations and abuses, to be attacked and
corrected.

Informally and discretely, however, a section

of the "classes" have lost a significant measure of
control over their lives.
In summary, the experience of immigrants and
bureaucrats since 1964 and especially since 1968 resembles
in many ways those of the old elite on the top of the
hill after 1930.

In all three cases, they were abruptly

sheared off from sources of political influence.

In the

case of the old elite at the top of the hill, this expe
rience of marginalization appears to have resulted in
a certain degree of economic downward mobility.

This

was clear both in the statements by informants and in
their genealogies.

For immigrants and bureaucrats,

the marginalization experience has been too recent to be
able to do more than suggest what the economic consequen
ces might be.

It is clear that the economic policies

of Brazil's new government affect all of the families
interviewed regardless of origin or occupation.

Many

informants expressed a sanguine optimism about their
futures.

However,all informants, including these

betrayed a kind of tension about their social positions
which undercut optimistic assertions.

This unease,

focused in particular on their relations with other
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groups above and below them on the social scale, forms,
I believe, a rudimentary consciousness of class, which
is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
•'NOSSA CLASSE MEDIA SOFRIDA:" THE OUTLINES OF
A CONSCIOUSNESS OF MIDDLE CLASS
This study has described the social and political
careers of a number of Santana families of disparate
origins.

Their careers have been informed and to a great

degree determined by the political and economic changes
which Brazil and Sao Paulo have undergone in the past
seventy years.

The families of the old elite, the fami

lies of immigrants and the families of bureaucrats expe
rienced the political epochs of the First Republic, the
Vargas years and the populist epoch in different ways
at different times.

The present period of military dic

tatorship finds them in approximately similar socio-eco
nomic-political positions, generally excluded from spheres
of power or influence.
Nonetheless, within the limits imposed by history,
these families also made their own lives, made their
own choices in order to achieve or maintain their patrimonio and nivel de cultura (inheritable wealth and level
of culture).

In the process they have developed a set

of ideas to explain and justify their successes and
failures and to place themselves in Sao Paulo's class
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structure.

In spite of their different careers, these

ideas are generally shared.
poses.

This chapter has two pur

xt argues first, that these ideas are the funda

mentals of a consciousness of middle class, and second,
it attmpts to document this inductively by drawing on the
statements of interviewees about their class positions.
These statements will be related to the structural dimen
sions I have discussed in the preceding chapters.

I will

focus specifically on the implications of the shift in
hierarchical organization entailed by the change from po
pulism to military dictatorship.

How this shift affects

the meaning of social mobility as measured by increased
consumption is also examined.

I shall attempt to relate

contradictory feelings about social mobility and achieve
ment and the condition of being classe media to the world
in which informants lived, and to judge the possible
effects that a consciousness fueled by these feelings
might have on the larger Brazilian political system.
I shall conclude that although the Santana fami
lies are involved in a wider world of consumption than
they were before, they are socially, politically and
ideologically cut off from other groups in society, and
often from each other in a way that was not characteris
tic of the populist years.

It would appear that the

existence of a set of ideas such as that held by Santana
families may be essential to the continuity of regimes
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such as the present Brazilian military regime, because
it is atomizing, blind to the structure of society and
therefore unable to affect it.

While it does not cause

it, such a mentality permits the political repression
necessary for associated-dependent development.

There

is in addition, important evidence that the military
dictatorship is aware of this and is actively interested
in propagating a "middle class mentality" as a non-coercive method of domination.
The informants who gave me the information upon
which much of this chapter is based were often older
women, over fifty years of age.

While

some

of

these women had worked as teachers, or in offices as
secretaries or typists before marrying, for most thsr
work was limited to their homes after marriage: raising
their children, running their households and caring for
their husbands when they were home from work.

It may

be surmised that the personal experience most of these
women had of the political and economic changes which
affected their families' careers was filtered through
their husbands' reports and through their own positions
as financial managers of the household.

To a great

extent the mentality which I shall discuss is one which
I saw especially among women, although the few men who
participated in such conversations seemed to understand
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and share it.
Possibly the major key of the Santana informants*
mentality is the emphasis on social mobility and achieve
ment through struggle and work.

The dominant characteris

tics necessary for achievement are 11luta.11 11controls11 and
Meguil^brio."

The three terms, literally translated as

"struggle," "control" and "equilibrium" or balanced judge
ment recur constantly.

They carry a host of implications

which shade into each other: perseverance, thrift, self
sacrifice, shrewdness and a strong dose of moral superio
rity which occasionally borders on the sanctimonious.
preciso ter perseveranpa e fbr§a de vontade,
tolerancia com certa reserva; altruismo, bondade,
dignidade, a honradez . . . e carater de urn modo
geral.
One needs perseverance and will power, tolerance,
with a certain reserve; altruism, goodness, dignity,
honor . . . or character in general.
£ga*£a&g and eguil{b&io are not simply
moral prescriptions.

They embody memories of economies

and privations among older women whose children are now
grown up, and vital concerns for younger women in the
midst of their childrearing cycles.
Minha vida tern melhorado, mais a primeira etapa
tormina agora porque os filhos terminam e vab ganhar
bem, e nos vamos melhorar sem aquela despesa. Minha
vida agora nao depende de dinheiro. Trabalhar, tern
de trabalhar sempre, mas com os filhos se formando
. . . e Alfredo rnuito providente. • . e se precisar,
eu posso vender as minhas coisas.
Mais t d chegando
o tempo que os filhos nao vao dar mais dispesa,
e que vamos melhorar.
Nunca vou ser rica, e ja fui
pobre naquela faze do Mappin, a£ eu fazia meus traba-

R e prod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co pyrigh t ow ner. F u rthe r rep rod u ction prohib ite d w ith o u t perm ission.

254
Lhinhos e tive aceitapao. Mais que foi uma iuta.
que precisou grande controle. foi, viu. 0 comeco
nao foi facil.
My life has improved, but the first stage finishes
now because the boys are going to graduate and make
good money and we will improve without these expen
ses. My life now doesn't depend on money. Work,
we'll always have to work, but with the boys gradua
ting . . . and Alfred very provident . . . and if
necessary I can sell my things Zthis lady did sewing
work for charity and for giftsj7. But the time is
coming when the children won't be expenses, and then
we will improve.
I will never be rich, and I have
been poor, in those Mappin days ^her husband had a
poorly paying job in a department storejt and then
I did my piece work, and people bought it. But
it was a struggle, that required a great deal of
control. The beginning wasn't easy (See Appendix
Luta. controle and eouilibrlo are important in coping
emotionally as well as in financial management;
A gente precisa aprender a ouvir, a calar, a ser
cega. Falar no momento certo, mesmo que esteja
no ponto de estouar.
So" na hors que esta equilibrada e que pode falar.
We must learn to listen and be quiet and be blind.
To speak at the right moment, even if one is at the
point of bursting.
One must only speak when one

is 22ajLa&££d.
Controle and eouilibrio define the limits of a balanced
emotional life, in which emotional excesses are not
permitted.

While the ideal of emotional control is not

always met, it provides a scale of judgement and expla
nation: it is felt that excessive anger, happiness or

Appendix 5 includes additional citations from
informants which are too long to be included in the
text.
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interest can lead to illness or death (See Appendix 5-B).
Thus, when otherwise healthy individuals became sick, a
discussion of the clinical symptoms (heart attack, stroke,
intestinal disturbances) was often followed by an analysis
of the person's emotional life.

The patient was too invol

ved in her children's lives, or too angry at a business
contretemps, and the loss of eouilibrio resulted in the
illness.
The theme of the middle way through the somewhat
dour prescriptions of lyta, &g.&£rqiS and eouiljibrio
appear to provide a substratum of a middle income ideology
of mobility and achievement.
nor indeed should it be.

Life is no bowl of cherries,

Success in the achievement or

maintenance of a middle income position depends on indivi
dual struggle and effort which is buttressed by interna
lized norms of control, careful thought, anticipation of
disaster and lack of excess.
The success itself is measured by material acquisi
tions and the sense that one's children have a different-higher--socio-economic springboard for their careers than
one did oneself.

These two criteria were unanimously

held by all the families interviewed.

Even among the

descendants of the elite families from the top of the
hill, achievement was associated with the successful
management of the dwindling remnants of their inheritances,
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through Luta. controle and equil£brio. in order to
educate their children and Maintain a "certain position,"
while witnessing the drastic decline of other less
prudent or less fortunate relatives.

Most of the fami

lies interviewed who were in the midst of the childraising
cycle sent their children to private schools and all had
every expectation that they would continue on to univer
sity.

All informants claimed to be materially better

off than their parents, and emphasised their enhanced
powers of consumption.
Hoje sou Coronel. Minhas crianjas terao melhores
chances na vida do que eu. Eu posso pagar os
estudos.
Today I am a Colonel.
My children will have better
chances in life than I.
I can pay for their studies.
Eu me considero realizado. Tenho casa e carro.
Meus filhos estudaram, casaram e tern casa e carro.
Estou realizado.
I consider myself fulfilled.
I have a house and a
car. My children have studied, married and they
have a house and a car. 1 am fulfilled.
/

y

/

/

Eramos de uma classe media pobre; a classe media e
a mais dificil de viver.
Nao somos ricos agora,
mas
comparado com meu pai, que era funcionario,
posso me julgar milionaria. 0 que pude presenciar
na minha casa no tempo de menina. ^Chorei quando
tive de parar os estudos. Agora nao,^ as meninas^
estao todas se formando, advogada, medica. Eu nao
podia ter urn sapato novo, aquilo que eu queria.
Ho#e nao. Vira-se, mexe-se, mais tem o sapato.
We were of a poor middle class: the middle class is
the hardest in which to live. We are not rich now,
but compared to my father who was a public servant ,
I can consider myself a millionaire. What I was
able to witness in my house as a child.
I cried
when 1 had to stop going to school. That»s not the
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case now, the girls are all graduating as a lawyer,
as a doctor,
I couldn't have new shoes, things that
I wanted. Not today. We may wriggle and squirm
but we get the shoes.(See Appendix 5-C).
Frequently discussions of personal achievements
were intertwined with an intense celebration of the
Brazilian economic •’miracle" of the early 1970's,

The

same criteria, education and material acquisitions of
the casa propria (one's own house), automobiles and other
consumer goods were seen as the measure of personal as
well as national progress and both were celebrated in the
same breath.
A classe media hoje vive bem, tem casa, carro,
saem de fim de semana. A maioria cam apartamento
de fora, todos os filhos estudando, . . ja nao
e facil distinguir entre a classe me'dia e a alta
. . . Tudo mundo tem me Ih orado bastante. Tem mais
facilidade de arrumar u m emprego melhor, sem muito
sacrificio, E'rara a familia que nao tem um
universitario, mesmo os pobres, que estuda de noite.
0 Bras.il vai pra frente can essa nova gera^ao. E
ja' comecou a£,jy£u. ^Em todos os set ores o Brasil
ta^ indo bem, nao e so esportes. Agora ja conhecem,
nao pensam que e Argentina.
The middle class today lives well, has a house, a
car, goes out on weekends. Most have a vacation
apartment, all have their children in school . • .
it is not easy any more to distinguish between the
upper and the middle classes. Everyone has improved
tremendously.
It is easier to get a good job, with
out too much sacrifice.
It is rare to find a fami
ly which doesn't have a university student, even
among the poor, who study at night.
Brazil is
moving ahead with this new generation, and it has
already started. Brazil is doing well in all sectors,
not just sports. Now people know about Brazil and
don't confuse it with Argentina (See Appendix 5-D).
However, coexisting with this generalized optimism
is a deep sense that they are threatened and on the verge
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of annihilation.
Agora a classe media ta um sanduiche, expremida entre
os pobres e os ricos.
Vamos desaparecer. A media
4 que trabalha, e ff uma luta. Do jeito que vamos,
td' sendo engulida. Uns vaoy pra baixo, me nos vao
pra cima . . . o cpntrole e pra nao ser engulida
por aJLnferior. E preciso^poupanca.
Nos femos uma
posi$ab que exige uma aparencia, boa camida, boa
roupa. Agora o dinheiro que entra esta sempre diminuindo, e sem controle nao tem jeito.
The middle class is now a sandwieh, squeezed between
the poor and the rich.
We are going to disappear.
The middle class is the one that works hard, and it
is a struggle. The way things are going it is being
swallowed up. Some go down, fewer go up. The control
is necessary to avoid being swallowed by the lower
class. We have to save. We have a position which
requires a certain appearance, we need good food,
good clothes.
Now the money which is coming in
is constantly diminishing, and without control, there
is no way.
Temos pouca seguranca: tudo muda muito depressa e
radicalmente.
Nao ve as desapropria^oes, o progresso
. . . nao sou contra o progresso de maneira nenhuma,
mais um pouquinho mais devagar.
0 cidadab tern de ter
alguma seguranca. A gente nunca sabe quando pode
espancar com a testa no chao.
We have little security: everything changes too
quickly and too radically.
You see the
expropria
tions, progress . . . I am not against progress in
any way, but a bit slower. A citizen needs to have
some security. We never know when we may smash
our heads on the floor. (See Appendix 5-E).
The tone of these statements is similar to
the dour ness of the luta. controle. eqpijL^b^g themes
which informants developed over the course of their
careers.

When juxtaposed to the optimistic themes of

progress and achievement, there are, however, added notes
of bitterness and betrayal.

If life shouldn*t be a bowl

of cherries, neither should it consist entirely of pits
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and stems.
Since all informants consider themselves better
off than their parents, relatively stable, and have been
able to educate their children and acquire more consumer
goods than their parents, these complaints do not appear
to have a primarily economic referent.

Rather, they seem

to reflect negative evaluations of changes in the politi
cal sphere, and changes in class relations.

It is as if

the criteria for social mobility included not only econo
mic factors but political ones as well.

Thus, the physi

cal markers of social mobility and class differentiation
are "loaded*' with symbolic meanings which imply political
relations besides or beyond the specificity of the material
wealth involved in houses, automobiles, consumer goods
and college educations.

That is, for example, while

material wealth and education for children are symbols of
mobility and progress, the symbolic meanings attached to
material wealth and education have varied with the politi
cal relations maintained by these families over time.
One such major change occurred in the change from
populism to the present military dictatorship.

In the

populist period, money meant power and education reflec
ted wealth and power, or at least the opportunity for
access to power through face to face relations with power
ful people.

Money and education seem to have reflected

the manipulatory

relations implicit in populism.

The
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implications of material wealth and education have
changed under the military dictatorship.

The change elu

cidates the common foreboding among informants that they,
those in the middle, are •'sandwiched*' and about to be
swallowed whole.

What these feelings may reflect is

their increasing isolation from other groups in society.
They are threatened by the extension of consumer
goods to the poor, by the decrease in the manipulatory
opportunities both up and down the social scale.

Their

concern with relations of dominance was apparent in
some spiritist^ sessions I was able to attend as well
as in the relationship many women attempted to maintain
with their domestic servants and people who were the
objects of their charitable efforts.

There is some

evidence that within their networks they no longer
feel comfortable with people who are wealthier.

They

feel that among wealthier relatives, it is these who
have ceased to extend aguela amizade. that friendship,
to them.

The result of their increasing isolation and

the resentment and humiliation which appears to be
entailed, has led to an entirely false view of the
social structure of Sao Paulo and to an embracing of the
government as their protector from rich and poor alike.

^Spiritism in a growing religion in Brazil.
Warren (1968) and Camargo (1961).

See
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Let us take each theme in turn.
The pressure on the "sandwich" from below is
apparent in a strain of iE will among some informants
commenting on the progress and the spread of consumerism
among the poor.
Agora asempregadas item tudo, geladeira, radio .. L. .
e nos quanto tempo levamos pra ter. fe ve os pobres
aqui na capital, tudo tem televisao.
Now maids have everything, iceboxes, radios . . .
and you should have seen how long it took us to get
those things.
You see the poor here in the capital,
they all have television.
A gente ve o progresso pelo numero de constru9oes
novas.
E'um sinal de crescimento e de progresso.
Tudo mundo tem carro, tudo mundo estuda.
Ja' nao
tem diferen^a entre patroa e domestica, com roupa
boa e peruca.
No meu tempo nunca comprariam essas
roupas.
Havia distin^ao muito grande de classe.
We can see progress by the number* of new construc
tions.
It is a sign of growth and progress.
Every
one has a car, everyone goes to school. There is
no longer any difference between the housewife and
the domestic, who has good clothes and wigs.
In my
day they would never buy those clothes. There was
too great a class distinction.
In sum, not only is their status threatened by the exten
sion of the material things which set them off from the
lower classes, to the lower classes, but the things them
selves no longer imply the class differences they former
ly did.
Among families like the Santana families, popu
list relations were based on personalist, face to face
relations, implying the extended use of kinship and
friendship in creating networks of patronage up and
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down the social scale.

Paradoxically, although people

were aware of class differences in these extended
networks, the populist idiom denied class distinctions
q

between individuals.

This is what Weffort means when

he writes that "populism always directs itself to the
people," and in this act "dissolves class distinctions"
(1965:194).
Two contradictory aspects appear to have been
basic to populism among families like the Santana
families: an elaborate sense of manners using an idiom
of friendship^ and an underlying contempt for those
being manipulated.

The contempt involved in populist

relations has received little previous attention.

We

shall see it further on, directed at families like the
Santana families.

It is apparent in the following state

ment by a man who ran for electoral office during the
populist years:
Naquele tempo quem tinha mais dinheiro ganhava.
Tinha de fazer cedulas, cartazes . . . Fui derro-

3
This personalist aspect of populism is extremely
clear in studies of favelas. and seems to have continued
in favelas after 1964. See especially Leeds (1972), for
a description of the personalist way in which a female
favela leader shames a politician into visiting her fave-~
la. prepares a celebration in honor of his birthday and
writes a song for him, hailing him as the "ideal friend
. . • our pride and passion" (Leeds, 1972:31-2). Although
the idiom is one of friendship, the structure is that
of patron clientage (See above, Chapter n , pp. 104-107)*
^This aspect of populism was pointed out to me by
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tado bonito. Descobri que tinha quinhentos e cin
que nt a e seis amigos--um voto^foi meu— e que nao
devia^confiar em ninguem a nao ser aqueles. Foi
uma dor de cabepa, a cachapa, fui a terreiro de
umbanda, tomei pinga no copo babado, pizza com
oleo diezel, com sujeito bandido, negrada . . .
e sempre aqueles pedidos, estandarte pras Filhas
de Maria de
Itanhaem, camisas de futebol . . .
pagava pinga, comia lixo, ate"' cinco ; ovos fritos,
e odeio ovos . . . Tiravam fotografias de mim . . .
dancei can uma negrona num clube de pretos . . .
nao gosto de pretos.
In those days whoever had most money would win. The
candidate had to pay for the ballots, the posters
. . . I was soundly defeated.
I discovered that I
had five hundred and fifty-si* friends— one vote was
mine— and that I shouldn't trust anyone but those.
It was a headache, the cane liquor, I went to umbanda
ceremonies, I drank liquor from drooly cups, ate
pizza with diesel oil with bandit types, blacks . . .
and those constant demands, demands for standards
for the daughters of Mary of Itanhaem, football shirts,
. . . I paid for drinks, drank drinks, ate garbage,
even five fried eggs and I hate eggs. They took
pictures of me
I danced with an enormous black
woman in a black people's club . . . I don't like
blacks.
Presumably politicians did not consciously show
their contempt for their constituents, but we should
note that these observations cast a new light on the
ethic of luta. controle and eouil£brio. which becomes
fr o m this perspective, an instrument to develop an

elaborate sense of manners, a tool to forge the bonds of
populist friendship.

In this respect, the anxiety of a

Sergio Miceli in 1973, when he suggested during the
course of a discussion that the best clients are those
who confuse the "idiom of friendship" with "friendship"
itself.
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woman

who had just seen a domestic servant publicly

reprimanded at a religious meeting is suggestive:
0 certo e nao falar na hora. Eu nunca teria^
coragem de chamar atengao. Eu nao tenho, nao
tenho coragem de falar. Dentro de mim posso estar
preta que nem carvao, mas^ ninguem ve. E'muito
dificil pra mim dizer "nao." Posso ver uma coisa
errada e podia chegar e dizer "Ce acha que ta
certo . . . 11 mais assim, aberto, "Voce deixou a
casa suja," "Voce pegou aquela comida . . • " de
jeito alguro. Ndt> se faz.
The correct thing is not to say a thing right away.
1 would never dare to correct someone.
1 haven't,
I haven't the c o w a g e to speak.
Inside myself I
can be as black as coal, but on one sees,
it is
very hard for me to say "No." I can see something
wrong, and maybe I could come and say "Do you
think that's right . . . " but that way, openly,
"You left the house dirty," "You took the food,"
in no way, it is not done.
These citations suggest that those who could not, or
would not maintain controle and eauillbrio could not
play the populist game.
As for the betrayals involved in the withdrawal
of the language of friendship which appears to have
followed the imposition of a dictatorship, very few
individuals were willing to suggest that in the past
they had been more intimately involved with figures of
higher social and political status than themselves, and
that they were now cut off.
to elaborate upon this theme.

Fewer still were willing
One man spoke of a boy

hood friend who was now an editor of an important
weekly magazine and who had on various occasions assis-
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ted him with gob placements or legal advice.

The

conflict between friendship and the self-interested
idiom of friendship became apparent during an exchange
with his daugher, when 1 asked the man how often he
saw his friend and what kinds of things they did toget-

He: Nao vejo ele mais nao.
Falamos pelo telefone
de vez em quando, se eu precisar^
She: E/um^contato commercial . . . nao e axnizade.
He: Ce nao sabe nada. Somos muito amigos, mais
ele ficou rico, e eu pobre.
He: I don't see him anymore. We speak on the tele
phone every now and then, whenever I need him.
She: It is a commercial contact . . . It is not real
friendship.
He: You don't know what you are talking about, we
are very good friends, but he became rich and I
poor.
In spite of the rarity of such examples, state
ments about rich and poor relatives suggest a shift away
from the extended use of kinship to form networks up and
down the social scale.

Many families had wealthier rela

tives who did not live in Santana, but in central city
neighborhoods like Higienopolis,
apartment buildings.

in new and modern

There were rare occasions for con

tact, and these appear to have been strained and uncom
fortable situations, which rarely took place in inf ori
en t s 1 own houses.
Estivemos na casa do Fabio que tem fazenda, estudo
. . . os amigos dele so' conversaram entre eles, nao
nos procuraram pra fazer aquela amizade, aquele
bate jpapo. A conversa vai sobre o que cada um faz.
Eu nao posso acompanhar conversa sobre yacht, casa
no Guaruja, as cabe^as de gado na fazenda. . • me
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fizeram sentir insignif icante . . .
We were at Fabio's house, who has a farm, has
been to university . . . his friends only spoke
among themselves, they didn't seek us out to extend
that friendship, that comfortable conversation.
The talk is about what each person does.
1 can't
join in conversations about yachts, houses in
Guaruja fan expensive sea side resort7, the heads
of cattle on the farm • • • they made me feel insig
nificant (See Appendix 5-F).
On the few occasions 1 was able to witness parties which
included many family members, some of whom

were wealthier,

informants allowed that they were surprised they had come
at all, and pointed out the way in which the wealthier
relatives segregated themselves and did not participate
in the general merrymaking.
I was able to gather a few intimations of
isolation from the world of power and wealth beyond
Santana, which seem significant.

As far as one can

ascertain, the kinds of people who live in Santana are
not readily recognized either by government agencies
directly related to the modernization of the area, or by
wealthier groups of people living in the elegant South
ern Zone of the city.

Thus for example, an agency con*

cerned with modernization and construction around the
northern terminal of the subway station in Santana was
in almost complete ignorance of the neighborhood.

These

did not contact local and regional politicians in an
effort to explain their plans,and while they felt this
was a great gaffe, they were profoundly surprised at the
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turmoil which followed the announcement of the proposed
project in the newspapers; they described with some
sarcasm the arguments which were presented by local
inhabitants against the project in the Municipal Legis
lature.

They contrasted the troubles they had in Santa

na with the

absence of any problems in Jabaquara, the

neighborhood at the southern end of the subway line,
where far larger tracts of land were expropriated than
in Santana.

The inhabitants of Jabaquara, much poorer

than those of Santana, did nothing until they were
"instigated" by a Santana lawyer.

Agency officials said:

Nos nao estavamos acostumados a lidar^com "bairro."
Tinhamos mais^experiencia com populagao desintegrada,
sem essa coerencia, essa organizagao.
We were not used to dealing with fieighborhoods. “
We had much more experience with disintegrating
populations, without this coherence, this organi
zation.
In addition, in spite of the extensive coverage which
Santana's opposition^ to the project received in the

The opposition appears to have been organized
by a very few individuals, mostly merchants, who hoped
to manipulate the government's interest in the neighbor
hood to their advantage— according to the planning agency.
I was unable to interview any of the individuals who
actively participated in generating public opposition
and press coverage of the opposition to the project.
Only two of the families interviewed lived in the path
of the proposed expropriations, and these did not partici
pate in the opposition.
One family was fairly certain
that if its house and plot were expropriated it would
receive adequate compensation.
The other, which had
planned to sell its house, was more concerned because
lands which have been designated for possible expropria-
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daily newspapers in the first half of 1973, an officer of
an important real estate finance company with government
contracts (with the BNH, the National Housing Bank) fear
public housing in the Northern Zone, was under the
impression that the whole of the Northern Zone, including
Santana, consisted of favelas and mud roads without any
public transportation at all (Cf. Figure 5, p. 4 ^
Ignorance of people like the Santana families,
often tinged with contempt, characterised the views of
residents from the wealthier Southern Zone of the city.
No systematic work was done among these people and only
the briefest of descriptive sketches is appropriate
here.

These were people of varied origins, including

foreigners and Brazilian "quatrocentao18 families often
intermarried with members of other Brazilian regional
elites or the descendants of foreign immigrants.

All

were vastly wealthier than the Santana families and
associated with large, often international financial,
industrial or real estate concerns.

While there were

differences in economic status among them, in general
their life styles were characterised by the symbols of
wealth and power: extensive property, extensive domestic

tion are frozen off the market and may not be sold.
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staffs, occasionally including armed guards, travel
abroad, conspicuous consumption of imported luxury
products (antiques, silver, clothes, liquor, etc.) and
the presence of important political figures in their
immediate
or friends.

entourages, as relatives, business associates
Many had participated in the organization

of the March of the Family for Democracy in Sao Paulo
which preceeded the 1964 military coup, and while one
might hear criticisms of the government among them,
they were the criticisms of an extremely loyal opposi
tion.

As a group they fully supported all government

efforts to suppress terrorism, to achieve order and to
develop the country.
Among people like these the investigator's own
concern with middle class formation was treated as a
joke.

I would be assured on the one hand that there was

no middle class in Sao Paulo, except perhaps among
domestic servants who sewed on the side, or who had
saved enough money to be able to buy televisions or
refrigerators on the installment plan, and on the other
hand that a middle class was necessary for the orderly
and progressive development of the country, and that
perhaps they might be considered middle class themselves,
since they knew people wealthier than themselves.

When

pushed however, some allowed with considerable discom
fort that poor relatives might be “classe media mesmo"

R eprod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co p yrigh t owner. F u rthe r re p rod u ction p rohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

270
(really middle class).

According to these accounts, what

made poorer relatives classe media mesmo was their social
invisibility, except on familial occasions, when they
could not be excluded:

Eg nao tem dinheiro^ trabalha,
essa luta, nao
aparece por ai, a nao ser em casamento ou missa
do setimo dia . . . usa essa roupa velha, esquisita.
Well, they have no money, they work, it's that
struggle.
They are hardly seen except at weddings
or at masses of the seventh day, and than in old
and strange clothes.
Since a number of such relatives were described as
middle level bureaucrats, the following comment, made
in another context, by a Zona Sul (Southern Zone) indi
vidual is suggestive:
0 funcionario publico e o cara mais nojento no
Brasil.
Sempre tem de agrada pra ccnsegulr algunia
coisa.
The public servant is the most repulsive type
in Brazil.
You always have to bribe them in order
to get something done.
Alternatively, persistent questioning on the
existence of a middle class in Sao Paulo would elicit
catalogues of codes of consumption, related to styles
of dress, styles of luxury or intellectual consumption
and even styles of setting the table.

The underlying

theme of such catalogues was the social invisibility
of many middle income people.

Examples made it clear

that there were people in Sao Paulo who were physically
visible— one saw them at beaches and certain business
clubs, and in the bureaucracies, but they remained social
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ly invisible.

If these impressionistic and unsystematic

observations are any indication of the distance between
people like the Santana families and government or groups
of higher social, economic and political status these
families are isolated indeed.
In a process which may parallel the loss of
contact with poor relatives which we saw among the elite
families in Chapter III, many of the Santana families
appear to be losing contact with their poorer as well as
their wealthier relatives.

The existence of poor rela

tives is often denied in terms of the question "Do you
know any poor people?"
broken already.
being broken.

Occasionally contact has been

At other times it is in the process of
Thus, when one man was asked if he knew

any poor people, he replied that he did not.

His son

interrupted and said "Mas Bai. tem sente pobre na familia."
and the father replied, "S mais a gente nao ve muito."
(But father, there are poor people in the family.
but we hardly see them).

Yes,

During subsequent interviews

with this family, poor relatives came to visit, and were
sent to the kitchen.

Other comments on poor relatives

included:
Su tenho parentes pobres: nao sao esforpados,^,
nem pra ter uma posipao.
Nao tem afnbipao.
Nao ^
querem lutar.
Sab da familia da minha mae, um e
operario que deve ganhar uns trezentos cruzeiros,
e outro deve ganhar uns duzentos cruzeiros.
Temos
sempre que ajudar quando aparecem.
Tinham terras,
caminhoes e venderam tudo, nao controlaram nada,
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nada.^ Nem os filhos. ^Tao com oito filhos.
Ey
que nao tem vontade, nao fazem economia, sei la.
I have poor relatives: they make no effort, not
even to keep a job. They have no ambition. They
don't want to struggle.
They are from my mother's
side of the family: one is a factory worker who
must earn three hundred cruzeiros /a month7 and
the other must earn two hundered cruzeiros /a month7.
We always have to help them when they show up here.”
They had land, trucks, they sold everything. They
didn't control a thing, not even their children.
They have eight children.
It?s that they have no
will, they don't economise.
I don't know /who

caresy.
Minha mae tem contato com gente pobre.
Nao sei
se no interior e'mais facil. La'os parentes se
ajudam, visitam, cuidam das familias e das empregadas. Mas, eu, contato direto nao tenho.
Nao
saio de casa. 0 marido tem um tio pauperrimo^ e
ajudamos quando ele aparece por ai, Mais isso
e meio esparso, nao e contato direto, ne?
My mother has contact with poor people.
I don't
know if in the interior it might be easier
There relatives help each other, visit each other,
care for the families and the maids.
But I, I
don't have any direct contact.
I don't leave the
house. My husband has a very poor uncle, and
when he shows up we help him.
But that's rather
sparse, it is not direct contact, right?
In addition to increased isolation from rich
and poor relatives, it is possible that the decline of
opportunities for doing "favors" for one another has led
to the re-emergence of invidious distinctions among
themselves, which may previously have been disguised by
the populist idiom of friendship.

If the hypothesis

that the bureaucrats acted as intermediaries for foreign
immigrants and non-bureaucrats is correct, the language
of ethnic distinction used by Brazilian families may
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express the contempt of manipulation as well as envy
at the success of families of foreign descent.
Ce ve nas esta^oes de agua . . . pessoas que nao
eram nada, carvoeiros, feirantes, agora ricos^. . .
Me sinto muito mal encontra-los.
Nao e questao de
orgulho. Prefiro falar com pessoas do meu nivel,
ou mais alto.
Esses italianos nem falam certo.
Mais ninguem percebe meu desgosto . . . me tornaria
ate antipatica se . . . nao, conversamos, ate' que
as vezes as italianinhas sao simpaticas.
You see, you meet people at the watering resorts,
people who were nothing,charcoal makers, salesmen
at feiras /open air markets^, n o w rich.
I feel
very badly when I meet them.
It’s not a matter
of pride . . . these Italians d o n ’t even speak
properly.
But nobody notices my distaste.
It
would make me unlikeable if I . . . No, we speak,
and at times the little Italian women are quite
pleasant (See Appendix 5-G ).
Ethnic distinctions are net new: we have seen
that they existed in Santana as soon as large numbers of
immigrants arrived in the area. However, while they were
probably stronger in the past when such distinctions
also reflected differences in political status and pres
tige, to the extent that populism brought mutual advan
tages to both parties, it is possible that the idiom of
friendship may have kept feelings of discomfort, guilt,
envy and contempt in control.

The inability to do things

together--in the populist way-- has the potential of
isolating people from each other, as well as from classes
above and below them.
Although this is never explicit, isolation
is implied by their statements about rich and poor
relatives, as well as by

their vision of Sao Paulo’s
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social structure and their place in it.

The social

world of Sao Paulo was divided for most Santana informants
into ricos, oobres and classe media (rich, poor and middle
class).

We have seen the contradictions and tensions

involved in being classe media and have suggested that
these arise from the shrinking areas of influence for
these families which resulted from the shift from popu
lism to dictatorship.

Accordingly, the categories of

rich and poor have become abstractions, because with the
shrinkage of populist networks, they no longer see rich
or poor people.
Both rich and poor alike are seen as contemp
tible and to be avoided, although for different reasons.
Money in large quantities is seen as an agent of corrup
tion or complication which can threaten the unity and
sanctity of the family.
Se eu tiver tudo, urn casarao, jo'ias maravilhosas,
uma por^sfo de carros . . . o que que euj>osso dar?
0 que que uma pessoa assim pode dar? Nao pode dar
nada, nao, pode dar de s£, o que e o importante. Ser
egoista e humano e somos todos egoistas, mais com
todas essas coisas e dificil nsto ser egoista e
dar de si. Eu agora, veja s^, eu nao tenho nada.
So' tenho arnim mesma, e so posso dar de mim mesma, mesmo
que seja so' urn sorriso.
If I had everything, a mansion, marvelous jewels, a
bunch of cars, what can I give? What can a person
like that give? Nothing, one can*t give of oneself,
which is the important thing.
It is human to be
selfish, and we are all selfish, but with all of those
things it is difficult not to be selfish and to give
of oneself. Me, for example, I have nothing.
I have
only myself and I can only give of myself, even if
it is just a smile.
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0 dinheiro cria problemas, viu. Poderiamos acertar
na Loteria Esportiva . . . seria for^ado a ter tana
outra posi^ao.
Um bairro mais chique seria necessario.
Meu modo de^tratar nab mudaria, mais teria de comprar
coisas.
Nao gostaria de mudar meu padrao de vida.
Sofreria interferencia da familia: especariam que
desse alguma coisa^jpra eles.
E^ £a ajudar, mas
criaria uma situacao incomoda.
0 dinheiro cria
problemas.
Money creates problems, see. We could win the
Sports Lottery . . . 1 would be forced to have
another position. A more elegant neighborhood would
be necessary. My way of behaving wouldn't change,
but I would have to buy things.
I wouldn't like to
change my life style.
I would suffer interference
from the family: they would expect me to give them
something. Of course 1 would help, but it would
create an uncomfortable situation (See Appendix 5-H).
The Santana vision of the rich is consonant
with the perception of money involving potential dangers.
While envy and a sense of personal indignity characterises
some of the perceptions of the rich, the rich are repeated
ly described as thoughtless, frivolous, ungenerous, idle
and immoral.

They are repeatedly described as people

who do not need to think (Nao precisam pensar).

For

example,
Minha imagem dos ricos: tem,urn patrimonio grande.
Nao posso imaginar quanto e. Por exemplo, quer
comprar a fazenda, vai um milhao a vista, sem pensar.
Um industrial, um homem de negocios, ta"" sempre
viajando pro Rio Grande do Sul, pro Peru.
Se afasta
da casa dele, que e uma mansao que nao tem vizinho
pra conversar. A casa e grande, com toda uma equipe de mordomo, criadagem, cozinheira, passadeira,
jardineiro . . . A esposa nab fica em casa, sai pra
reuniao, viagem pro exterior, o mundo todo. Nem
sempre o marido viaja com a mulher.
2 uma vida meio
futil. Os filhos . . • nao^saojcomo a classe media
com as mamadeiras.
2 las nao vao perder tempo cuidando dos filhos, tem baba. Entao surgiu o problema do
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playboy, dinheiro facil, nao tiveram educagao, se
ajuntaram e formaram quase uma classe. Nao conhecem
os pais. Acham quadrados, velhos, nao ha dialogo.
Vivem a vida deles.
0 James Dean era o sunbolo do
playboy.
^Os pais nao se prendem as coisas. As
mulheres vao fazer compras no Dener, Clodovil, fazem
questac de comprar o mais caro. Quer comprar j oias^
0 joalheiro vem pra casa delas. Mas via de regra vao
pra Franga.
E'provincialismo comprar aqui.
My image of the rich: they have a large capital base.
1 cannot imagine how large. For example, you want
to buy a farm? Down goes one million cash, without
thinking. A n industrialist, a businessman, is always
travelling to Rio Grande do Sul, to Peru . . . He
is away from his house, which is a mansion, with no
neighbors to speak to. The house is enormous, with
a staff of butler, a bunch of maids, a cook, an
ironing woman and gardner. The wife doesn't stay
home. She has a social life to develop.
Most of the
time she is out of her house at meetings, trips abroad,
throughout the whole world. And the husband doesn't
always travel with his wife.
It is sort of a futile
life. The children: they are not like the middle
class with their baby bottles. They don't waste
time caring for their children, they have nursemaids.
And so the problems of playboys arose, from easy
money, they had no upbringing, got together, almost
formed a separate class. They don't know their
parents, find them square and old, there is no dia
logue, They live their lives. James Dean was the
symbol of the playboy. The parents do not become
involved with /important^ things. The women go
shopping at Dener, Clodovil /two expensive dress de
signer sj and insist on buying the most expensive.
You want to buy jewels? The jeweler comes to their
houses.
But as a rule, they go to France, it is
provincial to buy here (See Appendix 5 - 1 ) .
Santana

informants' vision of the poor is

also filled with contempt because the ethic of luta.
controle and eauilibrio is felt to be absent from their
lives.
No Brasil so^morre de fome o vagabundo que nao
quer trabalhar.
In Brazil only good-for-nothings who don't want to
work die of hunger.
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Os^pobres: nem sei classifica^ portjue
sao gente.

quase nao

The poor: I hardly know how to classify them,
because they are hardly human.
But there is also the additional disdain felt
for people who can be manipulated and anxiety because the
opportunities for manipulation appear to be decreasing.
The manipulatory aspect of many of these women*s relations
with poor people are apparent in the charity work they
undertake.

Sane felt that perhaps the poor were poor

because they hadn*t had a chance to be anything but poor
("Nao tiveram chance").

Their charity work was precisely

to give them a "chance."

But, although this was rarely

explicit, there were strings attached.

The individuals

they helped had to acquire their values of luta, controle
and equii£brio as well as maintain a properly deferential
attitude, or help would cease.

Thus s woman describing

her charity work said,
Eu fazia servipo social na Sociedade de Tsoscfia.
Davamos assistencia a umas vinte ou trinta familias
por ano. Arranjava trabalho pro chefe, davamos
presentes pras/crianpas no Natal,^davamos roupa,
tudo isso. Dai, largava os que nao progrediam, os
que nao faziam nada, deixava.
Nao podia fcirar o
lugar de outro que teria fibra e controle. e que
queria lutar.
I used to do social work at the Theosophic Society.
We would help twenty or thirty families a year.
We
got jobs for the head of household, and gave presents
to the children at Christmas, clothes, all of that.
Then we would drop the ones who didn't progress, the
ones who did nothing. We couldn't let them take the
place of another who might have fiber and control and
who wanted to struggle.
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I was once present at a food distribution to poor women
in the Santana parish house.

The following is an abridge

ment of my notes at the time;
At two O'clock I arrived with a number of women
who were volunteering their services to the social
assistance program of the parish. The women put on
pink and blue cotton smocks over their street
clothes and began unlocking the cabinets in which
the provisions to be distributed were kept (rice,
beans, sugar, spaghetti, cooking oil, detergent and
bleach). They had brought cakes and a thick sweet
chocolate drink for themselves and spread these out
on a table in the back of the room.
In another room the poorer women arrived and
sat on benches against the wall in silence. They
looked wary. Snuffly children leaned against them.
O n e of the volunteers went into that room to register
on file cards any new applicants for aid.
In exchange
for the food the women were required to learn to sew
and embroider. First the raw cotton flour and sugar
sacking were given them to take home, where they were
to be washed until they were white and the letters were
bleached out. The following week they would take a
number c£ these white bags home to cut and hem them
into dishtowels.
Once hemmed, the volunteers who were
dispensing the charity would trace a design on the
fabric and teach the women how to embroider the design,
usually one of fruits and vegetables. A1 te rnatively,
if a woman already knew how to embroider, she would
be taught needlepoint, rag rug making or crochet. All
of this handiwork was sold at periodic church bazaars
and the money earned would pay for some of the cost
of the food distributed.
The main point was that no food would be given
to any woman who did not work. This was made clear
in my presence when an older woman complained that
the mistake she had made in her embroidery didn't
show very much and that she didn’t want to pick out
the whole pattern and start all over again. She only
did this at all, she said, so as to get the food. The
volunteer social worker said nothing and continued
showing her how to pick out the pattern. Emboldened
by the silence, perhaps, the older woman declared that
she wouldn't do it. Quietly and with a small smile
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/

the social worker said 11 2. e se eu rasaasse a sua
a Senhora^naoteria de vir mais. nem pra
pegar os mantimentos" (Yes, and if I tore up your
card you wouldn’t have to come here anymore, not
even to collect your supplies). The pattern was
picked out and started over again.
It is difficult to see how some of these
charitable activities would affect the life chances of
the individuals many women were trying to help.

Two

aspects of the organization of charitable works suggest
that such activities play a fundamentally different role
today than they did during the populist years.
of all, informants

First

said that all such organizations are

under much tighter government control than they used to
be.

While many parish organizations in Santana were

rife with internal factions and disputes, these disputes
could not spill outside the organization in a scramble
for populist type followings, because the control over
bookkeeping and materials seems to be much greater.

It

is no longer possible to sell or distribute materials
(food, textiles ) clandestinely or privately in order to
extend personal networks among the poor.
A nossa paroquia ficou privilegiada.
Somos todos
do mesmo nivel social e de educa^Ko. Tinha gente
d e s o n e s t a , diretora de paroquia que quase nem
sabia ler. Tinha^muita politicagem, e muita coisa
desaparecia.
Sntao, ehtrou esse controle . . .
Our parish became privileged /among those of the
Northern Zone of the city*.
We are all of the same
social and educational level. There were dishonest
people, parish leaders who hardly knew how to read.
There was lots of politicking and lots of things
disappeared.
So then this control was introduced . . .
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Second, items which were made by the poor
women in the Santana social assistance group described above
were sold very cheaply at periodic bazaars where they were
bought by middle income women like my informants. Because
the money which was earned at church bazaars paid for
much of the food which was distributed to the poor, the
poor women who made the merchandise might be considered
literally as working for subsistence— food.

This and

the decreasing opportunities and incentives to extend
personal networks among the poor suggest that at present,
charity work acts as a way of putting cheap merchandise on
the market for the consumption of middle income women
like my informants.
Thus, in spite of their charity, many charity
volunteers did not see much poverty and in fact chose
to avoid situations which put them in contact with the
poor and clearly unfortunate.

In the example cited above,

the food was distributed from the parish house: no one
took it to the houses of the women who needed it.

In

other cases, women donated money or goods to organizations
which would distribute it among the poor.

In yet other

cases women who had actively participated in charity
efforts in the past had simply given it up.
Contato com gente pobre? Nao tenho muito nao. Eu
dava aula jde artesanato lax na paroquia, fiz cur so
de voluntaria da parte social, mais jtgora ja nao vou
mais, Sabe, eu nao quero saber. Nao gosto de £azer
visita^ao domicilar. Sou uma pessoa muito sensivel,
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e ve todajsssa miseria, pobreza, nao posso fazer nada,
prefiro nab ver, nao saber. Ce nao vai modificar o
mundo, nao e mesmo ? Tambem sou muito sensxvel pra
ver doen^as, visitas de hospital.
Contact with poor people? I haven't much.
I used to
teach sewing at the parish house and I took a social
work course to be a volunteer, but I don't go anymore.
You know, 1 don't want to know. I don't like to visit
their houses. I am a very sensitive person and to see
all that misery, that poverty, I can't do anything
about it, so I prefer not to see, not to know. You are
not going to change the world, isn't that so? I am also
too sensitive for illnesses, visits to hospitals.
Contato direto? Nao, eu fa^o costura, levo pra Liga,
e eles que dispoe •
Direct contact? No, I sew, take it to the League and
they dispose of it.
Fazemos caridade pelo nosso centro Espirita. 0 nosso
centro manda pra outro centro, e eles que distribuem.
We do charity through our spiritist center. Our center
sends it to another center, and they distribute it.
Once an interview was interrupted by a woman who came in to
collect the plastic bags in which milk is sold in Sao Paulo.
She explained that it was for a hospital in Uberaba, Minas,
for people suffering from Fogo.Selvagem. or P e ^ g o , Foliaceo (literally, "Wild Fire;" shingles). The patient gets
watery boils which stick to the sheets, so plastic sheets
are made out of the milk bags. The interviewee had been
collecting them from the neighbors for some time, and as a
result had several large cartons full. The visitor said she
was taking them to the hospital herself, and the interviewee
was astounded:
Eu nao teria coragem, que horror meu De u s ^ ir ver toda
essa carne crua, ah, nao tenho coragem, nao: prefiro
ajudar, mas nao saber.
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I wouldn't have the courage, how awful, my God
to go look at all that raw meat, oh, no, I don't
have the courage.
I would rather help, but not
know about it.
The number of women who used to participate
in charitable activities and no longer do so, and the
fact that increasingly charitable organizations are
being bureaucratised under government scrutiny suggests
even in this sphere the opportunities for influence
are decreasing.

Among these women, in the absence of

the populist payoff, the incentive to deal with poverty,
which seems to make many women uncomffor'table, has obvious
ly decreased.

The only constant and daily contact that

most of these women had with people significantly poorer
than themselves was with their own domestic servants.
Certainly the difficulty of training and
keeping maids is a constant theme in many conversations.
However,

I suspect that the nature of the constant

contact gives a domestic servant an ambivalent status
that is no longer simply "poor."

Servants are part of

the household, almost "part of the family," and they
are "honestly" employed (there is a great preoccupation
to protect maids from prostitution).

If the servant

lives in she brings with her a minimum of the misery
associated with "poor" surroundings: if she does not
live in she is rarely seen in her own surroundings and
these need not be considered.

Furthermore, a good deal
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of effort is spent attempting to eradicate the evidence
of poverty and to instill in domestic servants values
consonant with those of the housewife.

Besides their

domestic duties, many of the Santana women claim to have
taught their maids how to bathe, use deodorant, brush
their teeth and go to the dentist, and to have given them
incentives to “better themselves.“

Such incentives

ranged from free time at night to go to night school,
small and more rarely large gifts, such as loans (which
are never repaid) to build small houses on the outskirts
of the city, or the use of an unrented house.

One woman

offered to send her servant*s children to boarding
school.

However, these gest ures are made in the context

of some tension: there is the explicit expectation that
the servant will follow her employer's plan for her life.
Not umdrurally, the expectation is frequently not met.
Thus, one young woman was fired because she married
against her mistresses* wishes.

Another was unwilling

to be separated from her children, no matter how much
more money she would have earned as a live-in maid.

And,

of course, servants often leave to find better paying
positions in other houses, leaving the housewife embitter
ed for having been so “generous11 and with a sense of
increasing lack of control over her own domestic servants.
The following are a few comments made by Santana infor
mants :
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Ajudo muito as familias das empregadas. Ajudamos
a comprar geladeira, televisao, moveis.
No Natal
mando de tudo, roupa, alimento, sapato, agasalho.
E fizemos grandes compras pra ela. Ela queria pagar
em dez vezes mas o^marido diz que os juros xam ser
muito grandes. Entao pagamos a vista, e ela 1 a pagar
pra gente. Depois, ela pagou metade e ele desculpou
0 resto da divida. No fim de tudo, foi bem pouco o
que ela pagou. Mas o problema e o mau humor
delas, a ma" vontade.
Pois el mais voce faz, mais
querem que faca. Cada ano de casa dou uma pe^a de
enxoval, um dinheiro. Mas s a e m de qualquer modo.
£ custa ensinar. Elas comem a mesma coisa_ que eu
como.
Se e filet mignon ou camarao, tambem e pra elas.
Podem coiner de tudo que tem em casa. A^ ultima
trabalhou numa casa rica com piscina: so^ comia arroz,
feijab, ovo, banana e laranja.
Geralmente e classe
rica, tanto brasileira como estrangeira que trata
empregada assim. Mas por bem que trate, elas
sempre saem.
1 help the maids* families very much. We helped them
to buy refrigerators, televisions, furniture. At
Christmas I send everything, clothes, food, shoes,
sweaters. And we have made large purchases for her.
She wanted to pay /'for somethings in ten installments.
My husband said the interest would be too high. So
we paid cash, and she was going to pay us back. Then
she paid half and my husband let her have the rest of
the debt.
In the end she paid very little, but the
problem is their bad humor, their ill will. That*s
the way it is, the more you do, the more they want
you to do. Every year they stay at my house I give
them a piece for their dowry or some money.
But
they leave anyway. And its hard to teach them. They
eat the same thing I eat.
If itfe filet mignon or
shrimp for me, it is for them, too. They can eat
of whatever there is in the house. The last maid
worked in a rich house with a swimming pool: she
only ate rice, beans, eggs, bananas and oranges..
Generally its the rich, whether Brazilian or foreign
who treat maids like that.
But no matter how well
you treat them, they always leave.
.

y

/

0 pior e quando e casada, falta muito. A crianpa ta
doente, e ai ce fica se preocupando com as criancas
dos outros.
Ce faz, traz, eu tinha de fazer comida
pras crianpas dos outros.
The worst is when they are married, they miss work
a lot. The children get sick, then you end up
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worrying about other people's children. /She brings
them to my house7 and I had to make, to carry, I
had to make food for other people's children.
Domestic servants, because of their ambigu
ous status— "poor" yet "part of the family" (Jelin, 1974)
--seem to provide one of the last areas of manipulation
for many women, regardless of the "alibis" of concern
for their future welfare (See Appendix 5 - J ).

Obviously

the control over domestic servants is not absolute because
other jobs for them are available.

Furthermore, to the

extent that they and other representatives of the poor
approach the consumption patterns of nossa classe media
(our middle class), through schooling, credit facilities,
not to mention gifts from the housewife, they become
a threat to the housewife's vision of social stratification.
It is as though in the view of their employers, domestic
servants can best rise above their stations (syirbolically)
by scrupulously maintaining them (materially), through the
liens of dependence and deference

to the housewife.

The increasing isolation experienced by many
individuals seem to have generated feelings of anger,
resentment and guilt which were only openly expressed in
the spiritist sessions I was able to attend.
sessions which I witnessed were Kardecist,

The three
or Espiritismo

Mesa Branca (White Table Spritism), which is not to be
confused with Umbanda. which combines Kardecism

with

Afrc-Braziiian cults (Brown, 1974,; Camargo, 1961).
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Spiritism is a rapidly growing and developing religion
in Brazil (Warren, 1968; Camargo, 1961) and indeed Brazil
has one of the world's largest spiritist populations.
Imported from France at the turn of the century, through
the writings of a medium, Alain Kardec, it spread signi
ficantly among the educated classes in Brazil following
the 1940's.
To my certain knowledge only six of the Santana
families interviewed were spiritists although many more
may have been spiritists as well as Roman Catholics.

Many

had attended spiritist and umbanda sessions out of curio
sity, but professed themselves uninvolved.

Some of the

women interviewed in Santana had been attracted to spiri
tism, but had subsequently abandoned it, apparently
because it violated the ethic of luta. controle and equilibrio.
Eu tinha medionidade, e no comeco achava tudo isso
lindo. Mais deixei, nao gosto daquele escandalo,
aquela gritaria, sem controle nenhum.
I had the capacity to receive spirits and in the
beginning I thought it was marvelous.
But I left it,
I don't like that scandal, all that shouting, with
no control whatsoever.
Acho o espiritismo muito ruim. A pessoa fica biruta,
a espSsa do Pedro ficou meia . ... desmoronou . . .
Pra seguir o espiritismo como se deve, tem de ser ,
pessoa muito controlada# , evoluida, equilibrada, ne,
e e raro ter tamanho controle.
I think spiritism is very bad. A person goes nuts.
Peter's wife got sort of . . . she came apart . . .
To practise spiritism properly, a person has to be
very controlled, developed, balanced.and it is rare
to have that much control.
Others who were familiar with spiritism through relatives
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or friends were similarly repelled: the apparent abandon
ment of self and self control appears to be almost phy
sically upsetting to many women.

While all were aware of

the large volume of charity works performed by spiritist
associations (Warren, 1968:402), and approved Of that
aspect of spiritism, they found the loss of self and
equilibrio

during the sessions themselves repugnant.

The sessions which 1 was able to attend took
place in the mid afternoon

6

in a large garage in a private

house which had been converted into a formal meeting
place.

The room was dimmed, and in back there was a table

covered by a white cloth around which the leaders, a man
and a woman, and the mediums would sit.

On the wall

behind the table hung portraits ofrthe Virgin Mary.
Gounod's Ave Maria was playing softly from a victrola
behind the table.

In front of the table were rows of

benches and chairs for spectators and new converts
called assistentes (assistants).

The meetings were

extremely controlled and patterned until the point when
the mediums were possessed.

Then the room became extreme

ly noisy with much unintelligible speech as various

^There were smaller groups who held their
sessions in their living rooms at night.
I did not
attend any evening ceremonies. After I left Brazil one
of these smaller groups expanded and the householder con
verted his garage into a spiritist center.
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spirits made their presence known (See Appendix 5 - K ).
Many spiritists emphasize the beauty iHs uma
beleza. e tao U n d o ")

of spiritist sessions, especially

sessions in which the air is allegedly filled with
flowers.

I was not able to attend any such sessions, and

admittedly the three sessions I was able to attend are few
to base judgements on.

Nonetheless, what was interesting

was the abandon the women fell prey to and the excesses
of the spirits' demands and exaltations.

The spirits

I was able to hear, because they spoke the loudest, were
the spirits of clearly lower class and brutal men, almost
caricatures of the vagabondos the women spoke of when
describing the poor.

It may be pointed out that the

opportunity for the emotional purge undergone by both
mediums and assistentes is rarely available during most
of these women's daily lives because of the ethic of
luta. controle and eouilxbrio.

However, in addition to

providing almost disproportionate confirmations of the
women's visions of the poor, the spirits many women were
receptive to were peculiarly concerned with power.

In

deed, one spirit was especially troublesome: he had pos
sessed an elderly woman and kept shouting, "Eu nao pe^o.
eu mando. eu sou Deus" (I don't ask,

I command,

I am

God" ).7

71 attended one umbanda session in a favela
which contrasted
interestingly with these sessions. Phy
sically the ceremony was much less structured than those
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This vulnerability, together with the anxieties,
resentments, guilts and envies implied in their visions of
the rich and poor suggest the reasons for the development
of a shared view of society which is increasingly turned
in upon itself and willfully blind to the rest of society
(cf., nEu nao ouero saber." 1 don't want to know).

The

Santana families of all three origins appear to have
developed an extraordinarily inaccurate perception of
Sao Paulo's social structure, which often contradicts
their vision of the middle class as squeezed and about to
be swallowed whole,

it was not an uncommon belief among

the same people who held the "sandwich theory" of the
middle class that Sao Paulo was largely populated by
people like themselves, because of national progress.
A maioria de Sao Paulo a de classe media . . , e
metade media, um quarto rica e um quarto pobre.
Agora vem muita gente do norte, essa popula^ao

in Santana. The arrival of the spirits, however, was
much more controlled and structured.
The room was smaller
with an altar in the corner covered with Afro Indian and
Roman Catholic saints. Women stood on one side of the
room and men on the other, but the distinction vanished
when spirits took control of the mediums or cayalos (literally,"horses» ) when both wandered or danced around the
room. The session began with songs.
No victrola and no
rhythm instruments. Then an orderly progression of spirits
possessed the oldest mediums or cavalo s : "preto velho"
and "boiardero"(old black man, cowboy) who were consulted
by the participants on matters of health, money and emo
tional difficulties.
The cavalos possessed by unruly
spirits grunted, flayed their arms and occasionally fell
on the floor, but they did not interfere with the orderly
arrival of spirits expected on that evening.
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que eles fala flutuante . . . c e ve aquele pessoal
chegando do norte, ai, que lastima, meu Deus . . .
o' esses imigrantes que dab a impressao de pobreza.
Has deixando de lado essa parte, a maior£a e media.
Tem a media e a media um pouco mais rica . ^ . mas
ce repara na favela como tem televisao.
Nao pode
ser tab pobre assim.
Most of Sao Paulo is middle class.
It is half middle
class, one quarter rich and one quarter poor.
Now
many people come from the north, that population
which they call floating . . • you see those people
arriving from the north, oh, the pity of it, my Lord,
. . . and it is these immigrants who give the impres
sion of poverty.
But leaving that part aside, most
of Sao Paulo is middle class. There is the middle
class, and the middle class which is a bit richer • . .
but you notice in the favelas. how many television
antennas there are. They can't be all that poor
(See Appendix 5-L ).
Itlis clear, howevei; that Sao Paulo is not
populated largely by people like the Santana families
(See Chapter I, Figure 10 , p. 52 )8

and we have heard

contradictory statements from Santana informants which
suggest that although they know it, they choose not to see
it and to limit their perceptions to the celebration
of their own achievement through luta, controle and eouil^brio. I have suggested that this follows from changes
in their structural position and from the resentment
g
It was suggested to me by a young doctor that
in Brazil's largest cities it was relatively easy to for
get about poverty. He had friends in Salvador, Bahia,
who forced themselves to go to the mud flats where the poor
build their ^houses and watch the children fight with vul
tures (uyubus) and dogs over garbage and stray crabs for
food.
He sai.d, "Se a gente nao fizer isso. devagar comeca
pensar que ta tudo dtimo. que o prostes so tg_ pcaftCgflJrfl&r
(If people don't do that, slowly they begin to think
that everything is wonderful, that progress is progressing).
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attendant upon their increasing isolation from groups
of higher socio-political status and their loss of in
fluence through populist networks.

Moreover, to the

extent that they are indeed isolated from other strata
in society and that families of disparate origins and
careers share the set of ideas described here, 1 have
argued that the Santana families are undergoing a process
of middle class formation.

They are no longer a part of

the "classes."
Their present achievements have resulted from
their own efforts in the populist context.

In the present

context they seem to feel that the maintenance of their
achievements depends on government protection, which en
sures stability and "protects" them from developing their
own bases of influence as well as from political manipu
lation by politicians and from exploitation by the rich.
It is interesting that it is only in connection with
government protection that the rich are seen as predatory,
as raising prices, as evading taxes, and as other than
lazy, futile, frivolous or immoral.

In 1972-1973 all

informants felt themselves economically stable: things
would change for the better if they won the Sports Lottery9

9 See Miceli (1972:222), who suggests that the
concept of upward social mobility as one subject to
chance rather than individual effort is one typical of
television programs aiming specifically at the poor, u n 
employed or marginally employed Brazilian viewer.
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or for worse, if the government collapsed*

Their

personal futures appeared intertwined with the Brazilian
economic •'miracle" of the time, for which the government
was seen as exclusively responsible:
/•

„

Quem foi responsavel? 0 governo brasileiro.
Essa
mao dura que temos. Com liberdade total, essas
coisas lengua lengua . . . 0 brasileiro e muito
indolente.
Who was responsible? The Brazilian government. This
hard hand we have over us. With total liberty
these things lag. The Brazilian is very indolent.
Quem foi responsavel? Os benditos militares que
deviam ter feito issoha tempo.
Foi d i f icil pro
povo,^mas^o povo sabia que tinha que ser assim,
se nao, nao era possxvel a restauraqao da nossa
economia.
Graces a esse governo que foi muito criticado.^ 0 Castelo Branco foi o melhor*. forte, nao
tinha medo, nao queria popularidade.
Viu unicamente
o bem da na^ao, ey viu que o povo ia fazer sacrificio.
E ce ve, agora ta tudo mundo com casa e carro, com
os filhos estudando.
Who was responsible? the blessed military who should
have done this a long time ago.
It was difficult for
the people, but the people knew it had to be this
way, otherwise it would have been impossible to
restore our economy.
Thanks to this government which
has been harshly criticized.
Castelo Branco was the
best, strong, unafraid, he didn't want popularity.
He aimed solely at the the good of the nation, and he
understood that the people would make sacrifices.
And you see, now everybody has a house and a car and
their children in school.
Two recent studies of television programs
(Miceli, 1972; Pessoa de Barros,

1974) have shown that the

government is actively interested in propagating a middle
class world view which coincides in many respects with
the one described here.

The basic themes in soap operas

(Pessoa de Barros, 1974) and in a talk show aimed at a
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middle class audience (Miceli, 1972) were nuclear familism
and social mobility.

On the talk show, neighbors, who

we have seen in Santana had provided a source of clients,
are defined as people from whom one expects no more than
momentary entertainment;
De uma vizinha nao se exige mais que um bom papo, uma
boa fofoca, uma gargalhada.
From a neighbor you d o n ’t expect more than a good chat,
a piece of gossip and a laugh (iiebe Camargo, cited
in Miceli, 1972:51)
The entire social arena of the talk show was
defined as a family living room which exibits celebrities
(popular musicians, fashion designers, actors and actress
es, scientists, religious figures and occasionally politi
cians) as the household “bibelots'1 (Miceli, 1972:60).

The

show encouraged consumption by displaying the latest fa
shions in clothing, furniture and other household items.
Poor people did not appear on this show.1®

To the extent

that an upper class was alluded to, it was characterized
by excessive consumption rather than political power.
After exhibiting the talents which made them famous, the
celebrities were regularly reduced to their familial roles
and relations.

The hostess’s questions revealed that for

all their fame, the celebrities were just like the spec-

^®With the exception of domestic servants, who
may be referred to as the housewife's "secretariat" or
"assistants."
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tator “who faces the same problems, suffers, loves, has
children, a home, a husband, goes to the supermarket,
uses blankets, tidies drawers and feels cold11 (1972:79,
emphasis in the original).

Never is any conflict presen

ted between the demands of the family and the demands of
society or the career.
By turning the exception into the rule, the fable of
social mobility opposes a state of privation and
iovelessness to one of success and happiness.
In
general, the people who illustrate the fable are
celebrities, who are presented as having been able to
surmount any obstacles or difficulties interfering
with their ascension. At the end of the trajectory
the celebrity remains unaltered.
He continues to be
the same good soul, modest and pure. The celebrity
keeps the good qualities from either pole of his
career; this permits him to remain immune to “relevant11
modifications as he travels the route of social ascen
sion.
In other words, the fable wishes to create
a belief in the existence of a Salvationist project
which is at everyone*s reach.
Everyone should aspire
to become the protagonist of this “positive11 and
"optimist1' story, in which me n and the world appear to
be improving daily (1972:97-100, emphasis in the ori
ginal).
In the soap operas studied by Pessoa de Barros
(1974) there were always two core elements, a love story
which must terminate in marriage and the creation of a new
nuclear family, and a social drama, which may or may not
be superimposed on the love story, involving upward social
mobility.

Differences in social stratification and social

inequalities are presented only to be minimized.

Inequa

lities can always be resolved by love, by social mobility
or by familism.

Thus, the poor differ from the rich

only in the absence

of superfluous luxuries:
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They resemble each other in the fundamentals: clean
liness, plenty to eat, a loving and concerned mother,
and harmonious relations between members of the
family (Pessoa de Barros, 1974:59).
When class conflict arises, it is the result not of
inequities in the social structure, but of the conflict
between equally rich •'good" and "bad" sides of an exten
ded family: the class conflicts are resolved by the reso
lution of the family conflicts— namely the expulsion or
death of the "bad" elements (1974:69).
The explicitly political sphere is entirely
absent from both types of programs.

This is apparent in

their treatment of the nation and the law, as well as in
their treatment of social stratification.

In the talk

show, the progress of the nation and state is intimately
and explicitly linked to the "•love,' loyalty and labor
of every native . . . regardless of other considerations,
we are all the same in the national and domestic arena"
(Miceli, 1972:123).

Far from representing an institution

of power or domination, the nation state is conceived of
as "protective,

•enveloping* and icuddly* /sic. !_/--as

a shield against the anxieties and aspirations of the
collectivity" (Miceli, 1972:123).
In the soap operas analyzed, Pessoa de Barros
noted a progressive identification of the moral

and

judicial worlds over time: whereas in the earliest soap
opera analyzed, moral infallibility was an attribute of
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the people (2 p o v o ) and the state and its representatives
were represented as fallib&& and distant from the action
on the screen, by the last soap opera analyzed the moral
and-judicial worlds were united.

The hero*s mistakes— or

crimes--can only be absolved in court and his forgiveness
there is what guarantees his moral integration into
society (1974:96).

Pessoa de Barros notes that

To the extent that political themes and political
institutions do not exist in soap operas, the fusion
between legal and moral authority carries a strong
ideological charge, since it is presented as natural
and self evident (1974:96).
In addition to propagating a world view which
is blind to inequalities, isolated in its familism, and
which ignores political power, this set of ideas also
provides a code to limit the input of new information.
This is clear in Miceli*s analysis of the panel discussions
on various topics in the talk show.
borrows the outward

While the code

signs of academic discourse (concern

for "definitions," "debate," "objectivity" and "scienti
fic method") to justify the assertions and opinions voiced
during the discussions, the subjects of debate are forced
into a restricted affective

treatment: this is apparent,

not only in the choice of topics (macumba. candomble.
gossip and eroticism, fear example), but in the way the
"academic techniques" (appeals to anecdotal and circum
stantial historical fact, or to "scientific investigation")
are used or ignored in the face of new information.

For
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example, in a debate over spiritism, two panelists
quibbled over its scientific status:
-Em que sentido o espiritismo e ciencia?
^
-Nesse preciso sentido, investiga^ao em laboratorio
dos fenomenos supranorxnais para poder descobrir
as leis desses fenomenos.
-Que laboratorio?
-Nos laboratories, naturalmente os laboratorios ^
devem ser de pesquisa cientff ica— ou o senhor nao
conhece isso?
-In what sense is spiritism science?
-In this precise sense, investigation in laboratories
of supernatural phenomena to discover the laws gover
ning these phenomena.
-What laboratories?
-In laboratories, naturally the laboratories have to
be those of scientific research— or don't you know
that? (cited in Miceli, 1972:109).
On another occasion, a female deep sea diver was attemp
ting to describe recent underwater research and was re
peatedly interrupted by the hostess with requests to
describe her sensations, whether she didn't miss her
husband, and whether she didn't get lonely way down
there underneath the ocean (Miceli, 1972:112).
The emphasis on optimism, mobility, consumption
and national progress touches en all the themes elabo
rated by Santana informants, with the exception of envy,
guilt, angerrandrdespair.

These appear in soap operas

only to provide plot tension.

However, these demons

must always be exorcised before the final epithalamion,
and they are thus exorcised for the viewer as well, but
as Pessoa de Barros notes, such conflicts must be resol
ved ritually and perpetually— by watching the next soap
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opera ( 1 9 7 4 : 7 9 ) .
Both writers present evidence of increasing
government control over television programming in an
effort to propagate this middle class world view as
opposed to a populist ideology or one which aims speci
fically at the poor.

Increasing government censorship,

the abolition of live broadcasting and the fact that soap
opera writers must hire lawyers in order to keep abreast
of government cultural manipulation (Miceli, 1972:159-88;
Pessoa de Barros, 1974:41-46) support their contention
that television is not only an agent of secondary socia
lization, but that behind the overt concern for culture,
education and wholesome recreation, the real concern of the

Miceli*s insights on programming for the poor
are extremely revealing. These are aimed at the largest
audiences presumably in order to attract the largest pro
fits for the program sponsors. These are generally audi
torium programs with two basic characteristics. First is a
surrealist disproportion in style which is apparent both
in what is exhibited and in the way it is exhibited.
The
programs act as a showcase of the material goods of the
advanced sector of the Brazilian economy and the dispropor
tion lies in what is exhibited and the consumption power of
the impoverished audience.
In one of the more popular
programs aimed at the poor, the material wealth is exhibi
ted by an equally surreal male personage who might wear
a mini-skirt, Louis XVI boots, a ruff around his neck and
a pirate hat, who is generally surrounded by voluptuous
and largely naked female flesh.
Second, through the sur
realism, the social scale is inverted. Such programs
exhibit the extreme types of exclusion, misery and exploi
tation by the promotion of contests of misery, contests of
the grotesque, whereby the most miserable contestant (the
woman who has had mos£_children, the wpman who can peel
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powers that be is to substitute one world view for
another which conceals the facts and mechanisms of domi
nation more effectively (Miceli, 1974:250-1).
Populist imagery had entailed a clear class
hierarchy with fairly precise perceptions of the upper
and lower reaches of society.

The connection between

wealth and the potential for power or manipulation was
clearly present.

Among middle income people like the

Santana families, populism was based on face to face
relations between friends or relatives: the idiom which
informed clientelism and patronage was one of friendship.
While it denied class or status differences or inequalities
between friends or relatives (this of course was the myth
in populist rhetoric), it extended the social hierarchy to
its full ranges and created at least a context for various
kinds of political mobilization.

The politician may

have felt contempt for his electorate, but he spoke to it
as a friend and leader.

The wealthy relative may have

coconuts with her teeth, or who can eat pins and little
stones, the man with no hands who writes with his mouth,
etc.) becomes the most enviable. While the surrealist
treatment of these programs dedramatizes the extremes
of exploitation and poverty associated with associateddependent development, the contrasts and disproportions
are there and central to the programs. They are not so
at all in the "middle class culture" of soap operas
and other programs which are gradually replacing this
style of program (Miceli, 1972:218-24; Pessoa de Barros,
1974:139).
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felt contemptuous of public servants, but he spoke to
them as friends or relatives, as did upper level bureau
crats to lower level bureaucrats or bureaucrats to their
clients.

The "man in the middle," no matter how declasse

or unworthy or manipulated he may have felt himself to
be, drew on his inner resources, his own controle and
eauilifbrio in order to contornar (by-pass, smooth over,
avoid) these difficulties,

in order to maintain the idiom

of friendship, because it was in turn the basis from
which he could exert his own manipulatory efforts— it was
the basis of his luta. and it depended on a constant
readiness to make connections up and down the social scale.
The present a-political social hierarchy glosses
over the existence of the rich and the very poor and con
ceals power behind the slogans of "progress" and "protec
tion."

It blows up the middle range of society and empha

sizes "Todo mundo tem" (Everybody has . . . e due at ion, autos,
etc.) so that the poles of the social scale tend to become
invisible.

Connections are no longer made and, implicitly,

they should not be sought out.

The statements which have

been quoted here reflect the Santana families* increasing
marginalization from sources of power or influence which,
informants seem to imply, will ultimately threaten a loss
of wealth, their main criterion for mobility and achieve
ment.

No one savs

the redefinition from a populist hierar

chy to the present one is troublesome, but the data suggest
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the tensions involved in increasing isolation and help
lessness and the resulting development of a consciousness
of class which is inward turning and willfully blind to
society, and which is exacerbated by government manipula
tion of the media.
Finally, families like these no longer seem to
be part of the ,,classes,, in the two class model proposed
by Leeds (1965), but rather seem to be forming a consumer
and lubricatory— middle— class with cultural as well as
structural boundaries between them and other classes.
Historical changes over time have not only brought three
types of families of disparate origins to similar socio
economic positions; they have also made these three groups,
who in the past had recognized their separateness from
each other, and their different social and political
positions, come to share a set of ideas which places them
in Sao Paulo*s social structure and which defines them
as apart from either the "masses" or the "classes" of that
city.

While the rudiments of a similar set of ideas may

have been present among any of these middle income groups
previously, especially following periods of exclusion
from the "classes" (as for instance among the old Santana
elite), what suggests that such ideas might today be
considered as a developing consciousness of class is that
they are shared
sult of shared

by previously disparate groups as a r e 
changes in political relationships, or
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class standing.
Moreover, whereas some groups at different
times have been included in and used by the ruling
circles of the "classes," only aspects of their consciousness of class are useful to the present regime.

12

When

sane of these ideas are elaborated and propagated by
government controlled media they become instruments of
domination because by presenting a false vision of society
they make it difficult for anyone of any class to attempt
to change it.

12

The culture and class consciousness of the
poor have been frequently manipulated by groups in power
(see, for example, Gross, 1971). There is an interesting
contrast between a Peronist type of manipulation and the
present Brazilian development of a consciousness of
classe media.
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CHAPTER VI
MIDDLE SECTORS AND A MIDDLE CLASS
I have shown in this work how over the course
of seventy years the descendants of families of three
entirely different origins at the beginning of the
century have been brought to similar social, economic
and political positions.

I have argued that among fami

lies like these, a middle class may now be said to be de
veloping, as they are increasingly segregated both by
their own consciousness and by historical factors beyond
their control from classes above arid below them.

By

way of conclusions, this chapter will summarize what
has gone before and make general observations for future
research among middle income sectors.
The material resources of ninety families
residing

in Santana, Sao Paulo, Brazil were described

in Chapter I.

In terms of their standards of living,

families like these are extremely well off compared to
the rest of the city of Sao Paulo, although they are far
from bourgeois.

Most owned their own homes, were steadi

ly employed and either planned to send their children to
university or had already done so.

Besides their homes,

their property included rental houses, vacation houses,
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automobiles, televisions and other expensive consumer
durables.

Families like these belonged to the top 10.6

percent of listed recipients of incomes in Sao Paulo.
Socially and politically, they were increasingly
isolated from classes above and below them.

Most informants

believed that Sao Paulo was populated largely by people
like themselves, whereas the income distribution figures
for the city show clearly that this is not the case. Very
few among them have any contact at all with the truly rich
and powerful in Sao Paulo city, and although Santana is
surrounded by neighborhoods poorer than itself, very few
of these families have any contact with the poor beyond
that supplied by their servants.

There is hatred and

contempt for rich and poor alike, who, for different
reasons, are seen as lazy and thieving.

While many have

both poor and wealthy relatives, contacts

with these

are sparse and strained.
While they presently have little political
power or influence beyond the power of their ballots cast
in elections, this was not always the case.

By juxtapo

sing the careers of the Santana families against the poli
tical epochs Brazil has undergone since the beginning of
this century, it was shown that each of these epochs,
discussed in Chapter II, created different political and
economic opportunities for different families among them.
Thus, during the First Republic, when Brazil was a neo
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colonial country exporting primary products, local land
owning families became a local elite as a result of the
growth of Sao Paulo city and of the Paulista coffee poli
tics which dominated Brazilian national politics.

When

these politics ended in 1930, the Santana elite was
sheared off from ruling groups in Sao Paulo city and state:
their economic positions dwindled as they sold off their
capital base: some of their descendants joined anonymous
middle income sectors, others became downright poor.
The Vargas years stabilized the positions of
literate rural migrants and foreign immigrants in Santana.
With their move to the city, rural migrants had lost what
ever local power they had in their areas of origins.

The

trajectory of downward economic mobility which had been
theirs in the countryside was reversed by the centraliza
tion of the Vargas regime.

Through their employment in

bureaucracies, this potentially dissident group was rein
tegrated into the new political system and contributed
to the state's increasing control over other groups of the
population.

In this respect, Vargas's bureaucracies

divided middle income groups just as his labor policies
split labor groups, while linking them to the central
state ^paratus.
Indirectly, the social stability of bureaucrats
contributed to the development of a varied commercial
center in Santana which was dominated by foreign immi
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grants or their descendants.

These had been present in

Santana since the previous century but had simply provi
ded ballot fodder for the local elite during the First
Republic.

During the Vargas years they laid the founda

tions for populist access to government influence through
their friendships with the bureaucrats.
The Santana bureaucrats acted as intermediaries
for the non-bureaucrats during the war years and after.
However, during the populist years, their efforts in this
respect also served to promote their own careers and to
increase their own prestige.

With electoral populism

clientelistic networks expanded up and down the social
scale, and while none of these public servants ever
reached positions of direct influence on policy,

I sugges

ted that their indirect influence, in conjunction with
that of all other bureaucrats in Sao Paulo and throughout
the nation, may have been considerable.
With the advent of transnational domination of
the economy under a military dictatorship, clientiLism,
corruption and informal influence has sharply decreased
among the Santana families.

Their loss of influence and

their increasing social isolation from groups above and
below them has led to a sense of malaise, tension and
fear and frequently

an overt disinterest in politics.

All appeared to support the military government as pro
tector against the demands of the poor and exploitation
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by the rich, but government itself was entirely out of
their control or influence.

The loss of the material

benefits of populism, especially in conjunction with inflatiorijmay have adverse consequences on their economic status.
This may have been partly compensated for by the extension
of consumer credit lines, which allow many families like
these to have almost anything that can be purchased, but
which also exchanges political influence as a measure of
status for life style and poder consumidor (the power to
consume) as a measure of status.
All three groups have undergone a process of
redefinition as the nation readjusted itself to a new
phase of capitalist development.

Whereas in the past,

there were differences between the three groups as regards
access to political and economic resources, they are now
all defined as consumers.

Although the Santana families

participate in defining themselves this way, they are
defined as consumers largely by the large corporations
and market research companies, on whose sales much of
Brazil's economic growth depends.

This is why there is

such an emphasis in the Brazilian media, whose time and
space is bought by such companies, on concepts such as
Classe A. 3, C, etc., which define groups with specific
abilities to consume.

The government participates in

this definition because it encourages this kind of econo
mic development and because it wishes to depoliticize
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middle income groups which had previously been part of
the "classes."

Wealthier Brazilians participate in the

redefinition of previous relatives and clients because
they no longer need them.

Many of them have become classe

media themselves, distinguished only by their superior
poder consumidor. rather than their superior proximity to
power or influence.
Among the elite at the top of the hill, political
decline preceded

economic decline.

to say definitely what will happen

While it is too soon
to the descendants of

immigrants and bureaucrats, the possibility of economic
decline is recognized by some.

As a result, all three

groups share an emerging sense of consciousness of middle
class as distinct from classes above and below them.

Un

like other class consciousnesses, an important aspect of
this consciousness is the inaccuracy of its vision of
society.
know.

Indeed, some informants simply didn't want to

Chapter V explored the logic behind this willful

blindness and suggested ways in which the government's
control of the media manipulates it to its own advantage.
There are two salient characteristics of the
Santana family histories.

Families like these have play

ed an increasingly passive role in Brazil's political
process.

Among the three groups discussed, the old elite

at the top of the hill controlled the most political
resources: because of their electoral control of Santana
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they formed a distinct group which controlled Santana
directly in the interests of the dominant Partido Reoublicano Paulista during the First Republic and they were
linked by kinship and fictive kinship to Sao Paulo's oli
garchy.

With the reintroduction of elections during the

populist period, the bureaucrats greatly enhanced their
situations, but theirs was an an order of influence which
was considerably smaller than that of the old elite.
They did not form a distinct group.

Instead they formed

networks and panelinhas which were extensions of the net
works and panelinhas of more powerful groupse

Non-bureau

crats participated in the populist game, but they did
not control the kinds of resources that were potentially
available to bureaucrats.
We have seen that the political relations each
of these groups has maintained with groups above and
below them have changed over time.

Periodically, one or

another of them have been included in the ruling “classes"
while others remained among, or returned to the “masses"
of working class or middle income people.

At present,

and we need not belabor the point, most of the families
are increasingly disconnected from sources of power or
influence in Sao Paulo.
Economically, families like these have not
held the initiative in Brazil*s development, and over
time their resources have decreased.

Among the three

groups, the old elite at the top of the hill again con
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trolled more than the immigrants or bureaucrats, but
all three have in the past had access if not to strategic
resources— rcoffee, industry, finance--to resources which
permitted them to generate money, at least for a time,
no matter how they spent it (urban real estate, commerce,
loans at negative interest rates).

Regardless of

decline, none of the three groups ever stood at the
polar extremes of income distribution during the periods
we

have considered.

economic power.

They were never at the apex of

They were simply there, pushed and

shoved by economic forces over which they had no control:
the initiatives in Brazil's economic development were
taken by more powerful groups in response to changes
in the world and national economies.

The economic func

tions of families like the Santana families were limited
to those Leeds has called "lubrieatory:"
The making effective of transactions involving the
strategic resources of society; the implementation
and exchanges of resources including money; collec
tion of information, transmission of knowledge; the
processing of information for ultimate users (1973::
53).
When applied to families like these, expectations that
a middle class might take the initiative in the develop
ment process towards modernization are clearly inappro
priate and misleading and should be decently laid to
rest.
The data suggests that the lack of political
influence or economic initiative translates in a complex
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way into economic vulnerability— or potential vulnerability.
The potential fluidity of inclusion or exclusion into the
“classes” and the implications thereof are

suggested by the

fact that while most informants regarded their personal
histories as success stories, what most informants seem to
fear above all is downward mobility, even while they are at
the height of their economic and political powers.

“Sao

que^o.miQfra.,,tijbajarafflS,j-g£a d»agua,pa.,cabe.pa“ (1
don*t want my daughter to carry cans of water on her head),
a patriarch from the top of the hill is alleged to have
said, thus recognizing a possibility that his descendants
might live in a favela without running water. And indeed,
the research among elite families and bureaucratic families
suggests that there might be a relation between political
marginalization and economic decline.
The dialectic of inclusion and exclusion of
middle income families into the “classes” may lead us to
reconsider the meaning and implication of social mobility
for families like the Santana families when their careers
are placed in historical context.

Over the long run,

careers which informants consider modest success stories
have the quality of survival rather than social mobility,.
Among the Santana families interviewed there was only
one frequently cited local myth of an ascent from rags
to riches:* most tales of mobility reflect not only

*One immigrant (whom 1 was not able to interview)
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different stages in informants* life cycles but political
and economic developments in Brazil.

Hutchinson (1960:10)

has already noted that upward economic mobility in Brazil
resulted from structural changes in the Brazilian economy
which created more highly paying positions.^

Indeed, this

is supported by the early histories of bureaucratic and
immigrant families, although it does not account for the
high rate of downward economic mobility among the relatives
of the elite families interviewed.

The quality of survi

val may arise from the fact that in order to remain in a
"middle income" standard of living during the transitions
which have periodically redefined groups among them from
the sources of power or influence,

Santana's families have

had to consume more, have more education, more of various
status criteria than did their fathers (See Hutchinson,
1960:204; lutaka, 1962, 1963).
These observations raise more general ones on
the nature and functions of middle income sectors and
the development of a middle class in Brazil.

The

dialectic of inclusion and exclusion of middle income

was allegedly able to transform an animal based transpor
tation company at the turn of the century into a world
wide moving and storage enterprise fifty years later.
^Hutchinson contrasts "structural mobility" to
that in which individuals circulate to positions in the
population "in accord with their individual capacities"
(1960:10).
It is highly doubtful that this degree of
mobility can exist by definition in a capitalist society
(See Leeds, 1973:52).
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groups which we have seen in the Santana histories
suggests that the “class/mass" dichotomy may have been
more fluid over time than we previously supposed, and
that middle Income sectors have acted as political as
well as economic ,,reserves,, or “ lubricators."

If this

is true, then we can perhaps speak of the manipulation
of middle income groups like the Integralists or like
the populist bureaucrats for the political ends of more
powerful interests.

It is possible that over time, the

exclusion or incorporation of middle income sectors into
ruling groups may operate like Wallerstein*s formula for
semi peripheral countries in world economic systems.
These systems, he argues, must have three layered struc
tures :
The existence of the third (middle) category means
precisely that the upper stratum is not faced with
the unified opposition of all the others because the
middle stratum is both exploited and exploiter.
It
follows that the specific economic role is not all
that important, and has thus changed through the
various historical stages of the modern world system
(1974:405).3
If these ideas and the analysis of the Santana
histories are correct,

it is possible that middle class

•*See also Simmel (1964:59-61) on the social
“magic1' of the number three:
“The appearance of the third
party indicates transition, conciliation and the abandon
ment of absolute contrast." He believes that the third
party introduces “objectivity" which serves towards recon
ciliation.
With regard to a three layered income struc
ture in capitalist societies, we would maintain that in
general the third party prevents objectification.
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formation is a far longer and less defined process than
we have thought and that there should be no "illusion of
finality" (Bury, 1920:351) when the process does begin.
The Santana histories show that before a middle class
can emerge, there must be middle income sectors.

Often

as not, in the Santana case, political considerations
created the economic circumstances for the expansion of
middle income s e c t o r s T h a t

is, the expansion of state

services, state control for political reasons entirely
unrelated to the lives of people like those in Santana
generated a need for increased goods and services.

If the

analysis of immigrant employment in the first four decades
of the century presented in Chapter IV is correct, this

^This may be so in dependent countries; see
Soares (1969) on "premature bureaucratization"in dependent
countries.
In England, for instance, the economy had
generated middle income sectors who participated in the
formation of the English working class consciousness and
political intransigence. The formation of a middle
class, however, was no less political than in Brazil.
E. P. Thompson describes the concern of the ruling class
to "associate the middle w ith the higher orders of so
ciety in the love and support of the institutions and
government of the country" (1964:817). Accordingly, before
the passage of the great Reform Bill which extended the
suffrage in 1832, the government undertook a massive
survey to discover the "numbers and respectability of
£ 10 householders in Leeds." The results stated "una
nimously that the c£l0
qualification did not admit to
the ,exercise of the elective franchise a single person
who might not safely and wisely be enfranchised; that
they were surprised to find how few would be allowed to
vote." "'We foresaw,1■ wrote a commentator on the Reform
Bill, " that its effect would be to detach from the working
classes a large portion of the middle ranks, who were then
more inclined to act with the people than with the aris
tocracy which excluded them.'" Thompson comments that what
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process is particularly clear in the development of
Santana's immigrant commercial center.

This, as we have

seen (Chapter IV, p p . 190-6 ) may have been indirectly
affected by Vargas's centralization policies: the growth
of bureaucracies and the large number of bureaucrats
migrating to Santana in the 1930»s provided a stable and
growing market for immigrant commercial concerns.
If the process of class formation is as fluid
and

vacillating as we suggest, how do we know that a

middle class is emerging in Sao Paulo?

One approach

is to examine the development of class consciousness as
we did

in Chapter V.

There it was pointed out that

informants harbored latent feelings of resentment and
fear towards those above and below them in the social
order and that those feelings, even if they obscured the
realities of social structure, contributed to a sense
of

boundaries between them and others.
However, because of the oscillating situation of

middle income sectors in general, we can assume that a
set of ideas similar to these will always be present among
some marginalised groups at any point in time.

Literature

the researcher had done was to “offer a definition of class
of almost arithmetical exactitude.
In 1832 the line was
drawn in social consciousness by the franchise qualifi
cation with the crudity of an indelible pencil” (1964:
817-21).
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from other times and places is rich with pertinent exam
ples in which marginalization and ideologies of resentment
are closely related.

Recent studies of witchcraft accusa

tions are a case in point.^
What is special about the Santana histories is
that they show how middle income sectors of diverse origins
and experience have come to share ideas such that the ideas
themselves transcend the particularistic experiences of any
given sector and apply in a general way to middle groups
as a whole.

Their shared ideas reflect differences in

their structural positions: that is previously distinct
groups have been assigned new functions, namely the
underwriting of Brazilian development by consumption and
by the lubrication of the administrative system for ratio
nal growth of transnational production.

This suggests

that a middle class which is distinct from "classes'1 or
"masses" or middle income sectors

within them, only

It might be interesting in this connection, to
re-examine the periodic outbursts of witchcraft in Europe
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. MacFarlane's (1970) study of witchcraft in Essex, England, is
especially revealing of the way in which the incidence of
witchcraft accusations arose as a function of the redefi
nition of the local class structure in response to natio
nal economic development.
It was not the poor who were
a problem.
"They could be whipped and sent on their way,
or hired as laborers.
It was the slightly less affluent
neighbors or kin who demanded only a little help, who
became an increasing source of anxiety" (1975:205)— and
who were regularly burned as witches.
See also Bendarsky
(1970) on the Salem witch craze, which also followed a
period of redefinition of political and economic status.
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begins to emerge when the nation*s political and economic
resources are vastly increased and vastly concentrated.^
It would be interesting to inquire whether a middle class
might not also be in the process of definition in other
dependent countries which have become staging areas for
manufacturing by transnational corporations.
As we have said earlier, however, there should
be no illusion of finality

about these developments,

because as we have seen in Chapter 11, the political
considerations which created middle income sectors and
defined a middle class in Santana, often arose in res
ponse to changes in the nation*s position in the world
economy.

As the latter develops, the process could be

reversed.

See footnote 4 above.
Jane Schneider (personal
communication) raises the question of the relationship
of middle class formation to imperium.
Empire needs
consumers and ideologues. Modernization theorists are
cast in an interesting light from this perspective.
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Appendix I: Sub-Districts of 3ao Paulo, ranked according
Pooulation

Area

Income

1. Tucuruvi
317,219

1. Sto. Amaro
11,472.2

1. Jardim America
1,308.74

2. V. Nova
Cachoeirinha
313,615

2. Butanta
4,680.3

2. Consolacao
1,132.63

3. Pirituba
3,248.4

3. Cerqueira Cesar
1,127.24

4. V. Prudente
3,214.0

4. J. Paulista
1,094.42

5. Tucuruvr
3,187.9

5. Pinheiros
1,040.36

6. Ibirapuera
2,775.1

6. V. Mariana
986.25

7. Capela do
Socorro
2,687.2

7. Perdizes
913.35

3. V. Prudente
313,064
4. Tatuape
252,927
5. Saude
220,743
6. Sto. Amaro
218,293
7. Santana
166.049
8. Ipiranga
165,049
9. Alto da Mooca
146,927

8. Tatuape’
2,354.8
9. Santana
2,106.7

10. Jabaquara
144,606

10. V. Katilde
2,093.5

11. Fenha
138,974

11. Saude
2,033.0

12. V. Katilde
128,366

12. Lapa
1,989.2

13. V. Maria
119,990

13. Ipiranga
1,620.0

14. Butanta
119,195

14. Jabaquara
1,431.3

15. Lapa
119.013

15. Brazilandia
1,345.4

8. Aclimacao
892.00
9. Sta. Cecilia
839.19
10. Indianopolis
830.44
11. Bela Vista
823.81
12. Cambuci
609'. 24
13. Ibirapuera
802.10
14. Liberdade
794.53
15. Sta. Sfieenia
727.00

i population, area,
No. Autos
oer 100 people
1. Cerqueira
Cesar
133.76
2. Jardim America
38.19
3. Pinheiros
29.13
4. Consolacao
20.80 4
5. J. Paulista
16.82
6. Perdizes
16.01
7. Sta. Cecilia
15.43
8. V. Mariana
15.04
9. India.noDolis
14.59
10. Ibirapuera
14.20
11. Kooca
13.90
12. Barra Funda
13.36
13. Pari
12.74
14. Cambuci
12.73
15. Bela Vista
12.32
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rding to population, area, average

family income, professions and students
Industrial
Workers

Service
Workers

Primar;
Studen'

1. Mooca
50,431

1. Se
83,527

1. Tuci
40,

2. Consolaca”o
9,469
d

2. Belemzinho
46,891

2. Consolacao
54,629 1

2. V. ;
39.

3. Sta. Efigenia
7,729

3. Lapa
46,580

3. Sta. Efigenia
39,784

3. Sto
34,

4„ Liberdade
7,668

4. Braz
35,098

4. Sta. Cecilia
20,457

4. Tat
30,

5. V. Mariana
5,608

5. Ipiranga
29,640

5. Braz
16,204

5. Sau
23,

6. Perdizes
16.01

6. Cerqueira
Cesar
4,570

6. Tatuap/
28,664

6. Liberdade
13,023

6. Sar
23,

7. Sta. Cecilia
15.43

7. Jardim America
4,225

7. Sto. Amaro
27,450

7. Ipiranga
12,118

7. Ibi
19,

8. V. Mariana
15.04

8. sela vista
3,161

8. V. Prudente
17,864

8. Mooca
11,901

8. Ip:
18,

9. Alto da Mooca
17,144

9. Bela Vista
10,341

No. Autos
per 100 people
1. Cerqueira
Cesar
133.76
2. Jardim America
38.19
3. Pinheiros
29.13
4. Consolacao
20.80 d
5. J. Paulista
16.82

Public
S^rvSQts
19,698

9. Indianooolis
14.59
10. Ibirapuera
14.20

sta. Cecilia
2,794

11. Mooca
13.90

II. Tucuruvi
2,564

12. Barra Funda
13.36

12. Saude
2,343

14. Cambuci
12.73

14. Alto d a
2,281

15. Bela Vista
12.32

15. Tatuaoe
2,224

10. Ibirapuera
16,166

10. Saude
10,099

11. Barra Funda
16,026

11. Jardim America 11. No
do
9,094
15
12. Tatuape'
12. A1
8,216
14
13. Pinheiros
13. La
8,213
14
14. Cerqueira
14. V.
Cesar
14
7,247

12. Cambuci
15,498

13. Sto. Amaro
2,343
Mooca

9. Bui
17
10. Pe:
16

13. Bom Retiro
12,047
14. Saude
10,696
15. Liberdade
10,158

15. Lapa
7,228
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amily income, professions and studenCs
Industrial
Workers

Service
Workers

Primary
Students

Total
Students

1. Mooca
50,431

1. Se
83,527

1. Tucuruvi
40,140

1. Tucuruvi"
50,888

.a^ao

2. Belemzinho
46,891

2. Consolacao
54,629 1

2. V. Prudente
39.338

2. V. Prudente
40,260

:figenia

3. Lapa
46,580

3. Sta. Efigenia
39,784

3. Sto. Amaro
34,349

3. Tatuape'
39,188
4. Sto. Amaro
39,081

iade

4. Braz
35,098

4. Sta. Cecilia
20,457

4. Tatuap/
30,866

•iana

5. Ipiranga
29,640

5. Braz
16,204

5. Saude
23,199

5. Santana
33,981

iira

6. Tatuap^
28,664

6. Liberdade
13,023

6. Santana
23,132

6. Ipiranga
32,206

7. Sto. Amaro
27,450

7. Ipiranga
12,118

7. Ibirapuera
19,594

7, Saude
31,442

8. Mooca
11,901

8. Ipiranga
18,650

8. Consolacao
31,012 7

9. Bela Vista
10,341

9. Butanta
17,178

9. Lapa
25,980

i America
'ista

8. V. Prudente
17,864
9. Alto da Mooca
17,144

la
lecilia

10. Ibirapuera
16,166

10. Saude
10,099

10. Penha
16,555

10. Penha
22,566

IV 3.

LI. Barra Funda
16,026

11. Jardim America
9,094

11. i\ossa Sra.
do O'
15.849

11. Alto da Mooca
20,958

12. Cambuci
15,498

12. Tatuape'
8,216

imaro

13. Bom Retiro
12,047

13. p inheir os
8,213

ia M o o c a

14. Saude
10,696

14. Cerqueira
Cesar
7,247

se

15. Liberdade
10,168

15. Lapa
7,228

12. Alto da Mooca
14.849

12. Nossa Sra.
do 0
20,673

13. Lapa
14,449

13. V. Mariana
19,723

14. V. Matilde
14.101

14. Braz
19,652

15. Jabaquara
13,414

15. Ibirapuera
31,060
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No. Autos
per 100 people

Public
Servants

Industrial
Workers

Service
Workers

16. Lapa
12.00

16. Bom Retiro
2,115

16. V. Mariana
9,987

16. Alto da Mooca
6,349

17. Belemzinho
11.79

17. Braz
2,080

17. Pari
9,239

17. Perdizes
5,974

18. Liberdade
11.26

18. Perdizes
1,983

18. Tucuruvi
8,986

18. Penha
5,895

19. Aclimacao
10.62

19. Lapa
1,876

19. Sta. Ef igenia
8,306

19. Sto. Amaro
5,658

20. Sta. £figenia
10.44

20. Ipiranga
1,858

20. Sta. Cecilia
8,254

20. Vila Maria
4,767

21. V. Madalena
9.31

21. Mooca
1,750

21. Santana
8,025

21. V. Prudente
4,345

22. Bom Retiro
8.60

22. Butanta'
1,636

22. Vila Maria
7,517

22. V. Mariana
4,018

23. Saude
8.32

23. V. Prudente
1,583

23. Indianopolis
7,165

23. Barra Funda
3,896

24. Ipiranga
8.25

24. Pinheiros
1,550

24. Perdizes
7,029

24. J. Paulista
3,379

25. Alto da Mooca
7.88

25, V. Guilherme
1,485

25. Capela do
Socorro
5,827

25. Tucuruvi
3,870

26. Santana
7.27

26. Ibirapuera
1,443

27. ButantaT
6.77

27. Cambuci
1,168

28. Tatuape
6.70

28. Jabaquara
1,138

29. Sto. Amaro
6.63
30. Se
5.97
31. Braz
5.80

29. J. Paulista
1,001
30. Penha
883
31. Pirituba
830

26. J. Paulista
5,817
27. Nossa Sra.
do 0'
5,767
28. Consolacao
5,629 c
29. Jabaquara
5,128
30. Penha
4,727

26. Belemzinho
3,793
27. aom «.etiro
3,666
28. Cambuci
3, 5fc2
29. Santana
3,240
30. Butanta'
3,023
31. Ibirapuera
2,400
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Service
Workers

Population

16. Alto da Mooca
6,349

16. Ibirapuera
110,406

16. Vila Maria
1,138.9

16. V. Madalena
684.60

17. Perdizes
5,974

17. Nossa Sra.
do O'
105,090

17. Nossa Sra.
do O'
1,099.4

17. Mooca
662.31

17.

18. Se'
635.90

13.

19. Saude
626.32

19.

20. Bom Rstiro
676.24

20.

IS.
Efigenia

Penha
5.695

6

19. Sto. Amaro
5.655

Cecilia
4

20. Vila Maria
4,767
21. V. Prudente
4,345
22. V. Mariana
4,018

nopolis

23. Barra Funda
3.695
24. J. Paulista
3,379

a do
ro

25. Tucuruvi
3,870

1
.llista

26. Belemzinho
3,793

1
Sra.

7

27. oom Aetiro
3.656
28. Cambuci
3,582

Lacao

Je

29. Santana
3,240

aara
30. Butanta
3,023
31. Ibirapuera
2,400

Area

18. Perdizes
101,841

IS.

19. Casa Verde
93,279

19. Penha
999.0

20. J. Paulista
87 1361

20. Canga£ba
902.5

21. V. Mariana
87,172

21. Jaragua
854.9

22. V. Formosa
86,452

Alto da Mooca
1,095.1

22. J. Paulista
845.2

23. Firituba
77,035

23. Casa Verde
753.4

24. Liberdade
70,751

24. Perdizes
739.7

25. Limao
64,597

25. Indianopolis
726.3

26. Indianapolis
64,045
27. Sta. Cecilia
64,044

26. Pinheiros
717.1
27. V. Formosa
716.8

Incsme

23.

Brazilandia
61,448

28. Mooca
714.8
29. V. Mariana
612.0

30. Belemzinho
57,670

30. Limao
596.0

31. Braz
57,529

31. Barra Funda
576a

16.

21. Barra Funda
675.06

21

.

22. Parr
622.11

22

.

23. Lapa
615.72

23.

24. Braz
563.13

24.

25. Belemzinho
566.46

25.

26. Ipiranga
530.81

26.

27. Santana
514.24

27.

23.

29. Bela Vista
59,421

Pri
Stu

Tatuaoe'
502.42

23.

29. Alto da Mooca
501.20
29.
30. Sto. Amaro
486.69
30.
31. Jabaquara
470.94
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Area

Income

Primary
Students

Total
Students

birapuera
10,406

16., Vila Maria
1,138.9

16. V. Kadalena
684.60

16. V. Formosa
12,163

16. Butanta
19,085

ossa Sra.
o O''
05,090

17., Nossa Sra.
do O'
1,099.4

17. Mooca
662.31

17. Casa Verde
11,853

17. Mooca
18,551

erdizes
01,841

18., Alto da Mooca
1,095.1

18. Se'
635.90

18. Pirituba
11,313

18. Casa Verde
18,132

asa Verde
93,279

19., Penha
999.0

. Paulista
87,361

20., Cangaiba
902.5

. Mariana
87,172

21., Jaragua
854.9

. Formosa
86,452

22., J. Paulista
845.2

irituba
77,035

23., Casa Verde
753.4

.iberdade
70,751

24., Perdizes
739.7

,imao
64,597

25., Indianopolis
726.3

nd ianopolis
64,045

26., Pinheiros
717.1

ta. Cecilia
64,044
srazilandia
61,448
Jela Vista
59,421

27., V. Formosa
716.8
28., Mooca
714.8
29,, V. Mariana
612.0

Selemzinho
57,670

30., Limao
596.0

5raz
57,529

31., Barra Funda
576= I

19. Saude
626.32

19. Vila Maria
11,099

19. Perdizes
17,987

20. Bom Retiro
676.24

20. Capela do
Socorro
9,504

20. V. Matilde
17,428

21. Barra Funda
675.06
22. Pari
622.11
23. Lapa
616.72
24. Braz
563.13
25. Belemzinho
566.46
26. Ipiranga
530.81
27. Santana
514.24
28. Tatuaoe'
502.42
29. Alto da Mooca
501.20
30. Sto. Amaro
486.69
31. Jabaquara
470.94

21. Perdizes
9,275

21. Sta. Cecilia
17.425

22. V. Mariana
8,745

22. Cerqueira
Cesar
16.085

23. J. Paulista
8,380

23 J. Paulista
14,677

24. V. Guilherme
8,333

24. Jabaquara
14,400

25. Consolacao
7,198 e

25. Pirituba
14,187

26. Mooca
7,027

26. Vila Maria
13,562

27. Limao
7,017

27. Libordads
13,492

28. Cerqueira
Cesar
6,599

28. V, Formosa
13,210

29. Jaragua
6,148
30. Canaaiba
6,064

29. Jardim America
11,556
30. Capela do
S ocorro
10,729
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Area

Population
32.

V. Guilherme
54,570

income

32. Belemzinho
560.8

V. Guilherme
450.25

No. Autos
per 100 people
32. Capela do
Socorro
5.60

33. Mooca
54,544

33. Jardim America 33. Butanta
550.7
431.89

34. Consolacao
54,113

34. V. Guilherme
548.3

34.

35. Cangaiba
52,262

35. Consolacao
408.5

35. Capela do
Socorro
405.14

35. Jabaquara
4.36

36. Cambuci
50,851

36. oraz
384.6

36. Casa Verde
387.11

36. Limao
4.72

37. Cerqueira
Cesar
44,819

37. Cambuci
361.8

38. Jaragua’
43,147
39. Capela do
Socorro
39,751
40. Sta. Efigenia
37,360

38. Liberdade
342.4

43. Pari
33,648
44. Pinheiros
32,423
45. Barra Funda
30,803

34. Jaragua
4.94

Vila Maria
384.26

37. Casa Verde
4.57

38. V. Prudente
365.55

38. Vila xaria
4.46

39. V. Madalena
326.3

39.

39. Penha
4.34

40. Cerqueira
Cesar
322.4

40. Jarasua
“342.06

40. V. Frudente
4.30

41.

Pari
279.3

41. V. Matilde
330.38

41. Tucuruvi
3.91

42.

Bela Vista
270.0

42. Tucuruvi
339.12

42. Nossa Sra.
do C"
3.73

43. Nossa Sra.
do O'
334.04

43. Pirituba
3.46

44. Pirituba
329.61

44. Cangaiba
3.25

4b. V. Formosa
326.64

45. V. Formosa
3.10

41. Aclimacao
37,005
42. V. Madalena
35,184

33. V. Guilherme
5.36

43. Sta. Efigenia
261.2
44. Sta. Cecilia
248.8
45. Vila Nova
Cachoeirinha
243.2

46. Jardim America 46. Aclimajao
201.4
29,469

Cangaiba
306.23
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Guilherme
450.25
itanta
431.89

No. Autos
per 100 people

Public
Servants

industrial
Workers

service
Workers

32. Capela do
Socorro
5.60

32. 3elemzinho
320

31. Cerqueira
Cesar
4,714

32. Jabaauara
2,309

3

33. Pari
1,757

3

34. indianopolis
1,717

3

35. Casa Verde
1.665

3-

36. ». Guilherme
1,463

3:

37. V. Matilde
1,414

3(

33.

3;

33. V. Guilherme
5.36

33. Casa Verde
77o

32. V. Guilherme
3,936

34. Jarasua
4.94

34. Nossa ora.
do O'
776

33. Se^
3,877

ipela do
>corro
405.14

35. Jabaquara
4.36

35. barra Funda
749

34. Jardim America
3,632

isa Verde
387.11

36. Lima*o
4.72

36. v. .-iatilde
634

35. Jaraaua
3,410

.la Maria
384.26

37. Casa Verde
4.57

37. Vila .\aria
624

35.

Prudente
365.55

38. Vila Karia
4.46

33.

37. Bela Vista
3,217

39. Penha
4.34

39. Indianopolis
501

38. V. Formosa
3,074

39. Nossa Sra.
do o'
1,203

40. V. Frudente
4.30

40. V. Formosa
429

39. Casa Verde
3,040

40. V. Formosa
775

41. Tucuruvi
3.91

41. Capela do
Socorro
396

40. Limao
2,272

41. Capela do
Socorro
770

4]

42. Aclimacao
673

42

43. Pirituba
673

42

Matilde
330.38
icuruvi
339.12

Par£
610

42. Nossa Sra.
do C"
3.73

42. V. Madalena
369

43. Pirituba
3.46

43. Limao
309

>ssa Sra.

> O'
334.04
rituba
329.61
Formosa
326.64
ngaiba
306.23

44. Cangaiba
3.25
45. V. Formosa
3.10

44. Cangaiba
265
45. Aclimacao
226
46. Braziliandia
138

ri.nneiros
3,309

41. Pirituba
1,497
42. Butanta
1,473
43. V. Matilde
1,179
44. Aclimacao
l,079c
45. Cangaiba
714

Cangaiba
1,255

44. Brazilandia
554
45. Limao
409
46. Jaragua

46. V. Madalena
618
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3?
4(

s,
emzinho
20

industrial
Workers
31. Cerqueira
Cesar
4,714

a Verde
75

32. v. Guilherme
3,936

sa jra.

C'
76

33. 5er
3,877

ra Funda
49

34. Jardim America
3,632

;\atilde
,34

35. Jarasua
3,410

.a -aria
,24

32. Jabaauara
2,309

31. Indianopolis
5,942

31. Se'
10,627

33. Pari
1,767

32. Cambuci
5,709

32. Cambucif
9,775

34. Indianopolis
1,717

33. Jardim America 33. Indianopolis
9,521
5,690

35. Casa Verde
1,665

34. Sta. Cecilia
5,553

34. V. Guilherme
9,520

36. ». Guilherme
1,463

35. Braz
5,513

35. Belemzinho
9,111

37. V. Matilde
1,414

36. Belemzinho
5,031

36. Pinheiros
8,710

38. Cangaiba
1,255

37. 3razilandia
4,676

37. Limao
8,267

38. V . Madeie na
4,647

38. Sta. Efigenia
7,995

39. P inheir os
4,551

39. V. Madalena
7,117

40. Liberdade
4,156

40. Cangaiba
6,994

-£

37. Bela Vista
3,217

lianopolis
iO l

38. V. Formosa
3,074

39. Nossa Sra.
do O
1,203

Formosa
1-29

39. Casa Verde
3,040

40. V. Formosa
775

>ela do
:orro
596

40. Limao
2,272

41. Capela do
Socorro
770

,10

Madalena
369
nab

41. Pirituba
1,497
42. Butanta
1,473

309
igaiba

43. V. Matilde
1,179

165
Limacab
226 ?
aziliandia
138

44. Aclimacao
l,079c
45. Cangaiba
714

Total
Studfrgts

Service
Workers

41. Sta. Ffieenia
3,745

41. Jaragua
6,148

42. Aclimacao
673

42. Pari
2,720

42.

43. Pirituba
673

43. Bom. Retiro
2,126

43. Brazilandia
4,676

44. Brazilandia
554

44. Bela Vista
1,643

44. Pari
4,131

45. Limao
409

45. Vila Nova
Cachoeirinha
1,529

45. 5arra Funda
3,753

46.

46. V. Madalena
618

Aclim.apac
1,508'

40m

Retiro
5,349

46. Bela Vista
3,019
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Area.
47. Bom Retiro
25,092
6,751

Income

j. Autos
per 100 people

Bom Retiro
201.0

47. Brazilandia
302.43

47. Brazilandi
1.35

Se"

48. Vila Nova
Cachoeirinha
296.00

45. Vila 1*ova
Cachoe iri:
.16

96.4

Source: Adapted from nochtief, Montreal, DeConsult (1970:20,
47, 213-25).
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le
ihdia
43
>va
jrinha
00

>io. Autos
per 100people
47. brazilandia
1.35
45. Vila Nova
Cachoe ir inha
.16

rublic
Servants

industrial
.Workers

Service
jorkegs

47. Jaragua
122

47. erazilandia
312

47. VJ. kaealena
357

4c * Vila Nova
Cachoe irir.ha
^2

v ila .<ova
Cacnoeiri.nna
56

—

vila ..ova
Cachoe irinna
12

It (1970:20,
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.ic
rants

in r iu s tr ia l

Jaragua
122

17.

Vila :.ova
Cachoe irir. ha

62

service

Prirrarv
Students

Total
Students

17.

v. h s e a l e r a

17. oarra funda

17. oclimacao
2,013r

v ila
.o va
C achoe ir in n a

1 . Se

'lowers
o r a z ila n d ia

1,197
193

15. Vila Vova
Cachoeirinha
1,361
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Appendix II.

Currency Conversion Table

Cruzeiros to
the dollar

1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952-1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

19.64
19.63
19.57
19.50
18.72
18.72
18.72
18.72
18.72
18.72
18.72

18.72-180.00
variable between
1951-1963

180.00-623.00
1610.00

2200.00
2200.00
3.22*
3.83
4.35
4.95
5 635
6]215

6.22
6.885

* In 1967 the Cruzeiro was devalued, and the New
Cruzeiro introduced.
Sources: Bidwell (1970:60-4), Pick (1974).
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Appendix III.
I.

Household composition, property and incomes of Santana
families interviewed, 1972-1973

Household composition
Family
£&•

No. with
incomes over
total in faro.

Adult
Husb. Wife Minors child.

Other

Maid
Maid
UvgrlQ

lQ£gEaa.-..aS£* 1.500.00-2.GOO.00
1.
2,
3.

4.
5.

6.

In c o m e s :

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

2/2
2/6
4/9
2/4
2/6
1/1

-

y
y
y

/
y
/
/

y

3

i

-

y

2

y

-

-

Moy
DaL
Mo/,A
2S/,Nc
S/,3Bro/
Mo
"

-

-

:

:

•

-

No/,Nf
•
Mo/
•
2S//
*

.
•
1
•
1
•
I
"

i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
■

GdD
-

1
1
1

•

NCr. -2Jj>8Q.«Qfirft»QPQ,*99
1/3
2/3
3/4
1/5
1/2
1/3
2/3
1/2
1/5
2/4
5/6
3/5
2/2
1/4
1/5
2/2
1/1
2/3
1/2
3/4

/

•

y
y

•

y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y

/
y
y
/
/

y
y

/
/

y
y

/

y

/
/

•

y

y
y
y

y

/
/

1
3
2
1
3
2
1
1
2
2
1

/
//
«
-

yy
yy
-

y

-

y

4.000.00-6.000.00
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

3/5

/

2/5
1/2
3/3
2/4
3/3
2/7
4/4

y
y
y
y

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

1/4
3/3
2/3
1/6
1/3
2/2

1/2

y
y
y
y
/

y
y

/
/
/

y
y
y
y
y

1
-

-

yy

3
-

2
-

/

y

-

/

y

-

2

y
/
/
/

yy
yy

4
-

-

-

yy
y
-

y
-

•
•

Mo,S
2Bro/y
Nc. ✓

1

•
•
*

1
•

2
1
-

1
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Family
No.

No. with
incomes over
total in fam.

Adult
Wife Minors child.

-Other

Maid
Live-in

Maid
Day

0. Incomes: NCr. 6.000.00-8.000.00
1/5
3 /6
2/2
1/4
4 /5
2 /4
1/3
3 /4
2 /6
1/4
2/3
2/5
1/2
2/2
1/2
1/2

4 2.
43.
44.
45.
46.
4 7.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y

y
y
y

/
/

3
i
2
1
2
1
1
3
2
lad.
2
-

/
/

-

/
/
/
/
/

2
2

/
/
y
/

y
y
/

y
/
/

y

y

-

.
yy
-

.
-

y

Ay

-

y

y
/

y

-

-

i
2
1
1
1
1
“

E. Incomes; NCr. 8.000.00-10.000.00
2/3
1/3
1/4
1/5
3/8

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

2/2
3/6
3/6

tasw- W r.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

1/2

y
y
y
y

1/4
1/4
2/3
1/3
1/4
1/4

y
y
y
y
y

2/4

2/6
3/5

/

1

: NCr,
76.
77.

.
i

y

/

-

Mo

yy

-

/
/

2nf s
2gr

yy
y

Moy

/
/
/
/
/
/

M*8C

y
y
y

y

4
-

-

-

i
i
i
i

l9.999.99-«afiSPaflg

o
o
o
o
0

f.

y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y

1/2
2/4

y
/
/
/

3

1
-

2
2
1
1
2
2

-

•
-

No/<$)
-

-

o
o
o
o
o

58.

y
y

/

_

y

2

/
/

3
-

•

*

"

NCr. 14.000.00-16.000.00
78.
79.

1/5
2/4

y
y

-

-
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Family
No.

No. with
incomes over
tqtaJ.Jlfl.fW.

Adult
Husb. Wife Minors child.

Other

Maid
Day
Live-in Maid

I. Incomes: NCr^ 16.000.00-18.000.00
80.
81.
82.

2/4
1/4
5/8

JJJ

J. Incomes: NCr. 18.000.0Q-20.000.00 (0)
K. Incomes: NCr. 20.000.00 *
83.
84.
85.

1/2
3/5
5/6

.
87.

5/6
2/3

86

H5

1/3

Mo j
2Bro/v/

v/7

Mo/Bro/
cousin

/

Notes
•
•
-

"No. with income over total" excludes domestic servants, but does
include their dependent children.
"Minors" includes smallchildren, be they grandchildren, adopted,
or maid's children, aswell asuniversity students whocontribute
nothing to their support.
"Day Maid" is a deepest ic worker employed between one or three days
a week.
Mb - Mother
paL - daughter in Law
A - aunt
S - sister
Nc - niece
Nf - nephew
Bro - brother
GdD - god daughter
M'sc - maid's child
Gr - grandchildren
ad - adopted
/ - present
V - has an income
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II.

Proparties sad nature of incomes.

INCOMES

*
Family g

Productiv

!

Non-Product ive

NCr. 1.500.00-2.000.Ot

1.
2

-

-

3.
4.
5.

-

/

.

1

6.

-

carp.shop.
*

inher
inher

plot of land

house

BNH

-B. Incomes; NCr. 2.000.00-4.OQQ.00
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.

-

.

o
_

1
1
•
1
1
2
1
1
•
1

-

a

/
• apt,hs,str
a
a house
- apt
/
/ 3hs,2str
a

/

•

*
a
•
a
a

-

-

-

4houses
2hcuses
a

3houses

inher
CE
inher

a
a
•

inher
inher
ni
inher
BNH

plot,house
a

plot,house
-

a
•
-

•
•

houses
a
a

bot
bot
bot
bot

a

house,plots
2houses
building
plot of land

-

/

inher
inher
inher

-

/

CE

/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

CE
CE
bot
CE
bot
bot
inher
inher
inher Id CE
FP
FP
bot
-

plot

C. Incomes: NCr. 4.Q0Q.QQ-6.QQQJ3.Q
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

I
1
2
2
1
1
4
1
1
2
1
1
1

1
•
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

/ 2stores
*
/
/ house,store
a

a
a

store

/

•

house.plot
house,plot
house
house

store,apt
m

•
a

*
*

_

.
.
-

3house8
•
plot “

3
2
1
1
2
1
2
3
1
1
-

1

1

/
•

~

•

-

2
-

2

“
•

•

-

a

3
1

/
“
-

1
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ISalaries

DWELLINGS
s
Family >
No. ^
1

3
-

a

“

Productive

Fori-Prgdusnyg

-

houses

house

/ inher
/ FP

-

2

-

/

0. Incomes; NCr. 6.000.00-8.000.00
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

1
3
3
1
1
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
2

1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1

-

-

-

2apts
•
- 2houses
• house
/ 3houses
/
/ 2houses
-»
- 2houses
/ 2apts
•
• offices
/ 2hs,2apt
/

2housas
house
2houses
plot
plot
“

/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

inher
inher
bot
BNH
inher
CE
ni
inher

/ CE
/
/
/
/

CE
bot
inher
CE

/
/
/
/
/

FP
bot
bot
bot
BNH

E. Incomes: 8.000.00-10.000.00
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

4
2
2
3
2
2
1
2

1
1
3
2
2
1
1
1

/
/
/
/
/

/

.
3houses
2houses
house
2strs,2apts
apt,8tr»hs
-

apartment
house
hs,aptfplot
3houses
5plots
apartment
house

_

-

-

/

/ CE
/ CE

-

1
1
1
1
3
2
3
2

F. Incomes: 10.000.00-12.000.00
66.

3

2

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

3
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
1

1
1
•
1
1
1
1
1
1

.

/ CE

-

/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

2hs,str,apt house
development
house
• properties
house»4plots
/ house
- house
/ fazenda.plots
house
- apartments
house
/ 2h8,apt

-

/

CE
bot
CE
inher
bot
bot
bot
inher

G. Incomes: 12.000.00-14.000.00
76.
77.

4
1

2
2

_

/

7houses
apartimnt

2houses
-

t bot
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O O

.

Family > •» u
No. h < m productive

»
Noa-frflflttfitlVg

.

h

u

o
!2

•
1

iSalaries

PROPERTIES

ni
inher

-

1
2

-

/
/

-

2
1
4

-

/
/

.
-

1
3
5

1
1

H. Incomesi NCr. 14.000.00-16.000.00
78.
79.

3
2

I
2

/

house
2carp, shops
8 houses

-

/
/

2plots

/ inher
/ni
/ CE

plot
plots

/
/
/

inher
FP
inher

apt,4plot8
apt,plots
2apts,plot
apt,plots

/
/
/
/

CE
ni
CE
inher

I. Incomes: NCr. 16.000.00^18.000.00
80.
81.
82.

3
4
3

2 - 3has, apt s
2 3 / apt.bldg.

83.
84.
85.

1
1
1

2

1

-

3

“

86.
87.
88.
89.

2 2 3 2

3
1

3
1

/

.

houses
4apts
8has,parking
lot
2apts,house
store.apts
hss,bar,apts
30houses
garage

2plots

*

.
-

4
2
1
1

.
1
-

90.**

Notes
** The ninetieth family was added fear convenience.
- ni - no information
- carp.shop. - carpentry shop.
- inher - inherited.
- hs, hss - house, houses.
- bot - bought or built.
- CE - Caixa Economics.
- FP - Forpa Publics*a Caixa Beneficiente.
« apt - apartment.
• str - store.
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Appendix IV.
A.

Supplements to Chapter IV.

Meu avb veio no tempo de Dom Pedro.
Veio por x
falta de, trabalho no Tyrol. Veio fazer America. A vo
tava gra'vida com minha mae, a unica brasileira.
Dom
Pedro vinha na casa do vo, pegava a mae no colo, fazia
bouquet de flores . . • Ele veio com dinheiro de La'.
O^avo recebeu um terrene na ccicnia e comprou uma porpao de lotes, enormes e quadrados, aqul, em Cambucx,
Casa Verde, muitos lugares.
Plantavam milho, uva, feijao, cafe'; faziam
cadeiras empalhadas do brejo e iam a pe' vender ^na Prapa
da Se. Depois de dezoito anos de Brasil foi la com
os filhos visitar a terra dele.
0 vo tinhaj:anto dinheiro que punha no sol
numa peneira pra nao mofar. Ele guardava o dinheiro
no chapeuv A gente ia a missa descalpo por causa da
lama, e so' calpava na igreja.
Ele chegava la descalpo,
suado, e tirava o chapeu e o pessoal dava dinheiro
pensando que era mendigo.
Poderia ser milionario, mas perdeu_tudo.
Ele
morreu na gripe de 1 9 1 8 Era forte, mas nao tinha
remedio pra dar. A vo' nao entendia portugues, ficou
desorientada sozinha com os filhos. Foi vendendo, e
muito foi roubado, grilado. Diziam que era por falta
de pagar imposto, mas eram todos canalhas.
^A mae e as tias casaram. A mae casou com um
portugues. Tinham gado leiteiro, burros, tinham empregados, m a s era tudo no terreno da minha vo^ e ela
foi vendendo e perdendo.
Justipa. Sao todos urns
canalhas.
Gastamos um dinheirao. Minha tia ja velha,
escreveu pro Getulio.
Eu tinha recxbos dos lotes e
fui procurar o engenheiro que fez as plantas. ^Um
desgracado.
Eu mostrei os recxbos dos lotes e ele
viu que eu reconhecia os lotes. Dax, ele enrolou as
plantas e nao me deixou mais ver. Ele escondeu as
plantas.
Gracas a Deus nao faltou nada. Ate que o
filho da minha irma, hoje e catedratico na faculdade
de medecina.
Eu ja tou velha. Mas nos, aqux, so
temos a casa.
My grandfather came in Dom Pedro's time.

He
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left the Tyrol because there wasn't enough work.
He came to do "America.'1 My grandmother was pregnant
with my mother, the only Brazilian. Dom Pedro came
to my grandfather's house, would take my mother on
his lap, they would make bouquets of flowers . . .
They came with money from there. My grandfather got
a plot in the colony and bought other plots, big and
square ones here, in Cambuci, in Casa Verde, in many
places.
They planted corn, grapes, beans^and coffee;
they made caned chairs from the marsh grasses, and
went on foot to sell them at the Praja da Se ^center
of town/. After eighteen years in Brazil, he returned
with his children to visit his own land.
My grandfather had so much money he would put
it in the sun in a sieve so it wouldn't mildew.
He
kept his money in his hat.
We would go to church
barefoot because of the mud, and only put our shoes
on in church.
He would get there barefoot and sweaty
and when he'd take his hat off, people gave him money
thinking he was a beggar.
He could have been a millionaire, but every
thing was lost. He died in the epidemic of 1918.
He
was strong, but there wasn't any medecine to give him.
My grandmother didn't understand Portuguese and she
became disoriented alone with the children. She
started selling, and much was stolen or lost to squat
ters. They said it was for lack of paying taxes, but
they were all cads.
Mother and the aunts married. M y mother
married a portuguese. They had dairy cattle, donkeys,
employees, but it was all on my grandmother's land
and she was selling and losing it. Justice, They are
all cads.
We spent a fortune.
When my aunt was old
she wrote a letter to Getulio.
I had the receipts for
the lots /the grandfather had bought7 and I went to
see the engineer who did the survey. He was a disgrace
--I showed him the receipts for the lots and he saw
that I recognized the plots and he rolled up the
survey and wouldn't let me see it again.
He hid the
survey maps.
Thank heavens we didn't lack for anything. My
sister's son is even a tenured professor at the medical
school.
But we, here, all we have is the house.
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B.

A chegada em Sab Paulo e uma lembranga triste.
Senti os deslocamentos da cidadezinha pra Sab Paulo,
e depois soubs que era uma coisa penosa.
Nos localizamos em Santana porque era um bairro atrasado, pruma
casa pequena e escura e triste, apertados em dois
quartos.
£ isso depois de uma dessas casas grandes
do interior. As distrapoes era de olhar da janela,
sentar na porta, e aos poucos entrar em contato com
os vizinhos.
No interior ter£amos mais facilidade
pra ter relacoes com familias de nossa posipac^. . ,
no interior serfamos a elite da cidade. Em Sao Paulo
ficamos marginalizados da vida social do bairro e
da cidade, salvo no que a igreja permitia.
The arrival in Sao Paulo is a sad memory.
I
felt the dislocation from a small town to Sao Paulo,
and later I discovered it was a sad thing for the
family. We moved to Santana because it was a backward
neighborhood, to a small, dark and sad house, squeezed
into two rooms. This after one of those big houses
of the interior. The distractions were to look out
the window, sit on the door step and slowly make
contact with the neighbors.
In the interior we would
have had greater facility in having relations with
families of our position.
In the interior, we would
have been the elite of the town.
In Sao Paulo we were
marginalized from the social life of the neighborhood
and the city, except for those contacts permitted by
the church.

C.

Eu fui muito mimado.
Os pais me deram o
estudo, terminei o gina'sio, mas foi com sacrificio.
Moravamos numa pensao em frente do colegio la" no centro. Eu nao sabia o que^queria ser. A minha oppao
para a corporapao foi a ultima.
Queria ser dentista,
mas nao pude estudar. _Fui trabalhar no Banco de _
Credit© Real, mais a£ nao tinha future. Minha funpao
era muito simples, e nao tinha condipoes pra seguir
carreira. Pagava mal, e nao gostava desse tipo de
servipo. J?iz uma porpao de coisas. Os tios deram
uma infiuencia pra entrar na For pa. Eu achava que
nao tinha condicoes pra outra coisa. Foi por necessidade.
0 comepo nao foi facil. Quando eu entrei, ja'
era tudo passado, a raiva do povo contra a Forpa
Publica: depois de '32 houve um desprezo, mas com o
tempo tudo se esqueceu. Dentro da corporacao as
portas estavam abertas para o sucesso. Tive m uito f
apoio dos comandantes e dos companheiros, e retribui.
Dentro da corporapao ha muita uniao, a propria funpao
exige, obriga ajudar o outro.
E'comum um oficial
tirar o servico do outro pra ajudar.
Tambem tem o
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Hospital Militar pro soldado e os familiares, a Cruz
Azul, a Caixa Beneficiente, com contribuipoes mensais
para as viuvas e dependentes. 0 fardamento, a comida,
tudo por conta do estado.
Na epcca, era bom caminho
pro^sucesso. Hoje sou Coronel. Minhas crianpas
terao melhores chance na vida do que eu. Eu posso
pagar os estudos.
I was very spoiled. My parents gave me my
studies. I finished highschool, but it was a sacrifice
for them. We lived in a rooming house in front of the
school in the center of the city.
I didn't know what
I wanted to be. My choice for the corporation was the
last.
I wanted to be a dentist, but I couldn't go to
school.
1 went to work at the Banco de Credito Real
/a bank/, but there was no future there. My job was
too simple, and it didn't offer opportunities for a
career.
It paid badly and I didn't like that kind of
work.
I did a bunch of things. My uncles influenced
me to join the Forca Publica. I didn't think that I
would have a chance at other things.
I joined from
necessity. The beginning wasn't easy. When I joined,
it was all in the past, the rage of the people against
the Forca Publica. They were held in contempt after
'32, but with time, everything was forgotten.
In the
corporation the doors were open to success.
I had a
lot of support from the commanding officers and my
companions and I returned it. There is a lot of unity
in the corporation, our jobs demand it.
It is very
common for an officer to take another man's job to
help him out.
Besides, there is the Military Hospital
for the soldier and his relatives, the Blue Cross,
the Caixa Beneficiente. with monthly contributions for
widows and dependents.
Uniforms, food, everything
paid for by the state. At the time, it was a good road
to success. Today I am a Colonel. My children will
have better chances in life than I.
I can pay for
their studies.
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Appendix V.
A.

Supplements to Chapter V.

0 comedo nao foi facil. Meu irmao casou, e eu
fiquei mantendo mamae e Januaria. Fazia datilografia,
e fui ganhar quinhentos mil reis numa firma Americana,
Ninguem deu nada, Ficou so os quinhentos cruzeiros,
Eu gostava de namorar, tomar sorvete, danpar, mas
fiquei mantendo mamae, Ja conhecia o Roberto que diz,
"Os dois scmos pobres, nab ternos despesa, nada, vamos
casar." Os irmaos nao deram nada,
Kao tive enxoval,
Daij/ieram os filhos, e ele cuidou de nos, Januaria^
mamae e a mae dele can setecentos cruzeiros,
Eu nao
trabalhei maisv Foi uma vida dura e controlada. A
casa pequena la perto do quartel, entrava chuva.
Era
uma luta muito grande.
The beginning wasn't easy. My brother married
and I was left to support mother and Januaria /a sis
terJ.
I was a typist at an American firm and I earned
five hundred cruzeiros.
I liked to flirt, go out for
ice cream, to dance, but I had to support mother.
I
already knew Robert, who said, "We are both poor, we
have no expenses, nothing.
Let's get married." The
brothers didn't give us a thing.
I didn't have a dow
ry. Then the children came and he took care of us,
Januaria, mother and his mother, all with seven hundred
cruzeiros /that he earned7.
1 didn't work anymore.
It was a hard and controlled life. A small house near
the /Forca Publica/ headquarters, the roof leaked.
It
was a very great struggle.
Agora eles estao bem, tern patrimonio, os
filhos estab educados, tudo isso.x Mas foi uma luta.
viu. Me lembro que o Coronel ia a pe* pro quartel
pra ter dinheiro pra comprar leite para as crianpas.
Now, they are well off, they have property for
their children to inherit, their children are all edu
cated and all that.
But it was a struggle, see.
I
remember when the Coronel walked to work so as to have
money to buy milk for the children.
_
,Ce ve, tou com tres crianpas, todos na escola,
e nao da, nao da mesmo, sem grande controle. mandar
pra escola, comprar as roupas, os materials escolares,
nao da mesmo.
You see, I have three children, all in school,
and I can't, I really can't, without a great deal of
control, manage to send them to school, buy their
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clothes, their school equipment,
B.

I really can't.

The following is drawn from field notes.
We walked down an alley to the
seamstress's
house and D. Chica pointed out the house of a friend
who had been so happy when her daughter graduated
from Normal School that she got diabetes and died
from it.
“Mas, D. Chica, sera que e possivel receber diabetes
de,alegria?"
^
"£ sim. Ela ficou tao alegre pensando que essa parte
da vida dela tava acabando que logo ficou com diabete .“
“Eu acharia o contrario , que quando a gente ta triste
a 1 que tern mais chance de ficar doente."
"De jeito algum.
Qualquer excesso pode matar, dar
doen^a, tudo^aquilo.
Olha, minha filha, eu conheco
gente que ate pode morrer de felicidade.
De tristeza,
ninguem morre.
Quando a pessoa ta meia chumbada, e
a£ que ela pensa com cuidado o que vai fa z e r ^ m a s
nessa euforia a pessoa nao pensa bem no que ta fazenda.
Por isso que voce ve tanta mocidade morrendo por ai s
sao felizes, eufbricos, e al, minha filha, voce ve,
ne, morre num desastre, num acidente. Por isso mesmo
que falei que a felicidade mata.
S, meu vizinho que
tava morando na casa nove era um rapaz, um orfao,
lutou pra ter sucesso.
Dal, ele casou com a namorada,
que tava namorando desde
os treze anos, arrumou^a
casa bem, ajudou fazer os doces, mandou fazer tres
ternos no Sr. Jandiro, meu vizinho do outro lado que
era alfaiate— ele nao queria sair de lua de mel e
voltar pra bagun^a nenhuma. Dal, ele casou, tava
na maior alegria, e logo que desceu do onibus, pos
o pe do onibus em Pocos ,de Caldas, onde iam passar lua
de mel, caiu morto. Ate que o^nebico,de la faiou pro
irmao que era isso mesmo.
Entab ce ta vendo, ne?
0 sofrimento cansa, mas o que mata e a felicidade."
"But D. Chica, is it possible to get diabetes from
happiness?"
"Yes, she was so happy thinking that that part of her
life was over that she soon got diabetes."
"I would have thought the contrary, that one might be
more likely to get sick when one was unhappy."
"Absolutely not. Any excess can kill, give diseases,
all of that. Look, my dear, I know people who can
even die of happiness.
No one dies of sadness. When
the person is sort of leaden /depressed?, that's when
he thinks carefully of what to do, but in that euphoria,
people don't think carefully about what they are doing.
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That's why you see so many young people dying, they are
happy* euphoric, and then, my dear, you see, don't you,
they die in an accident, a disaster. That's precisely
why I said that happiness can kill. Yes, my neighbor
who was living in the house number nine was a young
man, an orphan, he struggled to be successful, he and
his brothers, and he did succeed. Then he married his
girl friend whom he had been seeing since he was thir
teen years old. He fixed the house up nicely, helped
make the sweets/for the wedding7, had three suits
made by Sr. Jandiro, my neighbor on the other side, who
was a tailor.
He didn't want to go on his honeymoon
and return to any mess. So he got married and was in
the greatest happiness.
But as soon as he got off the
bus, put his foot on the ground of Popos de Caldas
/a resort/ where they were going to spend their honey
moon, he fell dead.
Even the doctor from there told
his brother that that's what it was /that he died of
happiness/.
So you understand, don't you.. Suffering
is exhausting, but happiness kills.
C.

Aqux estudei, casei-me.
Aive filhos, que em
Deus espero, terao melhores dias que os meus.
Here I studied, I married.
I had children,
who, God willing, will have better days than mine.
Quando era rapaz, nao podia encostar em carro,
nem com um dedo. Agora tudo mundo tern carro.
a car.

When I was a boy, I couldn't dream of having
Now everyone has a car.

Todos melhoraram de vida, todos nossos amigos,
mesmo os filhos de sapateiro, a Julia Turca, os
filhos estudaram, estao otimos.
Everyone has improved their lives, all of
our friends, even the children of the shoemaker, Julia
Turk's children went to school, they are all very
well off.
Hoje nos, a classe media, esta estabilizada,
tem renda boa pra viver, estudar. A baixa que vive
de teinozLa, e a alta de fazer o dinheiro rolar.
Today we, the middle class, are stabilized,
it has a good income to live on, to study with.
It's
the lower class that lives off shrewdness, and the
upper off income.
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D.

Hoje em dia ter carro e casa nao e luxo. Quem
depende de horario tem de ter carro.
Vajo os onibus
passar lotados, e nao pode. Quase tudo mundo da classe
media tem casa, e depois o carro e a regra. A casa,
o BNH facilita os pagamentos.
Nowadays, to have a house and a car is no
luxury. Those who must meet schedules have to have a
car.
1 see the busses pass full to capacity and
you can't depend on them. Almost everyone of the
middle class has a house, and after that, getting a
car is the rule. The BNH /National Housing Bank/
facilitates payments for a house.
Vivendo todos os dias, a gente ve o Me£ro, os
viadutos, a sujeira, tudo isso e progresso. £ um corre
corre danado, o transito ta' imprevisivel, dificulta
demais, me irrita, me atrapalha, mas o Brasil vai
ter um futuro.
On a daily basis, we can see the Metro, the
viaducts, the dirt, all this is progress.
It is a rat
race, traffic is unpredictable, it makes life compli
cated, it irritates me, but Brazil will have a future.
0 futuro do Brasil ta muito bonito. Sou
muito trasileira demais. Eu acho que o brasileiro vai
ter muito que falar neste mundo.
0 progresso ta de
mais.
The future of Brazil is lovely.
I am very
fgvo] Brazilian. I think Brazilians will have a lot
to say in this world. This progress is too much.
Alem dos jornais e das notieias, eu sentx o
progresso, o creseimento, porque viajei bast ant a na
Policia Florestal.
Nab e so na cidade, nao, Todo o
interior cresceu, as estradas, f a « uldades novas,
estao todos no interior.
Em So rocaba nab tinha nada,
poucas ruas asfaltadas, terreno baldio, <jhacaras.
Agora tem escola, as ruas iluminadas, predio^grande.
0 creseimento trouxe um futuro garantido.
Nao queremos
ser potencia guerreira.
Queremos# ajudar os outros
paises,
0 Brasil agora ajuda a A'frica, a Bolivia;
o Brasil e conhecido agora como na^ao, e nao como
terra do samba.
Besides from the newspapers and TV news, I
know about progress and growth because I travelled a

R eprod u ced w ith perm issio n o f the co p yrigh t owner. F u rthe r re p rod u ction p rohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

337
lot with the Forestry Police.
It is not only in the
cities. The whole interior has grown, with highways,
new universities, these are all in the interior.
In
Sorrocaba there was nothing, a few paved roads, aban
doned lots, truck farms. Now there are schools,
lighted streets, skyscrapers.
Growth has brought us
a guaranteed future. We don't want to be a warlike
power. We want to help other countries.
Brazil now
helps Africa, Bolivia; Brazil is now known as a nation
and not as the land of the samba.
Tudo mundo tem melhorado, tem casa e carro.
Eu acho que car. ambi^ac a gente va^i se meiherar em
tudo, emprego, casa, estudo.
E so olhar em volta
mesmo, olha como Santana ta. Antigamente, Santana
,
nao tinha predio de apartamento fino. 0 progresso ta
demais.
Everyone has improved, has a house, has a
car.
I think that with ambition, people will improve
in everything, in their jobs, their houses, their
studies.
You just have to look around you: see what
Santana has become.
In the old days Santana didn't
have fine apartment houses. Progress is too much.

r
E.

E a classe media que mais sofre.
Nao quer
descer e nao pode se comparar com os ricos e os seus
privilegios. Fica expremida entre o desejo de ser e
as dificuldades de conseguir.
The middle class suffers most.
It doesn't
want to fall /Into the lower clas§7 and it cannot
compare itself with the rich and their privileges.
It is squeezed between the desire to be and the diffi
culties of achieving.
A classe media e justamente a classe do sanduiehe
que sofre mais. 0 rico tem ttd<* o pobre nada.
The middle class is precisely the class of the
sandwich which suffers most.
The rich have everything,
the poor nothing.
E a nossa classe media que sofre demais.
Nao
quero que mude nada, nab, porque se mudar, so muda pro
pior.
It is our middle class which suffers most.
I
don't want anything to change, because changes are all
for the worst.
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0 rico e uma imundice, e o pobre e sujeira,
A classe media e o repcsitorio disso tudo, e e a classe
media que sofre mais.
The rich are filth and the poor are dirt. The
middle
class is the recipient for all this, and it is
the middle class which suffers most,
F,

A semana passada fomos grum jantar muito jalegante na casa do irmao do meu sogro. Me senti pessima,
insignificante, nao podia conversar das viagems que
tinha feito, e so tinha o yestido feito pela
costureira, sem joias nsihunia; e uma vida muito futil, viu.
Essa gente nao faz nada.
Last week we went to a very elegant dinner at
my father in law's brother's house.
I felt awful,
insignificant, I couldn't speak of the trips I had
taken, and I only had the dress made by the seamstress,
without any jewels; it is a very futile life, see.
Those people don't do a thing.
✓
X
Eu tenho uma prima jjue e rica.
0 marido e
medico, ate que tem projepao. Levam uma vida social
bem mais intensa, assim, a cl£nica rende muito.
0
casamento da^filha foi um espetaculo. Mais eu nao^
vejo muito nao. Moram longe, no Jardim Europa, tab
sempre fora, e ficam as meninas pequenas com as empregadas. Tem de telefonar pra ver se tab em casa.
Tivemos no casamento da filha, mas . . .
1 have a cousin who is rich.
Her husband, a
doctor, is actually quite well known. They lead a much
more intense social life, his clinic makes a lot of
money.
His daughter's wedding was a /magnificent/
spectacle.
But I don't see them often. They live far
away in Jardim Europa [a neighborhood in Sao Paulo/,
they are always out, and only the little girls and
the maids are home. You have to phone and see if they
will be home. We were at the daughter's wedding, but
^ y Nao sei bem como e que ele ficou rico. Meu
irmao e muito transeiro, ele fiea la com a turma dele.
Levamos com certa reserva. Ce ve, em vinte anos de
casamento, a semana passada foi a primeira vez que
ele convidou pra jantar. Sei la, deve ser porque
voces sao americanos.
I don't know how he made his money. My bro
ther is a wheeler-dealer and he stays with his own
friends /in another wealthier neighborhood/• We
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take him with a bit of reserve.
You see, in the
twenty years we've been married, last week was the
first time he asked us to dinner.
I don't know, it
must be because you are Americans.
G.

Infelizmente, com o^progresso os baixos sobem
assim.
Nos somos de tradipao, uma famllia de estudiop
sos. Os tios eram escritores, nao ficaram ricos.
Nao
e'c-omo a classe baixa qua so come banana e pode ficar
rico.
Filhos de imigrantes nao tern de ligar.
Unfortunately with progress, the low ones come
up like that.
We are of tradition, a family of studious
people. The uncles were writers, they weren't rich.
It is not like the lower class that only eats bananas
and can became rich, the sons of immigrants who don't
have to care.
Agora a classe baixa^esta estudando, ce ve os
deputados brigando, j>orque sao filhos de verdureiro,
tern cultura, mais nao e^de Jjer^o. Hoje urn casamento
com medico, advogado, ja na o e muito, tern tanta
gentinha.
Podem ter berpo muito humilde.
E bom de
convidar, ai ee ve como ele senta, mastiga, usa garfo,
e a£ nao precisa os pais implicar. A mo^a ve sozinha.
Now the lower class is studying, you see the
deputies fighting because they are the children of
green grocers. They have culture, but it's not from
the cradle. Today a marriage with a lawyer or a
doctor isn't much because there are so many little
people around. They could have had very humble origins.
It's a good thing to invite them /prospective sons in
law7 and then you can see how he sits, chews, uses a
fork, and then the parents don't have to say a thing.
The girl can see for herself.
These distinctions are made even within close
ly knit families: the following is abridged from my
field notes.
On D. Claudia's birthday all of her children
and grandchildren came to celebrate it with her at
lunchtime.
In the evening neighbors and associates
from her husband's bureaucracy would drop by to con
gratulate her and drink port out of the colored wine
glasses in the breakfront. Lunch was not such a for
mal occasion.
Each of her daughters in law had brought
a dessert, and the table was laden with food: a roast,
cus-cus, rice, beans, macaroni, roast potatoes, roast
chicken, condiments, fruit and various sweets. There
were children everywhere. There was no room to seat
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everyone at the table* The men sat around the table,
the children took their plates to the coffee tables
and the women, after everyone was served, sat in the
living room area. After lunch one of the sons in law
took a niece on his knee and proposed that she invest
some of her allowance in a calf. He explained why
it was a good investment. He would buy the calf for
X NCr., raise it for her for free on his farm, and
then sell it when it was grown for 6X NCr,
It was
clearly a good deal, and the little girl, about ten
years old, was excited. She asked her parents if she
could accept it, and they had no objections. Her
mother, who had gone to the bank before lunch, passed
her some money under the table. The uncle saw and
said, "Oh, no, it has to be your money, not your
parents* money." He insisted that she should go to
her bank and draw on her savings account. The little
girl wanted to, but her parents would not let her miss
afternoon school. The uncle said he would wait for
her at the train station the next morning at eight
o'clock, and if she could get the money to him before
he returned to his farm, the deal was on,
1 knew that this was a large and affectionate
family, and that the uncle and the girl's father were
good friends.
I was curious about the insistence by
the uncle on keeping the parents' money out of the
deal and on the child using her own money, although it
was clearly inconvenient
for her to get to the bank
before eight in the morning.
I asked D. Claudia why
he was being so difficult.
She leaned over and said
softly:
Ce ve, minha filha, ale esta fazendo certo, insistindo que negocio cada urn faz por si mesmo, que
ate parente pode aproveitar, _ Mas e diferente
da nossa classe media: nos nab temos o espirito
comercial. Nos damos muito mais importantia aos
estudos do que ao espirito comercial. Sao imigrantes, fizeram fortune a base do comercio.
Nos nao,
Atingimos o nosso nivel de cultura por estudo, e
o meu filho faz bem de nao deixar ela faltar aula.
You see, my dear, he is doing the right thing,
insisting that business one does for one's self,
and that even relatives can take advantage.
But it
is different with our middle class: we don't have
the commercial spirit. We give much more importance
to studies than to the commercial spirit. They are
immigrants, they made their fortune on the basis of
commerce. Not us. We have attained our level of
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culture through studiousness, and my son is
quite right not to let her skip school.
H,

0 dinheiro ate que cria problems. Teve o,
caso de uma lavadeira de Goias, ee entende, nao e
que lavava roupa, s'que era pobre. Ela ganhou na
loteria, ate que trouxe maleficio pra ela. Teve de
aprender a fazer sala, usar garfo . . .
Money can even create problems. There was
the case of the washerwoman from Goias, you understand,
itfe not that she literally washed clothes, ids that
she was poor. She won the lottery and it brought
ill fortune.
She had to learn how to make polite
conversation, to use a fork . . .
Ah, se corrompe o dinheiro. Mem cunhado era
um canalha, mais^a inteligencia dele foi corrompida
pelo dinheiro. Ele era corretor de cambio, lidava
com o dinheiro dos outros, de grandes banqueiros. ,
Tinha o vxcio de mulheres. Elas exploravam ele ate
o ultimo fio do cabelo. Como ele era mulherengo,
fazia agiotagem ilicita, parou na cadeia varias
vezes, e trocava de mulher como a gente troca de roupa.
Vendeu o terreno do filho quando arrumou outra mulher,
uma casada, con o marido canalhao que sabia^ e pedia
dinheiro. Deu um apartamanto Luis X V pra mae dela,
um a^ougue pro irmdo, e uma casa pra ela.
E pro
filho, vendeu o terreno e deixou o nome sujo. Ele
se suicidou. Tava pra ir para^a cadeia outra vez,
por falsifica^ao, e se matou la no escritorio. Quando
chegaram la, estava jogado como u m cao. Usou formicida
com soda caustica.
So tinha sangue. Se sofreu, raereceu, e merecia sofrer maisi
Ah, does money corrupt. My brother in law
was a scoundrel, his intelligence was corrupted by
money. He was an exchange broker, he dealt with
other people*s money, great bankers. He had the
vice of women, and they exploited him to the last
hair on his head. Since he was a womanizer, he did
illegal speculating, he went to jail several times,
and changed women the w ay we change clothes. He sold
his son's land when he got another woman, a married
woman, with a rogue for a husband, who knew and asked
for money.
He gave a Louis X V apartment to her mother,
a butcher shop to her brother and a house to her. To
his son he left a dirty name, and sold his inheritance.
He killed himself.
He was going to jail again for
forgery and he killed himself at the office. When
they arrived, there he was, thrown like a dog. He
used fermicid® and caustic soda. There was blood all
over.
If he suffered, he deserved it, and he deserved
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to suffer morel
Todos os problemas desse casamento vem da
bondade^do Luis. £le achou que devia dar d inheiro^
pra esposa, que ela nao devia pedir. Fez jum casarao
pra ela, deu um livro de cheque, e veja so, nam dorme
junto com o marido.
Nao a de se esperar que um homem
desses vai se contentar com as quatro parades.
All the problems in that marriage come from
Luis's goodness, **e felt that he should give his wife
money, that she should* have to ask. He made her a huge
house, gave her a check bock, and imagine, she doesn't
even sleep w ith her husband.
One can't expect a man
like that to be content with the four walls.
Hoje em dia ta desquitando de mais, A £ entra
a independencia monetaria da mulher.
Elas podem fazer,
ter casa; o que que vai prender ao homem?^ So se tiver
q, espirito religiose, de abnegaqao, de mae, M a s i s s o
e raro. Essa questao de dinheiro e um perigo, viu.
Ahere are too many divorces today. Here the
financial independence of women is important. They
can have or build their houses; what will keep them
with the man? Only if they have a religious spirit,
a spirit of abnegation, of motherhood.
But that is
rare. This matter of money is dangerous, see,
I.

Esse Tio foi capitalists:

nunca fez nada.

That uncle was a capitalist:
anything.

he never did

A classe rica se interessa mais^ no dinheiro
do que no sen$imento. V|.ve a vida e nao auer, saber.
Enxergam a vida de maneira aiferente.
Eu nao podia
sair . . . sao mais esclarecidos.
The rich class is more interested in money
than in sentiment.
It lives its life and doesn't
want to know. They see life in a different way.
I
wouldn't be able to participate . . . they are more
enlightened.
^
Ce pode entrar em contato com pessoas que sao
tao ricas, e que, nao tem nada pra dar, nera um sorriso.
Quantas vezes ta numa reuniab, eu via que pessoas se
pegava com cqisas tao insignificantes, com a parte
material.
Nao podem entender o que seja uma vida, o
que faz uma fam£lia.
Nao sabem dar o tratamento
certo pro marido, veem marido como uma maquina de
dinheiro.
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You can come into contact with persons who
are so rich and have nothing to give, not even a
smile. How many times you might be at a meeting, 1
would see that people were attached to such insignficant things, with the material part. They cannot
understand what a life is, what a family does. They
don't know how to treat husbands correctly, they see
husbands as money machines.
Considero rica uma pessoa que vive so' de
rendimento. ^ Enquanto que a gente tern de trabalhar pra
viver, nao e rico nao, ne. A gente tern conforto,
mas o dia que parar de trabalhar, vai indo pra traz.
Eles tern tana vida social muito intensa. Parece que
diminuiu muito. Antes era so recep^ao, por qualquer
motive, ate ^ro anivers£rio do cachorrinho.
E uma
vida muito futil. Mais diminuiu com o accrete do
imp os to de renda, que o Governo fica de olho pra quern
dar festas assim.
I consider rich a person who lives only off
income, that doesn't have to work and who lives well.
While we have to work, we aren't rich. We are comfor
table, but the day we stop working we slip backwards.
They have a very intense social life.
It seems it
has diminished a lot.
Before, it was always receptions
for any reason, even for their lap dog's birthday. A
very futile life.
But it has diminished with the
income tax decree, because the government keeps an eye
on people who give that sort of party.
Existe uma dist incpao grande nas convivencias
das faixas culturais. A gente procure conviver na
mesma faixa cultural.
Se fossemos milionarios, e
q u i z e s s e ,penetrar nessa classe rica, nab terxamos
chance: ja e outra conversa, outra maneira de conduta
social . . . Se forj?ra encontrar? Haveria um atrito,
a classe superior nao se deixaria involver.^ Nos
encaramos a vida com mais realismo. Eles sao bem
mais voluveis, contam piadas diferentes, tcmam liberdades com os maridos dos outros.
Nos damos formaqao
mais solida aos filhos, eles saem em turminhas, ou
ficam can as empregadas. Os pais nao ligam pra onde
vao. E /uma vida social muito intensa, e nao da tempo.
There is a great distinction in the way people
from different cultural strata relate to each other.
We try to relate to people in our own cultural stratum.
If we were millionaires and wanted to penetrate the
rich class, we wouldn't have a chance.
It's a different
conversation, a different way of behaving . . . If we
were to meet? There would be trouble. The upper class
would not become involved.
We see life with more realii«, They are mors voluble, tell different jokes, take
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liberties with other women's husbands*
We give our
children more solid upbringings.
Theirs go out in
little gangs, or stay with the maids.
The parents
don't care where they go.
It's a very intense social
life, and they don't have time.
J.

A empregada sai, ta* dificil.
Tenho medo de
ladra, de tudo. Tem de pegar as chucas la^ do interior
quando nao sabem nada, e depois vab embora.
Eu tenho
de ensinar como escovar dente, usar Modess, desodorizante.
E as melhores sao muito exigentes.
Ja' nao posso mandar,
tem de pedir . . .
Maids leave and it's difficult.
I am afraid of
getting a thief, everything.
I have to get the hill
billies from the interior, who don't know anything,
and then they go away.
I have to teach them to brush
their teeth, use Modess, deodorant. And the best are
very demanding.
I can't order them anymore, I have
to ask them . . .
Salario minimo nao e obrigado, ferias remuneradas a crite'rio do remunerador.
Nao e obrigado estipular .
horario de servipo.
Vai ser obrigado recolher pro INP3
uma porcentagem do salario.
Them de trabalhar doze
mezes consecutivos. E dificil, que empregada geralmente
nao para.
Ouvi no radio . . .
a impossivel, cada casa
tem tipo de vidjt diferente, nao pode com tanta diferen^a.
Por enquanto nao deve ser salario minimo. Que nab sab
boas, voce ensina, ajuda, e dai ela vai procurer um
emprego melhor. At^ que voce ensina tudo, e^uma luta.
E^quando ta jeitosinha, ela da o fora--pra que salario
minimo.
A minimum wage /for domestic servants/ is not
required, paid vacations are at the discretion of the
employer.
One is not obliged to stipulate working
hours.
One will be obliged /by the government/ to
collect a percentage of their salaries for INPS /"Social
Security/, but they have to work fin one place/ for
twelve consecutive months, and it's hard, because maids
generally don't stay /that long/.
I heard all this on the
radio . . . it's impossible, every house has a different
kind of life and there can be no /regulations/ with such
differences.
For the time being they should not receive
minimum wages.
They are no good, you teach them, help
them, and then she leaves to find a better job. And it's
a struggle to teach them. And when she knows how to do
things nicely, she leaves.
What do you want to give
them a minimum wage for?
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K.

The following is a condensation of notes made
on the three spiritist sessions which X attended:
Cel. Paulo and D. Maria had come early to take
me to the session. D. Maria had been to the hairdresser.
They wanted to meet me, interview me, explain about
spiritism, and warn me not to be frightened at any
noises I might hear or perturbations (perturbaeoes)
I might feel._ They explained that their cent&r was
part of the Sao Paulo Federation of Spiritists, which
had a day care center, an orphanage, a school tor
retarded children, all of which were run on contribu
tions by the members as well as by the government.
Then Cel. Paulo explained that every person had a
spirit which survived the body's death: that happiness
was impossible in this world, which was a place for
expiation. Spirits were reincarnated into this world
until they had progressed and then they moved on to
a higher plane.
The object of the sessions we were
attending was to help the spirits who had left this
world, to tell those spirits who might not know it
that they were dead and no longer of this world.
These
spirits, in their ignorance, could harm living people.
Healing sessions, dealing specifically with the ills
inflicted by spirits on the living oec cored on sepa
rate occasions.
When we arrived at the center '•passes1' were being
done to the people entering the garage for the meeting.
The mediums closed their eyes, felt the vibrations of
the person being "passed" and performed a series of
wiping gestures around the person's body. This was
explained to me as a kind of blessing and cleansing of
the spirit. Fifty to sixty people, of which twelve were
men, were "passed." When everyone was in the garage,
the mediums "passed" each other, came into the garage
and sat around the table.
The ceremony opened with a general talk by Cel.
Paulo on the amount of misery and unemployment in
Sao Paulo, on the need for tolerance of people of
color, including Indians, and on how evil spirits should
be considered as children to be led and shown the light
of reason. The president and the government wore
blessed. The talk closed with a warning that any emo
tional disturbances that the assistentes might feel
during the session were not to be confused with medionidade. or the ability to receive spirits. This
ability required a great deal of control and training.
He sat, the record was changed to another religious
piece and one of the mediums stood to explain that in
addition to the incorporation of spirits, the mediums
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were also going to write and draw what
dictate* She sat, and for a while the
quiet, except for coughs and shifts of
the assistentes. The mediums sat w i t h

a spirit might
room was
position among
bowed heads.

Slowly the room became noisy w i t h unintelligible
speech. On one occasion the noise was increased by
rain on the tin roof which also leaked in spots.
It
was hard to tell which medium had been possessed. The
noise grew louder and it was possible to follow only
one or two spirits at a time because of it. A young
man at the table was possessed by the spirit of a
gambler.
He rocked back and forth repeating M£u oreIgfifHTn W, B F S g i S , " U must gamble, I must
gamble). Others were possessed by spirits whose
bodies had died in automobile accidents and the direc
trix would quiet their sobbing by telling them they
were dead. Periodically the room was filled with
sobbing, both from the mediums and from the assistentes.
and with uncontrolled laughter.
One spirit was par
ticularly troublesome.
He had possessed D. Maria, whose voice became
harsh and guttural. Much of what he said I could not
understand. The directrix's explanations that he was
dead would not quieten him.
He demanded eacha^a (cane
liquor) and screamed 11Eu nao peeo. eu m ando. eu__sou
Paus11 (I don't ask, I command, I am God). After much
laughter and unintelligible shouting he said 11Eu sou
o aue sou. um trabalbador** (I am that 1 am, a worker).
The directrix seemed to become very angry and said
loudly 11Voce ia falou demajg. vai.embgra11 (You have
spoken too much, go away).
He did so, but only after
some grumbling and cackling, and 0. Maria was returned
to herself.
Slowly the other spirits subsided. The room was
silent for a second and then a number of the assistentes
began to weep quietly. Cel. Paulo rose and read a
list of names of people who had died recently and whose
spirits needed help. Then the two mediums who had been
writing read their pieces.
One had as a theme "ainda
se fa la nas f lores11 (flowers are still spoken of),
which was repeated between references to unemployment
and political strife. After this the mediums who had
been drawing exhibited primitive sketches by the spi
rits who had possessed them. One was a picture of a
black slave being beaten and another was of a baby in
the womb. The medium who had "drawn" the latter was a
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young pregnant woman, and she and others believed she
had been possessed by the spirit of her unborn child.
Many of the assistentes were amazed at the draw
ings and repeated among themselves “Mais eu sei que
nao sao artistes** (but I know they aren't artists with the implication that only spirits could have made
them draw). The assistentes were asked if they had
seen anything. A sallow young man in his early twen
ties said he had seen colors, lights and rain, a holy
bath, and flowers over the writing and drawing mediums.
It had been very dark, he said, in the areas where the
mediums were physically possessed. A n older woman
mumbled her agreement.
“hen it was clear that no one
had more to add, a closing prayer was said, again to
Gounod's Ave Maria.
In the car, on the way back, Cel. Paulo and D.
Maria were anxious that 1 had not been frightened and
were mildly apologetic at the low order of spirits
who had appeared that day. On subsequent occasions,
when the spirits were of just as "low” an order, they
explained in great detail that these mandoes. or bossy
spirits, were responsible for the political strife in
Sao Paulo.
I asked what they meant and they told me
they meant the terrorists and the strikers, although no
spirit of a terrorist or a striker had ever appeared
at their sessions, and the last great strike in Sao
Paulo ocurred in 1968 (Weffort, 1968).
L.

A maioria de Sao Paulo e da classe media.
pobres de antigamente sao agora os medios.
Most of Sab Paulo is middle class.
the old days are now the middle class.

Os

The poor of

Sao Paulo tem mudade bastante, acho que os anseios
da classe media s£b bem diferente
Ha vinte anos atras ,
a classe media pensava somente em economizer o sen
dinheirinho, numa casinha, o carrinho:
agora e viagems,
uma vida bem sossegada.
Sao Paulo has changed a lot.
I think the anxieties
of the middle class are very different now. Twenty
years ago the middle class thought only of economizing
a little money, a little house, a little car. Now
it?s trips, a very relaxed life.
Ha vinte anos atras, Sao Paulo era cidade mopta.
Depois de '30, Sao Paulo cresceu por causa da industria,
o comercio desenvolveu. Sao Paulo creceu desordenadamente, e comeparam surgir as classes.
Naquele tempo,
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so havia tres classes, alta, media e baixa.^ Agora a
classe media cresceu tremendamente: temos tres subdivisoes da classe media, a media alta, a media media e
a media baixa. A media alta tem propriedade, um ordenado muito alto.
Nab e rico, mas tem meios pra
aplicar o dinheiro^ Um funcionario publico alto, por
exemplo, o Cel. Joao ... ele nao a rico, mas ganha
bem, tem varias construpoes. A classe media ampliou
bastante. Agora a maioria de Sab Paulo e da classe
media.
Twenty years ago, Sao Paulo was a dead city. After
*30 it grew because of industry and commerce developed.
Sao Paulo grew in a disorderly manner, and the classes
began to emerge. At that time there were only three
classes, the high, the middle and the lower. Now the
middle class has grown tremendously. We have three
subdivisions of the middle class, the upper middle, the
middle middle, and the lower middle. The upper middle
class has property, a high salary. Such a person is
not rich, but he has the means to invest money. A
high public servant, for instance, Cel. Joao fa neigh
bor/. • . he isn't rich, but he earns well, has various
constructions. The middle class has grown a lot. Now
most of Sao Paulo is middle class.
Sao Paulo ,tem uma elite que e uma minorla. A
classe media ta no meio e ta sempre crescendo. Depois
e o proletariado, que grapas a eles tem esse progresso,
e os par las que vem de outros lugares, pens am que Sao
Paulo e uma Nova Colorado e formam essas favelas.
Eu
enxergo assim no meu mundo. Pode ser que seja
diferente.
Sab Paulo has an elite, which is a minority, The
middle class is in the middle and const.a ntly growing.
Then there is the proletariat, thanks to whom there is
this progress, and the pariahs who come from other
places thinking that Sao Paulo is a New Colorado /Ame
rica/ and form these favelas.
In my world this is the
way I see it.
It may be different.
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